109Information and psychological confrontation inhybrid warfare
The authors of the second group – mainly representatives of the military depart-
ments, both foreign and Russian (S. Grinyaeva, S. Komov, M. Rodionov) – attribute
IW to the sphere of military confrontation.10 In general, Russian military thought has
many points of view on the problems of information warfare, which complicates the
implementation of a general analysis of the views of Russian specialists. But the main
goal of the information war is still considered the mastery of the consciousness of the
population and undermining the morale and combat potential of the armed forces of
the eventual adversary.11
The authors of the third group of denitions of IW consider it a phenomenon of
the external peaceful period of interstate confrontation, allowing the solving foreign
policy problems in a non-violent way in the traditional sense.12
By IW means and methods, Russian authors have information, informational inu-
ences, or information technologies. V. Lisichkin and L. Shelepin believe that informa-
tion war is a war of ‘a qualitatively new type, where information is a weapon, and the
struggle is waged for a purposeful change in public consciousness.’13
A type of information war, waged mainly against social systems, is a psychologi-
cal (information-psychological) war.
The concept of ‘psychological warfare’ was used for the rst time by Dr. M. Cam-
paneo in his book ‘The Experience of Military Psychology’, published in 1904 in
Bucharest.14
The Americans rst experienced psychological warfare in World War II. Until
1945, these actions were of an auxiliary nature, and then, during the Cold War, they
acquired an independent character as a ‘psychological sphere’ of foreign policy. In
1948, the NSC Directive 10/2 was adopted, which obliged the CIA to conduct psycho-
logical warfare. It is still in force today. According to this directive, the main covert
operations are propaganda, economic war, preventive direct actions (sabotage, assi-
stance to underground movements and emigrant groups, etc.).
In Nazi Germany, the term ‘psychological sabotage’ was used, the main tasks
of which were: splitting a hostile state, causing discontent among the population of
a hostile state with the policy of its own government, isolating the hostile state from
its allies, various obstacles in its preparation for war and creating opposition.
The characteristic features of modern psychological warfare are considered:15
– globality – impact on all spheres of life of the opponent, neutral states, allies,
their population and military personnel;
10 S.N. Grinyaev, Intellectual counteraction to information weapons, Moscow: Sinteg, 1999,
p. 232; S.A. Komov, On the methodology for assessing the eectiveness of information warfare.
Military thought 1997, No. 5, s. 42–44; M.A. Rodionov, On the question of the forms of the in-
tsormation struggle, Military thought 1998, No. 2, s. 67–70.
11 A. Shevchenko, Information and psychological operations: conceptual approaches of NATO and
the leading countries of the world, “Social Psychology” 2004, No. 2, s.111–121.
12 N.I. Cherginets, State policy in the eld of information security: state and development prospects.
National security: management and information technology support, Minsk 2000, p. 9.
13 V.A. Lisichkin, L.A. Shelepin, The third world (information and psychological) war, M.: Insti-
tute of Social and Political Research ASN 1999.304, p. 9.
14 V. Yagupov, Military psychology: textbook, M.: Tandem 2004.656, p. 336.
15 Ibidem, p. 337.