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SYSTEM OF COUNTERACTING POTENTIAL THREATS TO UKRAINE'S MILITARY SECURITY AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF CHANGES IN GEOPOLITICAL POSITIONS AND GEOSTRATEGIC TASKS

SYSTEM PRZECIWDZIAŁANIA POTENCJALNYM ZAGROŻENIOM BEZPIECZEŃSTWA MILITARNEGO UKRAINY NA TLE ZMIAN POZYCJI GEOPOLITYCZNYCH I ZADAŃ GEOSTRATEGICZNYCH

Abstract: The problems of interaction between the main components of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine are considered: security and defence forces, both in peacetime and in wartime. The normative-legal documents defining the tasks and purpose of the Armed Forces are analysed, and their functions are outlined, which are reflected in the new strategic documents. It is shown that the aggravation of the socio-political situation in Ukraine, the intensification of anti-state and separatist movements in the occupied and adjacent territories were the result of information pressure as a special operation and direct Russian intervention in socio-political processes in our country, confrontation with which requires the accumulation of efforts of all components in the Security and Defence Sector. In this context, the threats to Ukraine are seen as hybrid, comprehensive, all-encompassing and such that their scale extends not only to Ukraine but also to the European community as a whole. The tasks of the state military policy on the implementation of the provisions of the new National Security Strategy of Ukraine have been determined.

Zarys treści: Rozpatrywane są problemy interakcji pomiędzy głównymi komponentami Sektora Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Ukrainy: siłami bezpieczeństwa i obrony, zarówno w czasie pokoju, jak i wojny. Analizowane są dokumenty normatywno-prawne określające zadania i cel Sił Zbrojnych oraz nakreślone są ich funkcje, które znajdują odzwierciedlenie w nowych dokumentach strategicznych. Wykazano, że pogorszenie sytuacji społeczno-politycznej na Ukrainie, nasilenie ruchów antypaństwowych i separatystycznych na terytoriach okupowanych i przyległych było wynikiem nacisku informacyjnego jako operacji specjalnej i bezpośredniej rosyjskiej interwencji w procesy społeczno-polityczne w naszego kraju, z którym konfrontacja

wymaga kumulacji wysiłków wszystkich komponentów w Sektorze Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony. W tym kontekście zagrożenia dla Ukrainy postrzegane są jako hybrydowe, kompleksowe, wszechogarniające i takie, że ich skala rozciąga się nie tylko na Ukrainę, ale także na całą wspólnotę europejską. Określono zadania polityki wojskowej państwa w zakresie realizacji postanowień nowej Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Ukrainy.

Key words: military security, national security, national security strategy, military power, security and defence sector

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo militarne, bezpieczeństwo narodowe, narodowa strategia bezpieczeństwa, siły militarne, sektor bezpieczeństwa i obrony

Introduction

The Russian Federation's interference in Ukraine's internal affairs, intensification of its intelligence activities, increasing informational and psychological pressure to destabilize the socio-political situation and direct military aggression have led to a breach of Ukraine's military security. Preparation to counter threats of a hybrid-military nature requires a more thorough and comprehensive approach in comparison with the time of contractual peace, keeping a flexible balance and coordination between civilian and military resources of the country, depending on the nature of the threat. Military security is characterized by a state's ability to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability from incursion (invasion) by military force. At the same time, this system should rely on its own forces. Russia's aggression against Ukraine requires a change in the approach to ensuring Ukraine's military security as part of national security.

Ukraine's military security is based on the National Security Strategy, the new version of which was adopted in September 2020 (hereinafter – Strategy). The new Strategy replaced the 2015 document, which was adopted under the conditions of a sharp change in the political and military situation caused by Russian aggression. The new Strategy identified the most important national security issues in terms of managing the security and defence area. It became the basis for developing strategic plans and programmes in this sector.

The core ideology of the National Security Strategy is to move away from the notion of an abstract 'security state' toward creating a triumvirate of 'containment, resilience, interaction'. This approach opens up more opportunities to modernize the security sector and respond more flexibly to new threats and challenges. The strategy provides for the development of 15 strategic documents, among which the Military Security Strategy of Ukraine occupies an important place. These documents should provide a substantive complement that outlines effective ways to combat hostile activities. The implementation of their content will determine the extent to which the newly adopted strategic document will become an effective planning tool rather than a formal bureaucratic response.

Among the functions of state policy, military policy ensures the sustainability of progressive socio-economic development by protecting Ukraine from the use

of military force. There are many definitions of military policy that reflect its different aspects: purpose, place in public policy, components, topics of formation and implementation, etc. For example, Western scientific thought uses the term 'defence policy' instead of the term 'military policy'.¹

In this context an interesting position is presented by Bocharnikova and Sveshnikova. According to them, there are three approaches to military policy. The first is based on the understanding of military policy as an activity aimed at ensuring military security. The second is based on the understanding of military policy as an activity aimed at ensuring defence capabilities. The third is based on the understanding of military policy as an activity aimed at resolving armed conflict.²

The position that recognizes that military activity is aimed at the resolution of armed conflict seems the most appropriate. This is supported by the fact that the category of armed conflict is primary in comparison with the categories of military security or defence capabilities. According to the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, this policy, as an integral part of the state security policy, is directly related to the prevention of armed conflicts, preparation of the state for participation in them, as well as the use of military force to achieve its own political goals and ensure national interests³. These elements are also called areas of military policy and are centred around the category of armed conflict. Thus, the object of military policy is armed conflict, and its object is threefold: prevention of armed conflict, preparation for participation in armed conflict and actual participation in it.⁴ In this perspective, it is possible to agree with the authors' position, at the same time it is expedient to follow the definitions of normative-legal documents that define the official position of the state.

The military policy of Ukraine defines the activities of national security entities related to the prevention of armed conflict, the organization and implementation of military construction and training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the State Service of Special Transport and others under the law of Ukraine on military formations, law enforcement agencies of special purpose for the armed protection of national interests. This is the definition given by the current military doctrine of Ukraine of 2015⁵. Compared with the previous doctrines of 2004 and 2012, there were no changes in the definition of military policy.⁶

¹ S.V. Svyeshnikov, V.P. Bocharnikov, *Voyenna polityka: sutnist' i problemy formuvannya y realizatsiyi*, "Nauka i oborona" 2018, № 1, s. 23–28.

² *Ibidem*, s. 24.

³ *Voyenna doktryna Ukrainy: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 15 chervnya 2004 r.*, № 648, Ofitsiyyny visnyk Ukrainy 2004, № 30, St. 2005. *Voyenna doktryna Ukrainy: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 24 veresnya 2015 r.*, № 555/2015, <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5552015-19443>, [access: 04.12.2021].

⁴ S.V. Svyeshnikov, V.P. Bocharnikov, *Voyenna polityka: sutnist' i problemy formuvannya y realizatsiyi*, "Nauka i oborona" 2018, № 1, s. 25.

⁵ *Voyenna doktryna Ukrainy: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 24 veresnya 2015 r.* № 555/2015, <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5552015-19443>, [access: 04.12.2021].

⁶ *Voyenna doktryna Ukrainy: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 15 chervnya 2004 r.* № 648, Ofitsiyyny visnyk Ukrainy 2004, № 30, St. 2005.

Military policy ensures the realization of the fundamental interests of the nation and determines, first, that without their realization other interests of the state cannot be realized, and second, that in peacetime military policy must constantly monitor the state of the vast majority of spheres of life. On the other hand, and in time of war almost all public policy should be focused on the implementation of war policy.⁷

Military policy is focused on the military doctrine adopted in the state for a specific period of time and defines the system of official views and regulations adopted in the state that determine the main directions of military construction, the conditions of preparation of the state and armed forces for war, the means and forms of warfare.⁸

The main provisions of military doctrine are shaped and changed according to the politics and social order, the level of development of the productive forces, new scientific achievements and the nature of the expected war. In fact, military doctrine is the ideological core of all military and political activities of the state, political parties, public organizations and institutions. It concerns the interests of the public and all government agencies. In general, doctrinal issues are reflected in various legal acts and combat and military documents.

Realizacja postanowień Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Ukrainy

Russia's aggression caused Ukraine to revise its approach to ensuring the defence and territorial integrity of the country and forced the adoption of a new military doctrine that abolished Ukraine's non-aligned status. The military doctrine adopted in 2015 defined the main directions of the state's military policy under conditions of Russian aggression. In 2015, the National Security Strategy⁹, the Concept of Development of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine¹⁰ and the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine,¹¹ the Concept of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2020 and the Comprehensive (State) Programme of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2020 were adopted.¹²

⁷ S.V. Svyeshnikov, V.P. Bocharnikov, *Voyenna polityka: sutnist' i problemy formuvannya y realizatsiyi*, "Nauka i oborona" 2018, № 1, s. 23.

⁸ *Vplyv hlobal'nykh politychnykh, enerhoresursnykh ta ekolohichnykh zmin na voyennu bezpeku derzhavy: monohrafiya* / V.V. Zubaryev, O.P. Kutovyy, O.O. Sverhunov, S.M. Khymchenko, Kyiv: Intertekhnolohiya, 2009, s. 256.

⁹ *Voyenna doktryna Ukrayiny: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid 24 veresnya 2015 r. № 555/2015*, <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5552015-19443>, [access: 04.12.2021].

¹⁰ A. Kalyayev, L. Novak-Kalyayeva, T. Stukalin, V. Motorny, L. Rudenko, *Imperatives of global governance in the field of military security: the European context and Ukraine*, Khalid S. Soliman (ed.) / *Innovation Management and Sustainable Economic Development in the Era of Global Pandemic*, Proceedings of the 38th International Business Information Management Association Conference (IBIMA) 23–24 November 2021, Sevilla, Spain, p. 1560–1569, ISSN: 2767-9640, [access: 04.12.2021].

¹¹ *Interpretatsiyi rosiys'ko-ukrayins'koho konfliktu v zakhidnykh naukovykh i ekspertno-analitychnykh pratsyakh* / V. Kulyka (red.), Kyiv: IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny, 2020, 328, s. 7, ISBN 978-966-02-9220-8.

¹² *Derzhavna prohrama rozvytku Zbroynykh Syl Ukrayiny na period do 2020 r.*, https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/oboron_plans/National-program-2020_uk.pdf, [access: 04.12.2021].

The novelty of the Military Doctrine was a move away from a policy of non-alignment and a resumption of the strategic course of Euro-Atlantic integration, shifting the emphasis in the conduct of armed conflict to the integrated use of military and non-military instruments. Ukraine's military doctrine separately provides for readiness to counter new methods of conducting armed conflict. It includes not only the unconventional (hybrid) war that Russia is waging in Donbass, but also countering information and disinformation campaigns, economic warfare, psychological campaigns, etc. In today's globalized world, these issues may be even more important than direct military intervention. The doctrine set itself the task of relocating military units and formations and creating an adequate military infrastructure in the eastern and southern regions of the country.¹³

The 2015 Military Doctrine became the basis for future changes in the field of military security. On its basis, programme documents were developed, first of all, the programme for the development of the Armed Forces and the programme for the development of weapons and military equipment. Such programmes were developed until 2020. According to the Ministry of Defence, for various reasons, these programmes are only 70–75 percent implemented.¹⁴

Changes in the military-political situation both around Ukraine and in the world led to the adoption of a new version of the national security strategy in 2020 and, based on it, other strategic documents based on European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

In official statements, Western political leaders agree that Russia's actions pose a threat to regional and even global security. However, there is obvious uncertainty about the assessment of Moscow's strategic goals by Western political elites evaluating the Russian threat.¹⁵ There is a tendency in publications by Western analysts to avoid critical analysis of the consequences of the conflict in Ukraine for European security. Even leading liberal scholars only urge the West to respond to the challenge of Putinism, but do not offer any concrete ideas.¹⁶ Moreover, the Russian propaganda

¹³ L. Novak-Kalyayeva, *National unity and territorial identity in Ukraine: problems of acceptance* // Processes of Integration and Disintegration in the European and Eurasian Space: The Geographical Context / edited by Cezary Mądry – Poznań: Bogucki Wydawnictwo Naukowe 2017, 230, p. 125–139, (1 др.арк.) ISBN 978-83-7986-146-0; L. Novak-Kalyayeva, *Hybrydowe wojna/pokój na Wschodzie Ukrainy jako czynniki bezpieczeństwa Europejskiego* // *Bezpieczeństwo państw Europy Środkowowschodniej w kontekście konfliktu na Ukrainie*, T. Pączek (red.), Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Społeczno-Prawne 2016, 502, s. 41–61 (1 др.арк.), ISBN 978-83-943337-9-9.

¹⁴ YU. Servetnyk, *Syly spetsial'nykh operatsiy – yikh rol' ta mistse v modeli suchasnykh zbroynykh syl*, http://www.r-studies.org/cms/index.php?action=news/view_details&news_id=8280&lang=ukr, [access: 04.12.2021]; *Shchodo kontseptsiyi zabezpechennya natsional'noyi stiykosti v Ukraini. Analitychna zapyska*, NISD, Seriya "Natsional'na bezpeka" 2020, № 8, s. 11–18.

¹⁵ K. Smahliy, *Hibrydna analityka: Prokremlivs'ka propahanda ekspertiv u Moskvi, Yevropi ta SSHA: Tematychno doslidzhennya analitychnykh isentriv ta universytetiv*, Instytut suchasnoyi Rosiyi 2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f8f41ef14aa13b95239af0/t/5c6d8b38b208fc7087fd2b2a/1550682943143/Smagliy_Hybrid-Analitics_10-2018_upd.pdf, [access: 04.12.2021].

¹⁶ A. Baratta, *Putting an accent on the future: Global Strategic Trends: The Future Starts Today*, Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre 2017, <https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/>

machine is more effective than the Ukrainian media, for both objective and subjective reasons. Leading analysts of Western countries are much more likely to rely on Russian sources than Ukrainian ones, since the former are much more often translated into Western languages and Russian is much more frequently used by Western analysts and readers than Ukrainian. Moreover, analysts rely on scholarly works by authoritative Western experts who are much more marked by Russian than Ukrainian influences and not only because of their different linguistic skills, but also because of their well-established views on the history and politics of Eastern Europe, where Russia has a prominent place. This is why one can so often find dubious, untrue and openly provocative allegations in Western academic and expert-analytic publications about the division of Ukraine into a Ukrainian-speaking West and a Russian-speaking East, the insurmountable closeness of eastern Ukraine to Russia and the dominance of radical nationalists and fascists in western Ukraine.¹⁷

The transformation of Ukraine from an object to a subject of international politics

The analysis of Western scientific and analytical publications on the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict is constantly in the spotlight. In particular, it is worth mentioning the article by Yu Matsievsky, who interprets the factors of the conflict in the Donbass on the basis of the work of Ukrainian, Russian and Western scientists, and provides the assessment of Ukrainian experts on the importance of these factors.¹⁸ A large-scale study was conducted by a group of Ukrainian researchers led by M. Karmazina.¹⁹ This group reviewed scientific, expert-analytical and media publications from various Western and post-Soviet countries on the situation and prospects of Ukraine in the context of the war in Donbass. K. Smagliya's in-depth analysis focuses on the activities of think tanks in Russia and the West, created or maintained by the Russian authorities to promote their views and justify their actions. The author tries to cover all areas of pro-Kremlin 'hybrid analytics'.²⁰

en/publications/putting-an-accent-on-the-future(c943a52a-c8e1-473f-bf16-56afa6ed6c63).html, [access: 02.03.2022].

¹⁷ *Interpretatsiyi rosiys'ko-ukrayins'koho konfliktu v zakhidnykh naukovykh i ekspertno-analitychnykh pratsyakh* / V. Kulyka (red.), Kyiv: IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2020, 328, s. 7, ISBN 978-966-02-9220-8.

¹⁸ YU. Matsiyevs'kyi, *Vnutrishniy konflikt chy prykhovana ahresiya: akademichna dyskusiya i ekspertni otsinky viiny na Donbasi*, Politychne zhyttya 2019, № 2, s. 55–68, DOI 10.31558/2519-2949.2019.2.9, https://eprints.oa.edu.ua/7875/1/9.10.2019_Internal%20conflict%20or%20hidden%20agression_%20Matsiyevsky.pdf. 199.

¹⁹ M. Karmazina, T. Bevz, N. Rotar, V. Napadysta, *Vyklyky y intehratsiyni perspektyvy Ukrainy v konteksti rosiys'koyi ahresiyi v Krymu ta Donbasi: analiz otsinok zarubizhnykh analitykiv i ekspertiv*, Kyiv: IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2017, s. 184.

²⁰ K. Smahliy, *Hibrydna analityka: Prokremlivs'ka propahanda ekspertiv u Moskvi, Yevropi ta SSHA: Tematyчне doslidzhennya analitychnykh tsestriv ta universytetiv*, Instytut suchasnoyi Rosiyi 2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f8f41ef14aa13b95239af0/t/5c6d8b38b208fc7087fd2b2a/1550682943143/Smagliy_Hybrid-Analytica_10-2018_upd.pdf, [access: 04.12.2021].

On the other hand, the collections edited by A. Hertel present the views on the 'Ukrainian crisis' of Western scholars and in particular of the 'Visegrad Four'. However, for policy analysis the works of scientists and experts of think tanks are more relevant.²¹ The work of scientists from the Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine²² significantly broadens the analytical horizon. This is because it covers seven different Western countries and systematically analyses them using common methods to compare results and identify the cause of differences.

Europeans' attitudes towards Ukraine are shaped by the materials of their national think tanks and mass media. Thus, the ambiguity of the results is confirmed by data from an opinion poll conducted by the New Europe Center in several major European countries. The general aim of the survey was to find out public opinion on Ukraine, as well as to identify the most frequent associations with the Ukrainian state. According to the results of the survey, the positions on Ukraine are worth noting, for example, that Ukraine is mainly associated with war. At the same time, in 2020 Ukraine is less associated with war and conflict. In 2015, 49% of respondents associated Ukraine with war, while in 2020 the number of such respondents decreased to 12%.²³ Ukraine is increasingly associated with immigrants. In 2015, the number of such statements was small. In 2020, this is the third most popular association with Ukraine (mentioned by 10.3% of respondents). This indicates a growing trend of migration from Ukraine in search of better jobs in the EU. The majority of respondents have negative associations with the Ukrainian state and this trend can be observed in all countries surveyed. The exception is Italy, which has more positive and neutral associations with Ukraine than any other country. An interesting observation is that 23.6% of respondents have no associations with Ukraine. This is also positive news because these respondents can be informed about Ukraine and promote positive associations.

There was no consensus among respondents on how to help Ukraine during the pandemic. Overall, about half of respondents believe that countries should maintain or intensify cooperation at current levels, while the other half believe that cooperation should be limited or focused on their own countries' problems. However, Russian narratives about Ukraine in the surveyed countries have proven ineffective. Only 0.8% of

²¹ A. Härtel (ed.), *EU member states national perspectives on the "Ukraine crisis"*, Ideology and Politics 2017, 1(7), [https://ideopol.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/1.0.ENG_IPJ%201\(7\)%202017Final.pdf](https://ideopol.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/1.0.ENG_IPJ%201(7)%202017Final.pdf), [access: 04.12.2021].

²² *Interpretatsiyi rosiys'ko-ukrayins'koho konfliktu v zakhidnykh naukovykh i ekspertno-analitychnykh pratsyakh / za V. Kulyka (red.)*, Kyiv: IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny, 2020, 328, s. 7, ISBN 978-966-02-9220-8.

²³ L. Litra, *Tak – perspektyvi chlenstva, ni – dopomozhi zbrojeyu: yakymy u YES bachat' vidnosyny z Ukrayinoyu*, Yevropeys'ka pravda, 18 Lystopada 2020, Tsentr "Nova Yevropa", <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2020/11/18/7116664/>, [access: 04.12.2021]; A. Kalyayev, L. Novak-Kalyayeva, T. Stukalin, V. Motorny, L. Rudenko, *Imperatives of global governance in the field of military security: the European context and Ukraine*, S. Soliman Khalid (ed.), *Innovation Management and Sustainable Economic Development in the Era of Global Pandemic*, Proceedings of the 38th International Business Information Management Association Conference (IBIMA) 23–24 November 2021, Sevilla, Spain, p. 1560–1569, ISSN: 2767-9640.

respondents believe that Ukrainians are waging a civil war, and less than 0.2% among those who consider Ukraine an extremist or fascist country.²⁴

As in 2015, the survey found that the biggest obstacle to Ukraine's EU membership is corruption, the fight against which is a priority for 43.1% of respondents in 2020 (37.5% – in 2015). The majority of respondents (55%) support Ukraine's EU membership. Support for Ukraine's membership in NATO is also important (38%), but this answer did not receive majority support. In 2020, the number of respondents associating Ukraine with Russia is 9.1%, while just five years ago this category was twice as large (18%).²⁵ This indicates an awareness of Ukraine's clear separation from Russia – an acceptance of a Ukrainian state independent of Russia.

The most popular answer to support Ukraine against Russian aggression (21.5%) is the continuation of EU sanctions against Russia. Of course, respondents' answers were based on the national characteristics of their countries, which influenced the ranking of priorities. Thus, Poland associates Ukraine primarily with immigrants (25.8%) and poverty (25%), and only then with war. At the same time, in Germany and France the most popular associations are with Russia and war. Most French respondents (15.5%) associate Ukraine with Russia, war and conflict (13.1%) and Eastern Europe (10.6%). The three most common associations in Germany are associated with Russia (war, invasion of Crimea, and Russia), which accounts for almost half of the respondents (47.5%).²⁶

In the case of Germany and France, the popularity of associations with war can be explained by the fact that due to the role of Berlin and Paris in the Normandy format, the topic of Ukraine's war with Russia resonates more often in these countries than in others. In general, in France, Germany and Poland most of the top ten associations are negative. The situation is different in Italy, where the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian war is almost absent from public opinion – only 0.6% of respondents mention it. Italians are among those who have the most positive attitude towards Ukraine.²⁷

Among the ten most popular associations there is only one negative one ('immigrants/unemployment'), while the others are either neutral, like 'gas/energy', 'politics' or positive, like 'culture/history' or 'Ukrainian friends'. In European public opinion, eliminating corruption as the number one priority is an obstacle to Ukraine's EU membership. This answer is given in all countries surveyed, but the level of support

²⁴ L. Litra, *Tak – perspektyvi chlenstva, ni – dopomozi zbroyeyu: yakymy u YES bachat' vidnosyny z Ukrayinoyu*, Yevropeys'ka pravda, 18 Lystopada 2020, Tsentr "Nova Yevropa", <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2020/11/18/7116664/>, [access: 04.12.2021].

²⁵ K. Smahliy, *Hibrydna analityka: Prokremlivs'ka propahanda ekspertiv u Moskvi, Yevropi ta SSHA: Tematychno doslidzhennya analitychnykh tsentriv ta universytetiv*, Instytut suchasnoyi Rosiyi 2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f8f41ef14aa13b95239af0/t/5c6d8b38b208fc7087fd2b2a/1550682943143/Smagliy_Hybrid-Analytica_10-2018_upd.pdf, [access: 04.12.2021].

²⁶ L. Litra, *Tak – perspektyvi chlenstva, ni – dopomozi zbroyeyu: yakymy u YES bachat' vidnosyny z Ukrayinoyu*, Yevropeys'ka pravda, 18 Lystopada 2020, Tsentr "Nova Yevropa", <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2020/11/18/7116664/>, [access: 04.12.2021].

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

for it is different: the highest (over 58%) is in Germany, the lowest (although one of the priorities) is in Italy (29.1%). The second most important priority is to significantly improve the economy. All countries note strengthening the economy as a second priority, except for France, where restoring territorial integrity is considered more important. Overall, the public perception is that territorial integrity does not appear to be an obstacle to Ukraine's EU integration or is the least problematic in the ranking of the three options presented in the survey.

Support for Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO is not linear in the surveyed countries, the majority of respondents (55%) support Ukraine's membership in the European Union. At the same time, support for NATO reaches 38%, which means that this idea is not popular enough. On the other hand, the number of those who believe that Ukraine should not join the EU and NATO is at 28.5%.²⁸ Among the surveyed countries, Poland (69.5%) and Italy (61.6%) have significant support for Ukraine's EU membership. At the same time, in Germany (47%) and France (42.6%), the idea of Ukraine's EU membership did not receive majority support.²⁹

The idea of Ukraine's membership in NATO does not yet have majority support in all researched countries. France is the most open to Ukraine's NATO membership (39.9%), followed by Poland (33.3%) and Germany and Italy, which have the same support rates for this answer (31.3%). As for supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, most respondents prefer to continue sanctions against Russia (21.5% indicated this answer as a priority).

At the same time, a similar number of respondents choose 'offering Ukraine EU membership' as the top priority. Three countries believe that expanding sanctions against Russia should be a priority: Poland (23.3%), France (23.4%) and Germany (23.4%), showing almost absolute unity on this issue. The only country where the approach is different is Italy, which chose Ukraine's membership in the EU as a priority (24.1%), and only then set the extension of sanctions.³⁰

Quite often the option of providing financial support to Ukraine does not have significant support as a first priority, but many listed this option as a second and third priority. On the other hand, the least popular option among the highest priorities was the answer 'provide Ukraine with weapons' (only 2%). Analysing individual countries, we see that Poland has the highest number of supporters of arming Ukraine (5.1%), followed by France (2.9%), Germany (1.4%) and Italy (0.9%).³¹

The case of Germany is rather ambiguous: here the option 'not to support Ukraine at all' as the highest priority met with the sympathy of 13.1% of respondents, which is more than total support for the options 'to support financially' and 'to provide Ukraine

²⁸ *Ibidem.*

²⁹ *Ibidem.*

³⁰ *Ibidem.*

³¹ *Ibidem*; A. Kalyayev, L. Novak-Kalyayeva, T. Stukalin, V. Motorny, L. Rudenko, *Imperatives of global governance in the field of military security: the European context and Ukraine*, Soliman Khalid S (ed.) / *Innovation Management and Sustainable Economic Development in the Era of Global Pandemic*, Proceedings of the 38th International Business Information Management Association Conference (IBIMA) 23–24 November 2021, Sevilla, Spain, p. 1560–1569, ISSN: 2767-9640.

with weapons'. A similar situation is observed in France. This tendency does not occur in Italy and Poland³².

Thus, in the context of Ukraine's military security, this study shows that the priority in solving security issues should be determined by our country and that one can hope for more political, moral and psychological support from Europe and the United States.

If Ukraine can still hope for EU membership in the near future, the system of national security and defence, protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and border inviolability must be based on its own strength. At the same time, cooperation with the EU on the Common Security and Defence Policy is an important systemic element of Ukraine's European integration course. This should be the priority of military policy.

Military doctrine must formulate the state's response to military-political aggression, taking into account only its own resources and capabilities. We believe that the doctrine's emphasis on external support is inappropriate, especially after the guarantor countries violated the Budapest Memorandum. In contemporary conditions, there may also be factors that change the policies of the lead states.

An important element of this system is the security and defence sector of Ukraine, which functionally combines military formations, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and special services, their forces, means, and basic resources. Taking into account the current tendencies of complex manifestation of various types of fighting in modern conflicts and with limited state resources, the creation of a strong security and defence sector should become one of the priorities of Ukraine's security policy.³³

The adoption of the new National Security Strategy of Ukraine marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of security theory, due to the evolution of the concepts of security and defence of European states against the background of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The Strategy for the first time proclaimed the creation of a comprehensive defence system, requiring the involvement of all spheres of Ukrainian society in resolving military security issues. The new version of the National Security Strategy defines the priorities of national interests and national security of Ukraine, goals and main directions of state policy in the sphere of national security.

³² L. Litra, *Tak – perspektyvi chlenstva, ni – dopomozi zbroyeyu: yakymy u YES bachat' vidnosyny z Ukrainoyu*. Yevropeys'ka pravda, 18 Lystopada 2020, Tsentr "Nova Yevropa", <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2020/11/18/7116664/>, [access: 04.12.2021]; A. Kalyayev, L. Novak-Kalyayeva, T. Stukalin, V. Motornyy, L. Rudenko, *Imperatives of global governance in the field of military security: the European context and Ukraine*, S. Soliman Khalid (ed.) / *Innovation Management and Sustainable Economic Development in the Era of Global Pandemic*, Proceedings of the 38th International Business Information Management Association Conference (IBIMA) 23–24 November 2021, Sevilla, Spain, p. 1560–1569, ISSN: 2767-9640.

³³ O.I. Poshedin, *Voyenna bezpeka Ukrainy v konteksti spivrobitnystva z Yevropeys'kym Soyuzom*, Visnyk Natsional'noyi akademiyi derzhavnoho upravlinnya pry Prezydentovi Ukrainy 2014, № 3, s. 57.

It is based on the following basic principles:

- deterrence – development of defence and security capabilities to prevent armed aggression against Ukraine;
- resilience – the ability of society and the state to adapt quickly to changes in the security environment and maintain sustainable functioning, in particular by minimizing external and internal vulnerabilities;
- interoperability – development of strategic relations with key foreign partners, primarily the European Union and NATO and their member states, the United States of America, pragmatic cooperation with other states and international organizations based on Ukraine's national interests.

The priorities of Ukraine's national interests and national security are: maintenance of state independence and sovereignty; restoration of territorial integrity within the internationally recognized state border of Ukraine; social development, especially human capital development, protection of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Ukrainian citizens; European and Euro-Atlantic integration.³⁴

Implementation of these priorities will be ensured, among others, in areas related to the military policy of the state and its military security. This is primarily the strengthening of the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other bodies of the security and defence sector.

On the list of threats is that, despite the continuation of Russian aggression and occupation of Ukraine, the current rate of rearmament of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the Armed Forces are not among the latest (modernized) models and will not meet the main needs for weapons and military equipment, which will be exhausted in the near future.

The growing shortage of financial resources complicates the allocation of resources to ensure the production and purchase of the necessary modern weapons and military equipment, which, combined with the imbalance of military capabilities of Ukraine and Russia, forces the development of a new strategy for military security and the nature of modern armed conflicts, the principles and ways to prevent their occurrence, to prepare the state for a possible armed conflict, as well as the use of military force to protect state sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital national interests.

The Draft Military Security Strategy defines the objectives, priorities and ways of implementing the state policy in the sphere of state security and defence in the part related to ensuring military security. The document is also the basis for the development of the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine, programme documents on defence and development of defence forces, development of military weapons and equipment, as well as the Defence Plan of Ukraine and plans for the use of defence forces.

The military security strategy is intended to replace the military doctrine of Ukraine and is being developed for the first time. It proposes consolidating the concept

³⁴ Pro rishennya Rady natsional'noyi bezpeky i oborony Ukrayiny vid 06 travnya 2015 r. "Pro Stratehiyu natsional'noyi bezpeky Ukrayiny": Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid 26 travnya 2015 r., № 287/2015, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/287/2015>, Article 4, [access: 04.12.2021].

of comprehensive defence and to involve not only the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but also all elements of the security and defence sector and civil society. The peculiarity of this strategy is that it applies the principle of comprehensive or total defence. This means that not only the defence forces will be involved in the defence of the country, but the entire Ukrainian society and all public authorities, which must oppose the enemy throughout Ukraine, using all forms and methods of struggle with respect to the principles and norms of international law. In other words, at a certain stage of the conflict only the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be used. If the potential of the Armed Forces is not enough to neutralize this threat, all defence forces (all security forces) will be engaged. If these resources are not enough, the defensive forces of the state will be involved in defence and a resistance movement will be launched, directing all financial and material resources to neutralize the threat. An important role in the draft of the new Military Security Strategy is played by the international component – political and material support of foreign partners in the fight against the aggressor. This document will define five strategic objectives to achieve further development of the Armed Forces and other components of the Armed Forces.³⁵

The first goal is effective defence management. This means that the Ministry of Defence must create a regulatory framework, set clear priorities and effectively allocate available resources for the successful development of the Armed Forces. To accomplish these tasks, it is necessary to create an optimal number and function of the Ministry of Defence that does not duplicate the tasks of the General Staff and other structures. The second objective is human resources. In the Armed Forces should serve highly professional personnel with appropriate moral qualities, a new philosophy and an active social position. The third objective is the modernization and improvement of weapons and military equipment. I will point out that this is probably the most critical problem that requires large investments. The fourth goal is to create a military infrastructure. Unfortunately, this issue had not been given due attention before. In recent years there have been significant changes in the security environment, and all major threats do not emanate from the West (as in Soviet times), but from the East. Therefore, it is necessary to completely reconfigure the military infrastructure. A separate issue – the creation of normal living and service conditions for our soldiers – this is an urgent task. And the fifth goal, for the achievement of which all the previous goals must be achieved, is to increase the ability of the armed forces to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine.

In our opinion, this is the most rational in the context of the existing military threat to national security, given the imbalance of military potentials of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

According to the authors of the draft new military security strategy, the nature of the direct military threats to Ukraine are:

- armed aggression and violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine (temporary Russian occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol

³⁵ *Stratehiya voyennoyi bezpeky. Proyekt*, https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/public_discussion/proj_vdu.pdf, [access: 04.12.2021].

and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions), increasing the military power of the Russian Federation in these territories and in the immediate vicinity of the borders of Ukraine, including the potential deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea;

- militarization of the Russian Federation in the occupied territories through the creation of new military formations and units, as well as the supply of fighters, military equipment and logistics;
- the presence of a Russian military contingent in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, which can be used to destabilize the southern regions of Ukraine;
- construction of the Russian Federation near the state border of Ukraine, a group of troops with powerful offensive and offensive potential, the creation of new, expansion and modernization of existing bases, military infrastructure;
- intensification of special services of the Russian Federation intelligence and diversionary activities in Ukraine in order to destabilize the internal socio-political situation in Ukraine, as well as to support illegal activities in the east of Ukraine and create conditions for the escalation of armed aggression;
- activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of Ukraine aimed at destabilizing the internal socio-political situation in Ukraine, intimidation of the population, deprivation of freedom to resist, disruption of the functioning of public authorities, local governments, important industrial facilities and infrastructure;
- territorial claims of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and violation of Ukraine's sovereignty in some of its districts;
- use of the territory and airspace (maritime) of Ukraine for combat operations in the event of an armed conflict between NATO and Russia³⁶.

Taking into account the development trends and the nature of the military-political situation in the medium term, the most likely armed conflicts are conflicts over the use of the opponent's own armed forces and illegal armed groups, terrorist groups, mercenaries as a tool to achieve their own goals and interests. The probability of escalation of such conflicts into war will increase significantly. The above challenges and threats to Ukraine's military security can manifest in the following scenarios:

- full-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine with the conduct of land, air and naval operations with decisive military and political objectives;
- separate special operation of the Russian Federation against Ukraine with the use of separate military units and/or units, arson attacks, information, information and psychological operations (activities) in conjunction with the use of non-military means, including under the pretext of allegedly bringing in peacekeepers and their delimitation in the absence of a corresponding decision of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC);

³⁶ *Ibidem.*

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- blockade with the use of armed force of the seaports, coastline or airspace of Ukraine, violation of its communications by the Russian Federation;
 - armed conflict in the state, inspired by Russia's attempt to separate from Ukraine administrative-territorial units in the east, south-east and south of the state with the participation of illegal armed groups, terrorist groups in cooperation with political, non-governmental, ethnic, religious or other organizations;
 - armed conflict on the state border of Ukraine, in particular border armed incidents (provocations, clashes) with regular or irregular forces of the Russian Federation, illegal armed groups, etc.;
 - terrorist acts on the territory of Ukraine or against citizens of Ukraine, attempts on the lives of statesmen or public figures, representatives of foreign states (aimed at causing war or international complications), sabotage (including of critical infrastructure) and explosions, arson to the premises of public authorities and their seizure, kidnapping or hostage taking.

Threats to Ukraine's military security, if realized, could lead to a change in the constitutional order of Ukraine, further occupation of Ukraine or its separate territories, weakening of the central government, change in the administrative-territorial structure, direct or indirect control over Ukraine and loss of state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The main tasks in the field of military security of Ukraine

The main task in the field of military security is to develop deterrence capabilities. The unconditional priority is the Armed Forces of Ukraine in combat readiness, a prepared and motivated military reserve and effective territorial defence, which in combination with the capabilities of other bodies of the security and defence sector can inflict such unacceptable losses on the ground, in the air, at sea and in cyberspace in the event of aggressive intentions. The state must take into account the lessons of hybrid aggression against Ukraine and warfare in the Middle East in new doctrinal approaches to military security.

The main goal of Ukraine's military policy is to create conditions for the restoration of the territorial integrity of the state, its sovereignty and inviolability within the internationally recognized state border. Ukraine considers as the main objectives in the field of military policy:

- to repel the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine;
- to ensure the defence capabilities of Ukraine are at a level sufficient to prevent the emergence of an armed conflict, and in the event of an armed conflict to localize and neutralize it;
- to create a system for maintaining the military security of the state that would ensure that Ukraine is perceived at the international level as an equal actor in international relations and meets the criteria for Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO;

- reducing corruption in the system of state policy on state military security, which threatens Ukraine's ability to maintain defence capabilities.

Based on the principles of domestic and foreign policy, as well as on the nature of existing and potential national security threats, the main objectives of Ukraine's military policy in the near and medium term are:

- localizing and neutralizing in the shortest possible time the military-political crisis in eastern Ukraine, preventing its escalation into large-scale armed aggression;
- eliminating illegal armed groups and restoring full control of Ukraine's state border;
- reforming Ukraine's defence forces to achieve operational and technical compatibility with the armed forces of NATO countries, including through the implementation of NATO standards;
- creation of an integrated state security and defence sector as the main component of the military security system, integration of the capabilities of its components for timely and effective response to existing and potential threats;
- ensuring the capabilities of the defence forces needed to achieve military policy objectives.

In our opinion, the objectives of the task of the military strategy and military policy set out in the Draft correspond to the current state and medium-term forecast of the military-political situation and can be clarified on the basis of a gradual approach to changes in the security environment of the conditions of socio-economic development of Ukraine and the capabilities of the defence forces. Having created the conditions for the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity, the main objective of military policy will be to prevent new armed conflicts, systematically strengthen the defence capabilities of the state and increase its role and authority in the international arena. In the framework of the implementation of this Strategy, the state's military policy should ensure the rapid development of the Security and Defence Sector through innovative approaches that provide sufficient state defence capabilities to repel armed aggression and comprehensive reform of the national security system to a level acceptable for EU and NATO membership.

The complex realities of a globalized world have placed on the agenda the need to identify effective means and possible ways to enhance international and national security in the military sphere. The leadership of global governance structures and leading countries of the world offer various political, military, economic and other measures, the implementation of which would prevent the emergence of new wars and armed conflicts or their cessation with the least possible loss of human and material resources. Each country chooses its own path to deal with this complex problem.

Ukraine, under current conditions, is one of the leading players in the political arena of Europe and in the context of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine has chosen the path of European integration and membership in

collective security systems. The current Military Doctrine of Ukraine (2015) recognizes as significant military threats: Russia's armed aggression, including the temporary occupation of Crimea and aggression in some regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; the increase of the military power of the Russian Federation in the immediate vicinity of the state border, including the possibility of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea; the militarization of the temporarily occupied territory, the presence of the Russian military contingent in the Transnistrian region of Moldova, the intensification of intelligence activities of the Russian special services and diversionary activities in Ukraine to destabilize the internal situation³⁷. The military doctrine assumes that the key tasks of creating conditions for the restoration of state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine are comprehensive reforms of the national security system to a level acceptable for EU and NATO membership; the creation of an effective security and defence sector that will provide sufficient national defence capabilities to repel armed aggression, as well as the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine according to Western standards and achieving compatibility with the armed forces of NATO member states.³⁸

Although this doctrine was the first document defining the priorities of Ukraine's military security, the development of the military-political situation in the world has brought new threats to Ukraine's national interests, and therefore requires updating. The analytical report of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine³⁹ states that the current global crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic and the destructive policies of the Russian and U.S. administrations have exacerbated the deep contradictions and moved the existing global threats to a higher level. The main components of the 'new reality' are: the limited effectiveness of collective security systems against the background of the spread of the use of force in international relations and disregard for international law; attempts to revise the principles of free trade; competition against traditional financial systems by blockchain technologies, as well as the willingness of regional players, including Russia, to 'play on the contradictions' of the world's leading players without giving up the use of unprocessed natural resources as a tool of geopolitics. Some global and regional players are trying to use this to more aggressively advance their interests in areas of their strategic priority. In such actions, they do not neglect the possibility of artificially exacerbating crises in certain countries in order to further draw them into the orbit of their own influence and create conditions for provoking new local or regional crises (conflicts) in the future.

³⁷ *Voyenna doktryna Ukrainy: Ukaz Prezidenta Ukrainy vid 24 veresnya 2015 r., № 555/2015*, <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5552015-19443>, [access: 04.12.2021].

³⁸ A. Kalyayev, I. Surina, L. Rudenko, *Institutionalizing Global Governance in the Sphere of Security and Defense: The European Context* / Proceedings of the 36th IBIMA International Conference, 15–16 November 2020. Granada, p. 4564–4574, ISSN: 2767-9640; A. Kalyayev, *European realities of collective defense: NATO and the EU relations issues*, "Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem" 2020, № 5, s. 17–30, ISSN: 2543-7321.

³⁹ H.M. Yavors'ka, B.O. Parakhons'kyi, *Zovnishnya polityka Ukrainy v umovakh kryzy mizhnarodnoho bezpekovoho seredovyschcha: analit. dopovid*, Kyiv: NISD 2015, 100 (Ser. "Natsional'na (Ser. "Natsional'na bezpeka", vyp. 10), ISBN 978-966-554-250-6.s.

The main factors affecting the situation in the regional security sphere in the context of Ukrainian interests is the confirmed ineffectiveness of the main security institutions (UN, OSCE) in resolving regional conflicts. At the same time, there was a tendency to militarize the territories and waters bordering the borders of Ukraine while destroying the current system of international treaties on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, that is, greater influence on the regional security environment of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and other states seeking to achieve their ambitions, including the use of Ukrainian resources.

The response to new challenges and threats to the countries of the world should be the strengthening of its own security sector, membership in the collective security system and close international cooperation. At the same time, Ukraine must take into account a number of contradictory factors when determining its military policy and deciding on membership in the collective security system. On the one hand, preparing for armed conflicts on its own is economically burdensome, and participation in one bloc or another offers a chance to increase its own security and reduce the burden on the military component of its budget. On the other hand, participation in a military alliance increases the likelihood of a country's involvement in an inter-civilizational conflict and requires readiness to participate in the wars that the chosen bloc will fight. The requirements for adequate war preparedness of individual states will be determined by the leadership of the chosen collective security system, with less regard for their economic capabilities. In addition, independence in defence matters is lost to some extent. The level of each state's relationship with the collective security system is a key issue in forming the basis of its defence policy, and the strategic documents that define it must be democratically based on the political consensus of not only the major political parties but also civil society.

Ukraine has taken a major step toward deepening practical cooperation with NATO. The North Atlantic Council has granted it the status of an enhanced partner. Only five countries have such status, including Georgia, as well as EU member states Sweden and Finland. This status is a recognition of Ukraine's contribution to collective security on the continent and in the world.

In fact, the Eastern Partnership is one of the two main dimensions of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration. The Eastern Partnership platform includes many sustainable areas of strengthening cooperation in the context of promoting new goals and areas of security cooperation for Ukraine. These include cyber security, reintegration policy and countering contemporary hybrid and terrorist threats. Given the multifaceted nature and trivial number of EU security institutions, the cross-border nature of terrorist threats, and the common potential of challenges in this area, the Eastern Partnership is the best option for ongoing cooperation.

Meanwhile, Russia seeks to block such cooperation, both by provoking a split in Ukrainian society over NATO membership and by undermining Alliance unity.

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Summary

The technology of implementation of doctrines, strategies, concepts and programmes of state policy in the field of military security objectively integrates all elements of state political activity. They are based on sound theoretical principles and historical experience. The goals and tasks of Ukraine's military policy correspond to both the current state and the medium-term forecast of the military-political situation and are determined by changes in security, the conditions of socio-economic development and the capabilities of the defence forces. The priority task is to create an effective system of state military security. Such a system in Ukraine is in the process of creation. The use of the latest information and communication technologies for continuous monitoring and analysis of military threats allows for rapid strategic decision-making.