57System of counteracting potential threats to Ukraine’s military security against...
Larysa NOVAK-KALYAYEVA
Ukrainian State Employment Service Training Institute, Kyiv
Ukraine
ORCID : 0000-0002-2897-8858
novak.kalyayeva@gmail.com
SYSTEM OF COUNTERACTING POTENTIAL THREATS
TO UKRAINE’S MILITARY SECURITY AGAINST
THE BACKGROUND OF CHANGES IN GEOPOLITICAL
POSITIONS AND GEOSTRATEGIC TASKS
SYSTEM PRZECIWDZIAŁANIA POTENCJALNYM
ZAGROŻENIOM BEZPIECZEŃSTWA MILITARNEGO
UKRAINY NA TLE ZMIAN POZYCJI GEOPOLITYCZNYCH
I ZADAŃ GEOSTRATEGICZNYCH
Abstract: The problems of interaction between the main components of the Security and De-
fence Sector of Ukraine are considered: security and defence forces, both in peacetime and in
wartime. The normative-legal documents dening the tasks and purpose of the Armed For-
ces are analysed, and their functions are outlined, which are reected in the new strategic
documents. It is shown that the aggravation of the socio-political situation in Ukraine, the
intensication of anti-state and separatist movements in the occupied and adjacent territories
were the result of information pressure as a special operation and direct Russian intervention
in socio-political processes in our country, confrontation with which requires the accumulation
of eorts of all components in the Security and Defence Sector. In this context, the threats to
Ukraine are seen as hybrid, comprehensive, all-encompassing and such that their scale extends
not only to Ukraine but also to the European community as a whole. The tasks of the state mi-
litary policy on the implementation of the provisions of the new National Security Strategy of
Ukraine have been determined.
Zarys treści: Rozpatrywane są problemy interakcji pomiędzy głównymi komponentami Sek-
tora Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Ukrainy: siłami bezpieczeństwa i obrony, zarówno w czasie
pokoju, jak i wojny. Analizowane są dokumenty normatywno-prawne określające zadania i cel
Sił Zbrojnych oraz nakreślone są ich funkcje, które znajdują odzwierciedlenie w nowych do-
kumentach strategicznych. Wykazano, że pogorszenie sytuacji społeczno-politycznej na Ukra-
inie, nasilenie ruchów antypaństwowych i separatystycznych na terytoriach okupowanych
i przyległych było wynikiem nacisku informacyjnego jako operacji specjalnej i bezpośredniej
rosyjskiej interwencji w procesy społeczno-polityczne w naszego kraju, z którym konfrontacja
57
57gl;;
Nr 6 ss. 57–75 2021
ISSN 2543–7321 Przyjęto: 24.03.2022
© Instytut Bezpieczeństwa i Zarządzania, Akademia Pomorska w Słupsku Zaakceptowano: 24.03.2022
Oryginalna praca badawcza DOI: 10.34858/SNB.6.2021.005
STUDIA NAD BEZPIECZEŃSTWEM
58 Larysa Novak-Kalyayeva
wymaga kumulacji wysiłków wszystkich komponentów w Sektorze Bezpieczeństwa i Obro-
ny. W tym kontekście zagrożenia dla Ukrainy postrzegane są jako hybrydowe, kompleksowe,
wszechogarniające i takie, że ich skala rozciąga się nie tylko na Ukrainę, ale także na całą
wspólnotę europejską. Określono zadania polityki wojskowej państwa w zakresie realizacji
postanowień nowej Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Ukrainy.
Key words: military security, national security, national security strategy, military power, se-
curity and defence sector
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo militarne, bezpieczeństwo narodowe, narodowa strategia
bezpieczeństwa, siły militarne, sektor bezpieczeństwa i obrony
Introduction
The Russian Federation’s interference in Ukraine’s internal aairs, intensication
of its intelligence activities, increasing informational and psychological pressure to de-
stabilize the socio-political situation and direct military aggression have led to a breach
of Ukraine’s military security. Preparation to counter threats of a hybrid-military nature
requires a more thorough and comprehensive approach in comparison with the time
of contractual peace, keeping a exible balance and coordination between civilian and
military resources of the country, depending on the nature of the threat. Military securi-
ty is characterized by a state’s ability to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity and
inviolability from incursion (invasion) by military force. At the same time, this system
should rely on its own forces. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine requires a change in
the approach to ensuring Ukraine’s military security as part of national security.
Ukraine’s military security is based on the National Security Strategy, the new
version of which was adopted in September 2020 (hereinafter – Strategy). The new
Strategy replaced the 2015 document, which was adopted under the conditions of
a sharp change in the political and military situation caused by Russian aggression.
The new Strategy identied the most important national security issues in terms of
managing the security and defence area. It became the basis for developing strategic
plans and programmes in this sector.
The core ideology of the National Security Strategy is to move away from the
notion of an abstract ‘security state’ toward creating a triumvirate of ‘containment,
resilience, interaction’. This approach opens up more opportunities to modernize the
security sector and respond more exibly to new threats and challenges. The strategy
provides for the development of 15 strategic documents, among which the Military
Security Strategy of Ukraine occupies an important place. These documents shou-
ld provide a substantive complement that outlines eective ways to combat hostile
activities. The implementation of their content will determine the extent to which the
newly adopted strategic document will become an eective planning tool rather than
a formal bureaucratic response.
Among the functions of state policy, military policy ensures the sustainabili-
ty of progressive socio-economic development by protecting Ukraine from the use
59System of counteracting potential threats to Ukraine’s military security against...
of military force. There are many denitions of military policy that reect its dierent
aspects: purpose, place in public policy, components, topics of formation and imple-
mentation, etc. For example, Western scientic thought uses the term ‘defence policy’
instead of the term ‘military policy’.1
In this context an interesting position is presented by Bocharnikova and Svesh-
nikova. According to them, there are three approaches to military policy. The rst is
based on the understanding of military policy as an activity aimed at ensuring military
security. The second is based on the understanding of military policy as an activity
aimed at ensuring defence capabilities. The third is based on the understanding of
military policy as an activity aimed at resolving armed conict.2
The position that recognizes that military activity is aimed at the resolution of ar-
med conict seems the most appropriate. This is supported by the fact that the catego-
ry of armed conict is primary in comparison with the categories of military security
or defence capabilities. According to the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, this policy,
as an integral part of the state security policy, is directly related to the prevention
of armed conicts, preparation of the state for participation in them, as well as the
use of military force to achieve its own political goals and ensure national interests3.
These elements are also called areas of military policy and are centred around the
category of armed conict. Thus, the object of military policy is armed conict, and
its object is threefold: prevention of armed conict, preparation for participation in
armed conict and actual participation in it.4 In this perspective, it is possible to agree
with the authors’ position, at the same time it is expedient to follow the denitions of
normative-legal documents that dene the ocial position of the state.
The military policy of Ukraine denes the activities of national security entities
related to the prevention of armed conict, the organization and implementation of
military construction and training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Service
of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the State Service
of Special Transport and others under the law of Ukraine on military formations, law
enforcement agencies of special purpose for the armed protection of national inte-
rests. This is the denition given by the current military doctrine of Ukraine of 20155.
Compared with the previous doctrines of 2004 and 2012, there were no changes in the
denition of military policy.6
1 S.V. Svyeshnikov, V.P. Bocharnikov, Voyenna polityka: sutnistʹ i problemy formuvannya y real-
izatsiyi, “Nauka i oborona” 2018, № 1, s. 23–28.
2 Ibidem, s. 24.
3 Voyenna doktryna Ukrayiny: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid 15 chervnya 2004 r., № 648,
Otsiynyy visnyk Ukrayiny 2004, № 30, St. 2005. Voyenna doktryna Ukrayiny: Ukaz Prezy-
denta Ukrayiny vid 24 veresnya 2015 r., № 555/2015, http://www.president.gov.ua/docu-
ments/5552015-19443, [access: 04.12.2021].
4 S.V. Svyeshnikov, V.P. Bocharnikov, Voyenna polityka: sutnistʹ i problemy formuvannya y real-
izatsiyi, “Nauka i oborona” 2018, № 1, s. 25.
5 Voy enna doktryna Ukrayiny: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid 24 veresnya 2015 r. № 555/2015,
http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5552015-19443, [access: 04.12.2021].
6 Voyenna doktryna Ukrayiny: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid 15 chervnya 2004 r. № 648, Otsi-
ynyy visnyk Ukrayiny 2004, № 30, St. 2005.
60 Larysa Novak-Kalyayeva
Military policy ensures the realization of the fundamental interests of the nation
and determines, rst, that without their realization other interests of the state cannot
be realized, and second, that in peacetime military policy must constantly monitor the
state of the vast majority of spheres of life. On the other hand, and in time of warc
almost all public policy should be focused on the implementation of war policy.7
Military policy is focused on the military doctrine adopted in the state for a speci-
c period of time and denes the system of ocial views and regulations adopted in
the state that determine the main directions of military construction, the conditions of
preparation of the state and armed forces for war, the means and forms of warfare.8
The main provisions of military doctrine are shaped and changed according to
the politics and social order, the level of development of the productive forces, new
scientic achievements and the nature of the expected war. In fact, military doctrine is
the ideological core of all military and political activities of the state, political parties,
public organizations and institutions. It concerns the interests of the public and all go-
vernment agencies. In general, doctrinal issues are reected in various legal acts and
combat and military documents.
Realizacja postanowień Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Ukrainy
Russia’s aggression caused Ukraine to revise its approach to ensuring the defence
and territorial integrity of the country and forced the adoption of a new military doctri-
ne that abolished Ukraine’s non-aligned status. The military doctrine adopted in 2015
dened the main directions of the state’s military policy under conditions of Russian
aggression. In 2015, the National Security Strategy9, the Concept of Development of
the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine10 and the Strategic Defence Bulletin of
Ukraine,11 the Concept of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2020
and the Comprehensive (State) Programme of Development of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine until 2020 were adopted.12
7 S.V. Svyeshnikov, V.P. Bocharnikov, Voyenna polityka: sutnistʹ i problemy formuvannya y real-
izatsiyi, “Nauka i oborona” 2018, № 1, s. 23.
8 Vplyv hlobalʹnykh politychnykh, enerhoresursnykh ta ekolohichnykh zmin na voyennu bezpeku
derzhavy: monohraya / V.V. Zubaryev, O.P. Kutovyy, O.O. Sverhunov, S.M. Khymchenko,
Kyyiv: Intertekhnolohiya, 2009, s. 256.
9 Voyenna doktryna Ukrayiny: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid 24 veresnya 2015 r. № 555/2015,
http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5552015-19443, [access: 04.12.2021].
10 A. Kalyayev, L. Novak-Kalyayeva, T. Stukalin, V. Motornyy, L. Rudenko, Imperatives of
global governance in the eld of military security: the European context and Ukraine, Khalid
S. Soliman (ed.) / Innovation Management and Sustainable Economic Development in the Era of
Global Pandemic, Proceedings of the 38th International Business Information Management
Association Conference (IBIMA) 23–24 November 2021, Sevilla, Spain, p. 1560– 1569,
ISSN: 2767-9640, [access: 04.12.2021].
11 Interpretatsiyi rosiysʹko-ukrayinsʹkoho koniktu v zakhidnykh naukovykh i ekspertno-analitych-
nykh pratsyakh / V. Kulyka (red.), Kyyiv: IPiEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny, 2020, 328,
s. 7, ISBN 978-966-02-9220-8.
12 Derzhavna prohrama rozvytku Zbroynykh Syl Ukrayiny na period do 2020 r., https://www.mil.
gov.ua/content/oboron_plans/National-program-2020_uk.pdf, [access: 04.12.2021].
61System of counteracting potential threats to Ukraine’s military security against...
The novelty of the Military Doctrine was a move away from a policy of non-alig-
nment and a resumption of the strategic course of Euro-Atlantic integration, shifting
the emphasis in the conduct of armed conict to the integrated use of military and
non-military instruments. Ukraine’s military doctrine separately provides for readi-
ness to counter new methods of conducting armed conict. It includes not only the
unconventional (hybrid) war that Russia is waging in Donbass, but also countering
information and disinformation campaigns, economic warfare, psychological campa-
igns, etc. In today’s globalized world, these issues may be even more important than
direct military intervention. The doctrine set itself the task of relocating military units
and formations and creating an adequate military infrastructure in the eastern and
southern regions of the country.13
The 2015 Military Doctrine became the basis for future changes in the eld of
military security. On its basis, programme documents were developed, rst of all,
the programme for the development of the Armed Forces and the programme for the
development of weapons and military equipment. Such programmes were developed
until 2020. According to the Ministry of Defence, for various reasons, these program-
mes are only 70–75 percent implemented.14
Changes in the military-political situation both around Ukraine and in the world
led to the adoption of a new version of the national security strategy in 2020 and, ba-
sed on it, other strategic documents based on European and Euro-Atlantic integration.
In ocial statements, Western political leaders agree that Russia’s actions pose
a threat to regional and even global security. However, there is obvious uncertainty
about the assessment of Moscow’s strategic goals by Western political elites evalua-
ting the Russian threat.15 There is a tendency in publications by Western analysts to
avoid critical analysis of the consequences of the conict in Ukraine for European
security. Even leading liberal scholars only urge the West to respond to the challenge
of Putinism, but do not oer any concrete ideas.16 Moreover, the Russian propaganda
13 L. Novak-Kalyayeva, National unity and territorial identity in Ukraine: problems of ac-
ceptance // Processes of Integration and Disintegration in the European and Eurasian Space:
The Geographical Context / edited by Cezary Mądry – Poznań: Bogucki Wydawnictwo Nau-
kowe 2017, 230, p. 125–139, (1 др.арк.) ISBN 978-83-7986-146-0; L. Novak-Kalyayeva,
Нybrydowe wojna/pokój na Wschodzie Ukrainy jako czynniki bezpieczeństwa Europejskiego
// Bezpieczeństwo państw Europy Środkowowschodniej w kontekście koniktu na Ukrainie,
T. Pączek (red.), Slupsk: Wydawnictwo Społeczno-Prawne 2016, 502, s. 41–61 (1 др.арк.),
ISBN 978-83-943337-9-9.
14 YU. Servetnyk, Syly spetsialʹnykh operatsiy – yikh rolʹ ta mistse v modeli suchasnykh zbroynykh syl,
http://www.r-studies.org/cms/index.php?action=news/view_details&news_id=8280&lang=ukr,
[access: 04.12.2021]; Shchodo kontseptsiyi zabezpechennya natsionalʹnoyi stiykosti v Ukrayini.
Analitychna zapyska, NISD, Seriya “Natsionalʹna bezpeka” 2020, № 8, s. 11–18.
15 K. Smahliy, Hibrydna analityka: Prokremlivsʹka propahanda ekspertiv u Moskvi, Yevropi ta
SSHA: Tematychne doslidzhennya analitychnykh tsentriv ta universytetiv, Instytut suchas-
noyi Rosiyi2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f8f41ef14aa13b95239af0/t/5c6d8b
38b208fc7087fd2b2a/1550682943143/Smagliy_Hybrid-Analytica_10-2018_upd.pdf, [access:
04.12.2021].
16 A. Baratta, Putting an accent on the future: Global Strategic Trends: The Future Starts Today,
Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre 2017, https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/
62 Larysa Novak-Kalyayeva
machine is more eective than the Ukrainian media, for both objective and subjec-
tive reasons. Leading analysts of Western countries are much more likely to rely on
Russian sources than Ukrainian ones, since the former are much more often transla-
ted into Western languages and Russian is much more frequently used by Western
analysts and readers than Ukrainian. Moreover, analysts rely on scholarly works by
authoritative Western experts who are much more marked by Russian than Ukrainian
inuences and not only because of their dierent linguistic skills, but also because
of their well-established views on the history and politics of Eastern Europe, where
Russia has a prominent place. This is why one can so often nd dubious, untrue and
openly provocative allegations in Western academic and expert-analytic publications
about the division of Ukraine into a Ukrainian-speaking West and a Russian-speaking
East, the insurmountable closeness of eastern Ukraine to Russia and the dominance of
radical nationalists and fascists in western Ukraine.17
The transformation of Ukraine from an object to a subject of international
politics
The analysis of Western scientic and analytical publications on the current
Russian-Ukrainian conict is constantly in the spotlight. In particular, it is worth
mentioning the article by Yu Matsievsky, who interprets the factors of the conict in
the Donbass on the basis of the work of Ukrainian, Russian and Western scientists,
and provides the assessment of Ukrainian experts on the importance of these fac-
tors.18 A large-scale study was conducted by a group of Ukrainian researchers led by
M. Karmazina.19 This group reviewed scientic, expert-analytical and media pub-
lications from various Western and post-Soviet countries on the situation and pro-
spects of Ukraine in the context of the war in Donbass. K. Smagliya’s in-depth
analysis focuses on the activities of think tanks in Russia and the West, created
or maintained by the Russian authorities to promote their views and justify their
actions. The author tries to cover all areas of pro-Kremlin ‘hybrid analytics’.20
en/publications/putting-an-accent-on-the-future(c943a52a-c8e1-473f-bf16-56afa6ed6c63).html,
[access: 02.03.2022].
17 Interpretatsiyi rosiysʹko-ukrayinsʹkoho koniktu v zakhidnykh naukovykh i ekspertno-analitych-
nykh pratsyakh / V. Kulyka (red.), Kyyiv: IPiEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny 2020, 328,
s. 7, ISBN 978-966-02-9220-8.
18 YU. Matsiyevsʹkyy, Vnutrishniy konikt chy prykhovana ahresiya: akademichna dyskusiya
i ekspertni otsinky viyny na Donbasi, Politychne zhyttya 2019, № 2, s. 55–68, DOI 10.31558/2519-
2949.2019.2.9, https://eprints.oa.edu.ua/7875/1/9.10.2019_Internal%20conict%20or%20hid-
den%20agression_%20Matsiyevsky.pdf. 199.
19 M. Karmazina, T. Bevz, N. Rotar, V. Napadysta, Vyklyky y intehratsiyni perspektyvy Ukrayiny
v konteksti rosiysʹkoyi ahresiyi v Krymu ta Donbasi: analiz otsinok zarubizhnykh analitykiv
i ekspertiv, Kyyiv: IPiEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny 2017, s. 184.
20 K. Smahliy, Hibrydna analityka: Prokremlivsʹka propahanda ekspertiv u Moskvi, Yevropi ta
SSHA: Tematychne doslidzhennya analitychnykh tsentriv ta universytetiv, Instytut suchasnoyi Ros-
iyi 2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f8f41ef14aa13b95239af0/t/5c6d8b38b208fc708
7fd2b2a/1550682943143/Smagliy_Hybrid-Analytica_10-2018_upd.pdf, [access: 04.12.2021].
63System of counteracting potential threats to Ukraine’s military security against...
On the other hand, the collections edited by A. Hertel present the views on the
‘Ukrainian crisis’ of Western scholars and in particular of the ‘Visegrad Four’. Ho-
wever, for policy analysis the works of scientists and experts of think tanks are more
relevant.21 The work of scientists from the Institute of Political and Ethno-National
Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine22 signicantly broadens
the analytical horizon. This is because it covers seven dierent Western countries
and systematically analyses them using common methods to compare results and
identify the cause of dierences.
Europeans’ attitudes towards Ukraine are shaped by the materials of their natio-
nal think tanks and mass media. Thus, the ambiguity of the results is conrmed by
data from an opinion poll conducted by the New Europe Center in several major
European countries. The general aim of the survey was to nd out public opinion
on Ukraine, as well as to identify the most frequent associations with the Ukrainian
state. According to the results of the survey, the positions on Ukraine are worth
noting, for example, that Ukraine is mainly associated with war. At the same time,
in 2020 Ukraine is less associated with war and conict. In 2015, 49% of respon-
dents associated Ukraine with war, while in 2020 the number of such respondents
decreased to 12%.23 Ukraine is increasingly associated with immigrants. In 2015,
the number of such statements was small. In 2020, this is the third most popu-
lar association with Ukraine (mentioned by 10.3% of respondents). This indicates
a growing trend of migration from Ukraine in search of better jobs in the EU. The
majority of respondents have negative associations with the Ukrainian state and this
trend can be observed in all countries surveyed. The exception is Italy, which has
more positive and neutral associations with Ukraine than any other country. An inte-
resting observation is that 23.6% of respondents have no associations with Ukraine.
This is also positive news because these respondents can be informed about Ukraine
and promote positive associations.
There was no consensus among respondents on how to help Ukraine during the
pandemic. Overall, about half of respondents believe that countries should maintain
or intensify cooperation at current levels, while the other half believe that cooperation
should be limited or focused on their own countries’ problems. However, Russian nar-
ratives about Ukraine in the surveyed countries have proven ineective. Only 0.8% of
21 A. Härtel (ed.), EU member states national perspectives on the “Ukraine crisis”, Ideology and
Politics 2017, 1(7), https://ideopol.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/1.0.ENG_IPJ% 201(7)%20
2017Final.pdf, [access: 04.12.2021].
22 Interpretatsiyi rosiysʹko-ukrayinsʹkoho koniktu v zakhidnykh naukovykh i ekspertno-analitych-
nykh pratsyakh / za V. Kulyka (red.), Kyyiv: IPiEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny, 2020, 328,
s. 7, ISBN 978-966-02-9220-8.
23 L. Litra, Tak – perspektyvi chlenstva, ni – dopomozi zbroyeyu: yakymy u YES bachatʹ vidnosyny
z Ukrayinoyu, Yevropeysʹka pravda, 18 Lystopada 2020, Tsentr “Nova Yevropa”, https://www.
eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2020/11/18/7116664/, [access: 04.12.2021]; A. Kalyayev,
L. Novak-Kalyayeva, T. Stukalin, V. Motornyy, L. Rudenko, Imperatives of global gover-
nance in the eld of military security: the European context and Ukraine, S. Soliman Khalid
(ed.), Innovation Management and Sustainable Economic Development in the Era of Global Pan-
demic, Proceedings of the 38th International Business Information Management Association
Conference (IBIMA) 23–24 November 2021, Sevilla, Spain, p. 1560–1569, ISSN: 2767-9640.
64 Larysa Novak-Kalyayeva
respondents believe that Ukrainians are waging a civil war, and less than 0.2% among
those who consider Ukraine an extremist or fascist country.24
As in 2015, the survey found that the biggest obstacle to Ukraine’s EU member-
ship is corruption, the ght against which is a priority for 43.1% of respondents in
2020 (37.5% – in 2015). The majority of respondents (55%) support Ukraine’s EU
membership. Support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO is also important (38%),
but this answer did not receive majority support. In 2020, the number of respondents
associating Ukraine with Russia is 9.1%, while just ve years ago this category was
twice as large (18%).25 This indicates an awareness of Ukraine’s clear separation from
Russia – an acceptance of a Ukrainian state independent of Russia.
The most popular answer to support Ukraine against Russian aggression (21.5%)
is the continuation of EU sanctions against Russia. Of course, respondents’ answers
were based on the national characteristics of their countries, which inuenced the ran-
king of priorities. Thus, Poland associates Ukraine primarily with immigrants (25.8%)
and poverty (25%), and only then with war. At the same time, in Germany and Fran-
ce the most popular associations are with Russia and war. Most French respondents
(15.5%) associate Ukraine with Russia, war and conict (13.1%) and Eastern Europe
(10.6%). The three most common associations in Germany are associated with Russia
(war, invasion of Crimea, and Russia), which accounts for almost half of the respon-
dents (47.5%).26
In the case of Germany and France, the popularity of associations with war can
be explained by the fact that due to the role of Berlin and Paris in the Normandy
format, the topic of Ukraine’s war with Russia resonates more often in these co-
untries than in others. In general, in France, Germany and Poland most of the top
ten associations are negative. The situation is dierent in Italy, where the topic of
the Russian-Ukrainian war is almost absent from public opinion – only 0.6% of re-
spondents mention it. Italians are among those who have the most positive attitude
towards Ukraine.27
Among the ten most popular associations there is only one negative one (‘immi-
grants/unemployment’), while the others are either neutral, like ‘gas/energy’, ‘poli-
tics’ or positive, like ‘culture/history’ or ‘Ukrainian friends’. In European public opi-
nion, eliminating corruption as the number one priority is an obstacle to Ukraine’s EU
membership. This answer is given in all countries surveyed, but the level of support
24 L. Litra, Tak – perspektyvi chlenstva, ni – dopomozi zbroyeyu: yakymy u YES bachatʹ vidnosyny
z Ukrayinoyu, Yevropeysʹka pravda, 18 Lystopada 2020, Tsentr “Nova Yevropa”, https://www.
eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2020/11/18/7116664/, [access: 04.12.2021].
25 K. Smahliy, Hibrydna analityka: Prokremlivsʹka propahanda ekspertiv u Moskvi, Yevropi
ta SSHA: Tematychne doslidzhennya analitychnykh tsentriv ta universytetiv, Instytut suchas-
noyi Rosiyi 2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f8f41ef14aa13b95239af0/t/5c6d8b
38b208fc7087fd2b2a/1550682943143/Smagliy_Hybrid-Analytica_10-2018_upd.pdf, [access:
04.12.2021].
26 L. Litra, Tak – perspektyvi chlenstva, ni – dopomozi zbroyeyu: yakymy u YES bachatʹ vidnosyny
z Ukrayinoyu, Yevropeysʹka pravda, 18 Lystopada 2020, Tsentr “Nova Yevropa”, https://www.
eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2020/11/18/7116664/, [access: 04.12.2021].
27 Ibidem.
65System of counteracting potential threats to Ukraine’s military security against...
for it is dierent: the highest (over 58%) is in Germany, the lowest (although one of
the priorities) is in Italy (29.1%). The second most important priority is to signicantly
improve the economy. All countries note strengthening the economy as a second prio-
rity, except for France, where restoring territorial integrity is considered more impor-
tant. Overall, the public perception is that territorial integrity does not appear to be an
obstacle to Ukraine’s EU integration or is the least problematic in the ranking of the
three options presented in the survey.
Support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO is not linear in the survey-
ed countries, the majority of respondents (55%) support Ukraine’s membership in the
European Union. At the same time, support for NATO reaches 38%, which means that
this idea is not popular enough. On the other hand, the number of those who believe
that Ukraine should not join the EU and NATO is at 28.5%.28 Among the surveyed
countries, Poland (69.5%) and Italy (61.6%) have signicant support for Ukraine’s
EU membership. At the same time, in Germany (47%) and France (42.6%), the idea
of Ukraine’s EU membership did not receive majority support.29
The idea of Ukraine’s membership in NATO does not yet have majority support
in all researched countries. France is the most open to Ukraine’s NATO member-
ship (39.9%), followed by Poland (33.3%) and Germany and Italy, which have the
same support rates for this answer (31.3%). As for supporting Ukraine against Russian
aggression, most respondents prefer to continue sanctions against Russia (21.5% in-
dicated this answer as a priority).
At the same time, a similar number of respondents choose ‘oering Ukraine EU
membership’ as the top priority. Three countries believe that expanding sanctions
against Russia should be a priority: Poland (23.3%), France (23.4%) and Germany
(23.4%), showing almost absolute unity on this issue. The only country where the
approach is dierent is Italy, which chose Ukraine’s membership in the EU as a prio-
rity (24.1%), and only then set the extension of sanctions.30
Quite often the option of providing nancial support to Ukraine does not have
signicant support as a rst priority, but many listed this option as a second and third
priority. On the other hand, the least popular option among the highest priorities was
the answer ‘provide Ukraine with weapons’ (only 2%). Analysing individual coun-
tries, we see that Poland has the highest number of supporters of arming Ukraine
(5.1%), followed by France (2.9%), Germany (1.4%) and Italy (0.9%).31
The case of Germany is rather ambiguous: here the option ‘not to support Ukraine
at all’ as the highest priority met with the sympathy of 13.1% of respondents, which is
more than total support for the options ‘to support nancially’ and ‘to provide Ukraine
28 Ibidem.
29 Ibidem.
30 Ibidem.
31 Ibidem; A. Kalyayev, L. Novak-Kalyayeva, T. Stukalin, V. Motornyy, L. Rudenko, Im-
peratives of global governance in the eld of military security: the European context and
Ukraine, Soliman Khalid S (ed.) / Innovation Management and Sustainable Economic Develop-
ment in the Era of Global Pandemic, Proceedings of the 38th International Business Informa-
tion Management Association Conference (IBIMA) 23–24 November 2021, Sevilla, Spain,
p. 1560–1569, ISSN: 2767-9640.
66 Larysa Novak-Kalyayeva
with weapons’. A similar situation is observed in France. This tendency does not
occur in Italy and Poland32.
Thus, in the context of Ukraine’s military security, this study shows that the prio-
rity in solving security issues should be determined by our country and that one can
hope for more political, moral and psychological support from Europe and the United
States.
If Ukraine can still hope for EU membership in the near future, the system of na-
tional security and defence, protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and border
inviolability must be based on its own strength. At the same time, cooperation with the
EU on the Common Security and Defence Policy is an important systemic element of
Ukraine’s European integration course. This should be the priority of military policy.
Military doctrine must formulate the state’s response to military-political aggres-
sion, taking into account only its own resources and capabilities. We believe that the
doctrine’s emphasis on external support is inappropriate, especially after the guaran-
tor countries violated the Budapest Memorandum. In contemporary conditions, there
may also be factors that change the policies of the lead states.
An important element of this system is the security and defence sector of Ukraine,
which functionally combines military formations, law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, and special services, their forces, means, and basic resources. Taking into
account the current tendencies of complex manifestation of various types of ghting
in modern conicts and with limited state resources, the creation of a strong security
and defence sector should become one of the priorities of Ukraine’s security policy.33
The adoption of the new National Security Strategy of Ukraine marked the be-
ginning of a new stage in the development of security theory, due to the evolution
of the concepts of security and defence of European states against the background
of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Strategy for the rst time proclaimed
the creation of a comprehensive defence system, requiring the involvement of all
spheres of Ukrainian society in resolving military security issues. The new version of
the National Security Strategy denes the priorities of national interests and national
security of Ukraine, goals and main directions of state policy in the sphere of national
security.
32 L. Litra, Tak – perspektyvi chlenstva, ni – dopomozi zbroyeyu: yakymy u YES bachatʹ vidno-
syny z Ukrayinoyu. Yevropeysʹka pravda, 18 Lystopada 2020, Tsentr “Nova Yevropa”, https://
www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2020/11/18/7116664/, [access: 04.12.2021]; A. Kalyayev,
L. Novak-Kalyayeva, T. Stukalin, V. Motornyy, L. Rudenko, Imperatives of global gover-
nance in the eld of military security: the European context and Ukraine, S. Soliman Khalid
(ed.) / Innovation Management and Sustainable Economic Development in the Era of Global
Pandemic, Proceedings of the 38th International Business Information Management Asso-
ciation Conference (IBIMA) 23–24 November 2021, Sevilla, Spain, p. 1560–1569, ISSN:
2767-9640.
33 O.I. Poshedin, Voyenna bezpeka Ukrayiny v konteksti spivrobitnytstva z Yevropeysʹkym Soyuzom,
Visnyk Natsionalʹnoyi akademiyi derzhavnoho upravlinnya pry Prezydentovi Ukrayiny 2014,
№ 3, s. 57.
67System of counteracting potential threats to Ukraine’s military security against...
It is based on the following basic principles:
– deterrence – development of defence and security capabilities to prevent armed
aggression against Ukraine;
– resilience – the ability of society and the state to adapt quickly to changes in
the security environment and maintain sustainable functioning, in particular by
minimizing external and internal vulnerabilities;
– interoperability – development of strategic relations with key foreign partners,
primarily the European Union and NATO and their member states, the United
States of America, pragmatic cooperation with other states and international
organizations based on Ukraine’s national interests.
The priorities of Ukraine’s national interests and national security are: maintenan-
ce of state independence and sovereignty; restoration of territorial integrity within
the internationally recognized state border of Ukraine; social development, especially
human capital development, protection of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of
Ukrainian citizens; European and Euro-Atlantic integration.34
Implementation of these priorities will be ensured, among others, in areas rela-
ted to the military policy of the state and its military security. This is primarily the
strengthening of the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other bodies of
the security and defence sector.
On the list of threats is that, despite the continuation of Russian aggression and
occupation of Ukraine, the current rate of rearmament of the Armed Forces of Ukrai-
ne and other components of the Armed Forces are not among the latest (modernized)
models and will not meet the main needs for weapons and military equipment, which
will be exhausted in the near future.
The growing shortage of nancial resources complicates the allocation of resour-
ces to ensure the production and purchase of the necessary modern weapons and mili-
tary equipment, which, combined with the imbalance of military capabilities of Ukra-
ine and Russia, forces the development of a new strategy for military security and the
nature of modern armed conicts, the principles and ways to prevent their occurrence,
to prepare the state for a possible armed conict, as well as the use of military force to
protect state sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital national interests.
The Draft Military Security Strategy denes the objectives, priorities and ways of
implementing the state policy in the sphere of state security and defence in the part re-
lated to ensuring military security. The document is also the basis for the development
of the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine, programme documents on defence and
development of defence forces, development of military weapons and equipment, as
well as the Defence Plan of Ukraine and plans for the use of defence forces.
The military security strategy is intended to replace the military doctrine of Ukra-
ine and is being developed for the rst time. It proposes consolidating the concept
34 Pro rishennya Rady natsionalʹnoyi bezpeky i oborony Ukrayiny vid 06 travnya 2015 r. “Pro
Stratehiyu natsionalʹnoyi bezpeky Ukrayiny”: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid 26 travnya 2015 r.,
№ 287/2015, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/287/2015, Article 4, [access: 04.12.2021].
68 Larysa Novak-Kalyayeva
of comprehensive defence and to involve not only the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but
also all elements of the security and defence sector and civil society. The peculiarity
of this strategy is that it applies the principle of comprehensive or total defence. This
means that not only the defence forces will be involved in the defence of the country,
but the entire Ukrainian society and all public authorities, which must oppose the
enemy throughout Ukraine, using all forms and methods of struggle with respect to
the principles and norms of international law. In other words, at a certain stage of the
conict only the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be used. If the potential of the Armed
Forces is not enough to neutralize this threat, all defence forces (all security forces)
will be engaged. If these resources are not enough, the defensive forces of the state
will be involved in defence and a resistance movement will be launched, directing
all nancial and material resources to neutralize the threat. An important role in the
draft of the new Military Security Strategy is played by the international component
– political and material support of foreign partners in the ght against the aggressor.
This document will dene ve strategic objectives to achieve further development of
the Armed Forces and other components of the Armed Forces.35
The rst goal is eective defence management. This means that the Ministry of
Defence must create a regulatory framework, set clear priorities and eectively allocate
available resources for the successful development of the Armed Forces. To accomplish
these tasks, it is necessary to create an optimal number and function of the Ministry of
Defence that does not duplicate the tasks of the General Sta and other structures. The
second objective is human resources. In the Armed Forces should serve highly professio-
nal personnel with appropriate moral qualities, a new philosophy and an active social po-
sition. The third objective is the modernization and improvement of weapons and milita-
ry equipment. I will point out that this is probably the most critical problem that requires
large investments. The fourth goal is to create a military infrastructure. Unfortunately,
this issue had not been given due attention before. In recent years there have been sig-
nicant changes in the security environment, and all major threats do not emanate from
the West (as in Soviet times), but from the East. Therefore, it is necessary to completely
recongure the military infrastructure. A separate issue – the creation of normal living
and service conditions for our soldiers – this is an urgent task. And the fth goal, for the
achievement of which all the previous goals must be achieved, is to increase the ability
of the armed forces to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence
of Ukraine.
In our opinion, this is the most rational in the context of the existing military threat
to national security, given the imbalance of military potentials of Ukraine and the
Russian Federation.
According to the authors of the draft new military security strategy, the nature
of the direct military threats to Ukraine are:
– armed aggression and violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine (tempo-
rary Russian occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol
35 Stratehiya voyennoyi bezpeky. Proyekt, https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/public_discussion/proj_
vdu.pdf, [access: 04.12.2021].
69System of counteracting potential threats to Ukraine’s military security against...
and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions), increasing the military power
of the Russian Federation in these territories and in the immediate vicinity of
the borders of Ukraine, including the potential deployment of tactical nuclear
weapons in Crimea;
– militarization of the Russian Federation in the occupied territories through the
creation of new military formations and units, as well as the supply of ghters,
military equipment and logistics;
– the presence of a Russian military contingent in the Transnistrian region of the
Republic of Moldova, which can be used to destabilize the southern regions of
Ukraine;
– construction of the Russian Federation near the state border of Ukraine, a group
of troops with powerful oensive and oensive potential, the creation of new,
expansion and modernization of existing bases, military infrastructure;
– intensication of special services of the Russian Federation intelligence and
diversionary activities in Ukraine in order to destabilize the internal socio-po-
litical situation in Ukraine, as well as to support illegal activities in the east of
Ukraine and create conditions for the escalation of armed aggression;
– activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of Ukraine aimed at desta-
bilizing the internal socio-political situation in Ukraine, intimidation of the
population, deprivation of freedom to resist, disruption of the functioning of
public authorities, local governments, important industrial facilities and infra-
structure;
– territorial claims of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and violation of
Ukraine’s sovereignty in some of its districts;
– use of the territory and airspace (maritime) of Ukraine for combat operations in
the event of an armed conict between NATO and Russia36.
Taking into account the development trends and the nature of the military-political
situation in the medium term, the most likely armed conicts are conicts over the use
of the opponent’s own armed forces and illegal armed groups, terrorist groups, merce-
naries as a tool to achieve their own goals and interests. The probability of escalation
of such conicts into war will increase signicantly. The above challenges and threats
to Ukraine’s military security can manifest in the following scenarios:
– full-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine with the
conduct of land, air and naval operations with decisive military and political
objectives;
– separate special operation of the Russian Federation against Ukraine with the
use of separate military units and/or units, arson attacks, information, infor-
mation and psychological operations (activities) in conjunction with the use
of non-military means, including under the pretext of allegedly bringing in
peacekeepers and their delimitation in the absence of a corresponding decision
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC);
36 Ibidem.
70 Larysa Novak-Kalyayeva
– blockade with the use of armed force of the seaports, coastline or airspace of
Ukraine, violation of its communications by the Russian Federation;
– armed conict in the state, inspired by Russia’s attempt to separate from Ukra-
ine administrative-territorial units in the east, south-east and south of the state
with the participation of illegal armed groups, terrorist groups in cooperation
with political, non-governmental, ethnic, religious or other organizations;
– armed conict on the state border of Ukraine, in particular border armed in-
cidents (provocations, clashes) with regular or irregular forces of the Russian
Federation, illegal armed groups, etc.;
– terrorist acts on the territory of Ukraine or against citizens of Ukraine, attempts
on the lives of statesmen or public gures, representatives of foreign states
(aimed at causing war or international complications), sabotage (including of
critical infrastructure) and explosions, arson to the premises of public authori-
ties and their seizure, kidnapping or hostage taking.
Threats to Ukraine’s military security, if realized, could lead to a change in the
constitutional order of Ukraine, further occupation of Ukraine or its separate terri-
tories, weakening of the central government, change in the administrative-territorial
structure, direct or indirect control over Ukraine and loss of state sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
The main tasks in the eld of military security of Ukraine
The main task in the eld of military security is to develop deterrence capabili-
ties. The unconditional priority is the Armed Forces of Ukraine in combat readiness,
a prepared and motivated military reserve and eective territorial defence, which in
combination with the capabilities of other bodies of the security and defence sector
can inict such unacceptable losses on the ground, in the air, at sea and in cyberspace
in the event of aggressive intentions. The state must take into account the lessons of
hybrid aggression against Ukraine and warfare in the Middle East in new doctrinal
approaches to military security.
The main goal of Ukraine’s military policy is to create conditions for the restora-
tion of the territorial integrity of the state, its sovereignty and inviolability within the
internationally recognized state border. Ukraine considers as the main objectives in
the eld of military policy:
– to repel the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine;
– to ensure the defence capabilities of Ukraine are at a level sucient to prevent
the emergence of an armed conict, and in the event of an armed conict to
localize and neutralize it;
– to create a system for maintaining the military security of the state that would
ensure that Ukraine is perceived at the international level as an equal actor
in international relations and meets the criteria for Ukraine’s membership in
the EU and NATO;
71System of counteracting potential threats to Ukraine’s military security against...
– reducing corruption in the system of state policy on state military security,
which threatens Ukraine’s ability to maintain defence capabilities.
Based on the principles of domestic and foreign policy, as well as on the nature
of existing and potential national security threats, the main objectives of Ukraine’s
military policy in the near and medium term are:
– localizing and neutralizing in the shortest possible time the military-politi-
cal crisis in eastern Ukraine, preventing its escalation into large-scale armed
aggression;
– eliminating illegal armed groups and restoring full control of Ukraine’s state
border;
– reforming Ukraine’s defence forces to achieve operational and technical com-
patibility with the armed forces of NATO countries, including through the im-
plementation of NATO standards;
– creation of an integrated state security and defence sector as the main compo-
nent of the military security system, integration of the capabilities of its compo-
nents for timely and eective response to existing and potential threats;
– ensuring the capabilities of the defence forces needed to achieve military po-
licy objectives.
In our opinion, the objectives of the task of the military strategy and military poli-
cy set out in the Draft correspond to the current state and medium-term forecast of the
military-political situation and can be claried on the basis of a gradual approach to
changes in the security environment of the conditions of socio-economic development
of Ukraine and the capabilities of the defence forces. Having created the conditions
for the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the main objective of military poli-
cy will be to prevent new armed conicts, systematically strengthen the defence capa-
bilities of the state and increase its role and authority in the international arena. In the
framework of the implementation of this Strategy, the state’s military policy should
ensure the rapid development of the Security and Defence Sector through innovative
approaches that provide sucient state defence capabilities to repel armed aggression
and comprehensive reform of the national security system to a level acceptable for EU
and NATO membership.
The complex realities of a globalized world have placed on the agenda the need to
identify eective means and possible ways to enhance international and national secu-
rity in the military sphere. The leadership of global governance structures and leading
countries of the world oer various political, military, economic and other measures,
the implementation of which would prevent the emergence of new wars and armed
conicts or their cessation with the least possible loss of human and material resour-
ces. Each country chooses its own path to deal with this complex problem.
Ukraine, under current conditions, is one of the leading players in the po-
litical arena of Europe and in the context of Russia’s armed aggression aga-
inst Ukraine has chosen the path of European integration and membership in
72 Larysa Novak-Kalyayeva
collective security systems. The current Military Doctrine of Ukraine (2015) re-
cognizes as signicant military threats: Russia’s armed aggression, including the
temporary occupation of Crimea and aggression in some regions of the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions; the increase of the military power of the Russian Federa-
tion in the immediate vicinity of the state border, including the possibility of de-
ploying tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea; the militarization of the tempora-
rily occupied territory, the presence of the Russian military contingent in the
Transnistrian region of Moldova, the intensication of intelligence activities of
the Russian special services and diversionary activities in Ukraine to destabilize
the internal situation37. The military doctrine assumes that the key tasks of creating
conditions for the restoration of state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine
are comprehensive reforms of the national security system to a level acceptable for
EU and NATO membership; the creation of an eective security and defence sector
that will provide sucient national defence capabilities to repel armed aggression, as
well as the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine according to Western stan-
dards and achieving compatibility with the armed forces of NATO member states.38
Although this doctrine was the rst document dening the priorities of Ukraine’s
military security, the development of the military-political situation in the world has
brought new threats to Ukraine’s national interests, and therefore requires updating.
The analytical report of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine39 states that the
current global crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic and the destructive policies
of the Russian and U.S. administrations have exacerbated the deep contradictions and
moved the existing global threats to a higher level. The main components of the ‘new
reality’ are: the limited eectiveness of collective security systems against the back-
ground of the spread of the use of force in international relations and disregard for
international law; attempts to revise the principles of free trade; competition against
traditional nancial systems by blockchain technologies, as well as the willingness
of regional players, including Russia, to ‘play on the contradictions’ of the world’s
leading players without giving up the use of unprocessed natural resources as a tool of
geopolitics. Some global and regional players are trying to use this to more aggressi-
vely advance their interests in areas of their strategic priority. In such actions, they
do not neglect the possibility of articially exacerbating crises in certain countries in
order to further draw them into the orbit of their own inuence and create conditions
for provoking new local or regional crises (conicts) in the future.
37 Voyenna doktryna Ukrayiny: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid 24 veresnya 2015 r., № 555/2015,
http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5552015-19443, [access: 04.12.2021].
38 A. Kalyayev, І. Surina, L. Rudenko, Institutionalizing Global Governance in the Sphere of Secu-
rity and Defense: The European Context / Proceedings of the 36th IBIMA International Confer-
ence, 15–16 November 2020. Granada, p. 4564–4574, ISSN: 2767-9640; A. Kalyayev, European
realities of collective defense: NATO and the EU relations issues, “Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
2020, № 5, s. 17–30, ISSN: 2543-7321.
39 H.M. Yavorsʹka, B.O. Parakhonsʹkyy, Zovnishnya polityka Ukrayiny v umovakh kryzy mizhnarod-
noho bezpekovoho seredovyshcha: analit. dopovid, Kyyiv: NISD 2015, 100 (Ser. “Natsionalʹna
(Ser. “Natsionalʹna bezpeka”, vyp. 10), ISBN 978-966-554-250-6.s.
73System of counteracting potential threats to Ukraine’s military security against...
The main factors aecting the situation in the regional security sphere in the con-
text of Ukrainian interests is the conrmed ineectiveness of the main security insti-
tutions (UN, OSCE) in resolving regional conicts. At the same time, there was a ten-
dency to militarize the territories and waters bordering the borders of Ukraine while
destroying the current system of international treaties on non-proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, that is, greater inuence on the regional security environment of
Ukraine by the Russian Federation and other states seeking to achieve their ambitions,
including the use of Ukrainian resources.
The response to new challenges and threats to the countries of the world should
be the strengthening of its own security sector, membership in the collective security
system and close international cooperation. At the same time, Ukraine must take into
account a number of contradictory factors when determining its military policy and
deciding on membership in the collective security system. On the one hand, preparing
for armed conicts on its own is economically burdensome, and participation in one
bloc or another oers a chance to increase its own security and reduce the burden on
the military component of its budget. On the other hand, participation in a military
alliance increases the likelihood of a country’s involvement in an inter-civilizational
conict and requires readiness to participate in the wars that the chosen bloc will ght.
The requirements for adequate war preparedness of individual states will be determi-
ned by the leadership of the chosen collective security system, with less regard for
their economic capabilities. In addition, independence in defence matters is lost to
some extent. The level of each state’s relationship with the collective security system
is a key issue in forming the basis of its defence policy, and the strategic documents
that dene it must be democratically based on the political consensus of not only the
major political parties but also civil society.
Ukraine has taken a major step toward deepening practical cooperation with
NATO. The North Atlantic Council has granted it the status of an enhanced partner.
Only ve countries have such status, including Georgia, as well as EU member states
Sweden and Finland. This status is a recognition of Ukraine’s contribution to collecti-
ve security on the continent and in the world.
In fact, the Eastern Partnership is one of the two main dimensions of Ukraine’s
Euro-Atlantic integration. The Eastern Partnership platform includes many sustainab-
le areas of strengthening cooperation in the context of promoting new goals and areas
of security cooperation for Ukraine. These include cyber security, reintegration policy
and countering contemporary hybrid and terrorist threats. Given the multifaceted na-
ture and trivial number of EU security institutions, the cross-border nature of terrorist
threats, and the common potential of challenges in this area, the Eastern Partnership is
the best option for ongoing cooperation.
Meanwhile, Russia seeks to block such cooperation, both by provoking a split in
Ukrainian society over NATO membership and by undermining Alliance unity.
74
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Summary
The technology of implementation of doctrines, strategies, concepts and programmes of state
policy in the eld of military security objectively integrates all elements of state political acti-
vity. They are based on sound theoretical principles and historical experience. The goals and
tasks of Ukraine’s military policy correspond to both the current state and the medium-term
forecast of the military-political situation and are determined by changes in security, the condi-
tions of socio-economic development and the capabilities of the defence forces.
The priority task is to create an eective system of state military security. Such a system in
Ukraine is in the process of creation. The use of the latest information and communication
technologies for continuous monitoring and analysis of military threats allows for rapid stra-
tegic decision-making.
System of counteracting potential threats to Ukraine’s military security against...
