INSTYTUT BEZPIECZEŃSTWA I ZARZĄDZANIA

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ISSN 2543–7321   DOI: 10.34858/SNB.7.2022

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THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY IN EUROPE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY. SELECTED ASPECTS

EWOLUCJA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA W EUROPIE NA POCZĄTKU XXI WIEKU. WYBRANE ASPEKTY

Abstract: Security is a phenomenon that is undergoing constant evolution. The beginning of the 21st century has brought many changes in the field of security. This has been influenced by, among other things, civilizational changes, the development of technology and a change in the mentality of society and politicians. In the first part of the article, the term security and a historical outline of the changes in international security are indicated. Subsequently, the factors that have had a significant impact on the changes in the evolution of security in Europe are listed and then the current situation in international security is characterised.

Zarys treści: Bezpieczeństwo jest zjawiskiem, które podlega ciągłej ewolucji. Początek XXI wieku przyniósł wiele zmian w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa. Wpływ na to miały m.in. zmiany cywilizacyjne, rozwój technologii oraz zmiana mentalności społeczeństwa i polityków. W pierwszej części artykułu wskazano pojęcie bezpieczeństwa oraz zarys historyczny zmian w bezpieczeństwie międzynarodowym. Następnie wymieniono czynniki, które miały istotny wpływ na zmiany w ewolucji bezpieczeństwa w Europie, a następnie scharakteryzowano obecną sytuację w zakresie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego.

Keywords: security, international security, evolution of international security
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo, bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, ewolucja bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego

The concept of security has evolved over the years and new definitions of it have been created. Particularly in recent years, due to the development of security sciences, new definitions and divisions of it are emerging. The evolution of security that has taken place in recent years and the factors that influence it are not insignificant. "Security in general is a universally understood concept. Like justice, joy, happiness, respect or love, security contains many personal references. Something that for one person,

community or nation is happiness or justice for others will mean quite the opposite. Some people under specific conditions are happy and secure, while others under the same conditions will be desperate, lost and live with a sense of insecurity. Security at the level of the individual is generally associated with peace, whereas at higher levels, e.g. at the national and international levels, we usually associate security with peace, as the opposite of war."[1]

Security is a primordial need of individuals, social groups, nations, states and continents. It is not a once and for all good. It is subject to evolution, depends on shifting balances of power and is a function of changes in the global security environment. Given that it is a process where participants in international relations form a mosaic of states that are diverse in terms of: aspirations and influence of a given state on international relations, geostrategic, geopolitical, historical, ethnic, national, religious, cultural and many other conditions – it requires a comprehensive approach taking into account the scale and dynamics of the changes taking place.

During the period of the bipolar division of the world, security issues were closely linked: with military policy, with military structures, with armed forces and defence in the broadest sense. The erosion and collapse of this system was a triumph of Western politics. However, these transformations bring with them serious international concerns and problems; their development and consequences were probably not foreseen by the architects of this policy.[2] It is worth bearing in mind, however, that all changes, including those in the modern world, are very complex and cannot be predicted, let alone their side effects avoided. For we are witnessing progressive globalisation, which, with the breakdown of the bipolar division of the world, does not encounter any barriers and is accompanied by systemic, socio-political, cultural, economic and military transformations with unforeseeable consequences. The development of organised cross-border crime, terrorism, the phenomena of nationalism, chauvinism and religious fundamentalism must also be taken into account. The mass movement of people, knowledge, services, finances and hostile ideas is also an important issue. It is therefore important to modify the approach to security views in particular, including national and international security.

Currently, the concept of security refers to almost all areas of development: political, ideological, social, cultural, ethnic, demographic, economic, financial, access to natural energy resources, scientific, technical, technological, food, information, information technology (ICT, cyber), environmental, health and military etc. This catalogue is open-ended and will be systematically supplemented with the progress of civilisation.

"In specific situations individual aspects may be dominant and the order presented above will not correspond to reality. However, it seems that, regardless of the circumstances of the environment, the political aspect will always be dominant, if not at the beginning of the development of the situation, then certainly during. It is worth

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1   Gołębiewski, J., *National Security of the Republic of Poland*, [in:] *Universal Rescue System and Defence and State Security*, „Zeszyt Problemowy Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej" 1999, no. 1, p. 5.
2   Dworecki, S., *From conflict to war*, BUWIK Publishing House, Warsaw 1996, p. 11.

noting that, as a general rule, one cannot expect only one aspect of security because the emergence of any one aspect implies another."[3]

The scale and dynamics of the changes occurring in the global security environment include times of major re-evaluation in social life, the development of technology and, above all, in the mentality of the population (politicians) and the rise of civilizational threats also have an impact on the perception of security. All the more so as security is not only about the will to survive, but also about protecting prosperity and free lifestyles, freedoms and national, ethnic, religious identity and movement etc. This means that the world has shrunk, we live in a global village and security is primarily an international category. It is the processes taking place in this environment (positive and negative) which translate into the level of security: state, local, sub-regional, regional, supra-regional and global. The space dimension of security should also be borne in mind, concerning, among other things, protection from asteroids approaching the Earth.

In terms of the reflections carried out, the end of the then political-military and economic division of the world resulted in major changes and turbulence in the international security environment and the perception of this qualitatively new reality. Many states were forced to search for a new security formula in order to move freely in a high-risk environment in the face of evolving changes in their geopolitical and geostrategic positions.

It is important to note that the discussion on the new shape of security was accompanied by serious re-evaluations, among others, in the perceptions of politicians, whose decisions did not always lead to rational solutions. As a consequence of the decisions taken, the internal and external security systems of states (including the protection of state secrets) were compromised, which directly translated into reduced defence budgets and significant reductions in the armed forces. This has led to a so-called military stalemate, affecting the current military capabilities of, among others, NATO member states, as pointed out by the former US President (Donald Trump). It can be assumed that his successor, Joe Biden, will uphold the position of his predecessor. In view of the US presidential election (2020), the current President, due to the ongoing review of decisions made by the former President, has put on hold the decision to further withdraw US troops from German territory. This situation will undoubtedly have an impact on international politics, relations with NATO and the EU, as well as with Russia and Turkey, and thus on European and global security.

The processes taking place in the international security space are no longer accompanied by information warfare, but by active information warfare, where its participants, appreciating its importance for their own particular interests, will conduct active information activities aimed not only at acquiring information, but also at disrupting the perception of the object of attack.

With the above in mind, it must be assumed that security must be viewed through the prism of many complex aspects (internal and external), which are interdependent

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[3]   Gołębiewski, J., *National Security…*, op. cit., p. 13.

and have an impact on its level. Security is interdisciplinary and multifaceted and should be related to all functions of the state and the global security environment.

The asymmetry, turbulence and complexity of the international security environment characterise the 21st century world. Its determinants are diversity (variety and varying speed of the processes taking place), complexity (non-linearity and huge number of processes), volatility (dynamic changes of informational, civilizational, cultural, nature etc.) and unpredictability (dynamics and non-linearity of processes).[4] These are factors that fundamentally affect the current and future international security environment. Considerations include globalisation processes, increasingly sophisticated forms of asymmetric warfare, the impact of demographic and environmental change, states in decay, radical ideologies and uno.esolved conflicts.[5]

Thus, "the concept of security is constantly acquiring new meanings, which are, of course, accompanied by diversity and even freedom of interpretation. This capacity for meaning and interpretation is due not only to the different traditions, sizes, locations and particular interests of states, nor only to the developmental tendencies of the international community, which are forcing an ever broader understanding of the concept, but also to its hitherto objective and subjective nature. On the one hand, security is a state defined by a set of measurable factors and circumstances subject to rational judgement. On the other hand, it signifies the more or less subjective feeling of the nation and the forces governing it that the state is secure or not. With, of course, a whole range of intermediate feelings."[6]

International security (which is a broader concept than state security), on the other hand, encompasses the external security of individual states and the global system as a whole. It should be noted that international security is not the sum of the security of states, as it encompasses both the existential values of individual states and the common values of the global security system, such as stability, peace, international order, degree of democratisation, cooperativeness, balance and cooperation in various areas.[7] Security is a dynamic process that changes in time and space and is significantly influenced by the information warfare that always accompanies human action. It involves information operations in support of all decisions aimed at adhering (or not adhering) to norms and principles of non-use of force in solving international problems. This can be military as well as non-military force. Thus, international security is seen in the category of complex conditionality, which corresponds to diverse international arrangements.

The historical changes that took place in the international security environment after the break-up of the bipolar division of the world: the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989) and the reunification of the German states (October 1990); the dissolution of the Soviet Union (December 1991); the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact

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[4]   Witecka, M.S., *Asymmetric threats and information technologies*, "Issue Notebook of the Defence Knowledge Society" 2011, no. 4, p. 9.

[5]   Kozub, M., *Strategic security environment in the first years of the 21st century*, AON Publishing House, Warsaw 2009, p. 128.

[6]   Dworecki, S., *From conflict to war...*, op. cit., p. 12.

[7]   Pokruszyński, W., *Bezpieczeństwo teoria i praktyka*, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Euroregionalnej, Józefów 2012, p. 69.

(July 1991), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (June 1991); and the division of Czechoslovakia (1992/1993) into two independent states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, fundamentally changed the approach to the emerging global security environment. After the collapse of the Soviet Union many new states were created, including Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine among others, and in its Asian part (e.g. Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). The Commonwealth of Independent States with a dominant position for Russia has also emerged. It should also be borne in mind that the states that had lost the protection of the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union and its military might were faced with a new balance of power, which at that time had yet to see adequate security structures.

"For the sake of security, in the initial phase of the transition, an attempt was made to give new importance to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This resulted from both the Paris meeting in 1990 and the Review Conference in 1992, which had the effect of clarifying cooperation with European organisations and states. The main European institutions and institutions providing security on the European continent included the aforementioned Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), together with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace, which the Alliance had established; the European Union (EU); the Western European Union (WEU); the Council of Europe; and the Commonwealth of Independent States, with its main power, Russia."[8]

At the time, it was felt that the above institutions dealing with security issues should undertake comprehensive activities in accordance with their capabilities. At the same time, care was taken to ensure that their activities did not conflict with those of other similar organisations.

In the international realities of the time, European and world politicians posited that there was a limited possibility of an East-West political-military conflict. This meant a change in the approach to international security, where security and peace-keeping issues continued to be prioritised. Under these qualitatively new conditions, decisions were made in the designated organisations to take them into account and to develop new rules of operation. Disussions on the new shape of the European security system continue to this day. Three model concepts of security have been identified:

1. collective security under the leadership of the OSCE,
2. European with a dominant role for the European Union,
3. Euro-Atlantic with the North Atlantic Alliance as a key force.

Following the processes taking place, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union have been recognised as a significant component of the European security system.

"The OSCE emphasised human rights, the free market and the peaceful settlement of disputes, all of which dominated the Paris Conference in November 1990.

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[8]   Kaczmarek, J., *Models of European security*, „Zeszyt Problemowy Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej" 1998, no. 2, p. 6.

Considerable progress was made in the elimination, reduction and control of armaments of various classes and categories (Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement – CFE). The agreement reached on the basis of this treaty made it possible to undertake undertakings verifying the work on the reduction of military equipment and personnel (e.g. the Clean Sky Agreement)."[9]

The result of the processes taking place was, among others, the inclusion of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the programme on: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and strategic arms reduction. For example, "in the rolling of 1993, 158 states signed *the Chemical Weapons Convention*. In addition, work on the Start I and Start II treaties was resumed, and work was undertaken on limiting the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (including their production technologies). During this period, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty were adopted, the International Atomic Energy Agency was strengthened, work resumed on the verifiable implementation of the 1972 *Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention*, negotiations began on the near completion of the *Fissile Material Convention* and missile technology transfer control regimes were expanded."[10]

In addition to the work indicated, decisions were made to cut defence budgets, resulting in reductions in armed forces in all countries. For example, Canada between 1989 and 1999 (by 32%), Italy in the 1990s (by 21%), the Netherlands between 1990 and 2001(by 42.5%), Austria between 1991 and 1995 (by 16%), Sweden by 1999 (by 37%), Poland between 1990 and 1995 (by 37%).[11] These trends led to a serious weakening of these countries' defence capabilities in the mid-1990s, the effects of which are still visible today.

It should also be borne in mind that the turn of the 1990s, as a result of significant reductions in the armed forces, resulted in changes to the tasks facing the modern army, with a reduction in its functions.**[12]**

In the new liberal conception of the approach to this specific public good of national defence and the army, governments are attempting to introduce elements of economic calculus, limiting the military's area of activity to performing only defence and offensive functions and taking away from it many activities related to logistics.[13] Internal armed and non-armed conflicts, ongoing in the international space, cause armed forces to be engaged in missions and operations conducted in support of peace. Each of these activities is treated as non-war operations involving international components of the armed forces.

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[9]   Gołębiewski, J., *Bezpieczeństwo Polski – aspekt międzynarodowy*, „Myśl Wojskowa" 2000, no. 5, p. 5.
[10]   *Ibidem*, p. 6.
[11]   Gołębiewski, J., *National Security...*, op. cit., p. 10.
[12]   Żebrowski, A., *Wywiad i kontrwywiad XXI wieku,* Wydawnictwo Wydziału Administracji Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomii i Innowacji, Lublin 2010, p. 289.
[13]   Łukaszewicz, A., *Afghanistan and Iraq: the economic balance sheet of the war on terrorism*, Warsaw 2010, pp. 73–74.

"The decline in the threat of world war and the emergence of the so-called peace dividend – the possibility of allocating resources previously spent on defence to other purposes – has resulted, among other things, in significant reductions in the size of the armed forces in most European countries and in the United States and Canada. In the USA alone, the armed forces were reduced from 2.1 million men in 1989 to 1.4 million in 2008. On a larger scale, these processes took place in Russia and the pro-Soviet states."[14] This meant massive reductions following which a large group of relatively young, dynamic and well-trained (often with combat experience) military professionals appeared on the labour market.[15] Thus, they naturally became the cadre of private military companies and therefore it can be assumed that the end of the Cold War contributed to the development of the market for private military services.

"Private military companies are legal business entities whose activities cover the international area. They employ personnel to carry out tasks, the details of which are defined by civil-legal contracts with the client. At the same time, the client can be either an individual, an organisation or even the government of any country. One proposed definition to describe private military corporations is as follows: legally constituted entities that profit from the provision of services of a military nature, in an organised manner, including training, logistical support, equipment production and intelligence gathering. These companies are most often covered by contractual secrecy under threat of cancellation and consequent loss of remuneration. Employees of military corporations are obliged to fulfil the tasks set before them by their employers, according to the rules established in accordance with the company's internal policies."[16]

Another important argument is the processes associated with increasing globalisation, which include the free movement of people, services, capital, information and knowledge. These provide the natural conditions for concealing the relationships that exist between private military and private security companies and other actors. The demand for such services is also closely related to the growing national and transnational concerns that are increasingly relocating their activities to other geographical areas, sometimes with unstable internal situations.

It should be noted that in many countries the developing market for private military services has been favourably received, which has made it possible, among other things, to solve problems related to the management of soldiers discharged from service.[17]. This complex process has, however, been accompanied by negative phenomena related to the supplying of organised transnational criminal groups and terrorist organisations by dismissed soldiers. It is also important to bear in mind the transfer of scientists (nuclear physics) from the former Soviet Union to countries launching their own national nuclear programmes.

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[14]   Uesseler, R., *War as a Service. How private military companies destroy democracy*, Warsaw 2008, p. 14.
[15]   *Ibidem*.
[16]   Błonko, K., *Contractors vis-à-vis Temida*, 'Komandos' 2009, no. 12, pp. 59–60.
[17]   Żebrowski, A., *Wywiad i kontrwywiad...*, op. cit., p. 289.

There are many complex reasons for the popularity, growth and involvement of private companies offering services in the military sphere, such as:

1) the breakdown of the bipolar division of the world and the end of the Cold War;
2) the employers for private military companies are multinationals, which are most often involved in the extraction of natural resources. Such activities are often carried out in politically unstable regions, which makes the costs of running the infrastructure extremely high (including providing security for European and US personnel). In addition, in some cases, agreements made by governments with multinational corporations are not accepted by local communities, often leading to conflicts including the use of violence (force). Therefore, services to both unstable governments and the aforementioned economic actors are becoming a motivation for the development of private military services;
3) the execution of government contracts abroad. It should be noted that government contracts executed abroad as a form of military assistance to other countries are more politically secure, meaning that any failure does not trigger repercussions. This is also supported by the fact that the employer is a private civilian company and not the government. Additionally, in the event of the death or kidnapping of an employee, the fact is less likely to shock the public. It should be emphasised that private military services are closely linked to politics and the economy (natural resources) and companies operating in this sphere are an excellent tool in the hands of state authorities;
4) carrying out government contracts for the benefit of its own armed forces. Private companies for the benefit of the armed forces offer a wide range of services, which include the following: protection of military facilities, implementation of logistical security activities, training of armed forces and security in other countries, protection of VIPs, security of infrastructure related to oil and gas extraction, protection of transport (e.g. money).[18]

Terrorist attacks, the growth of organised cross-border crime and, above all, armed conflicts (Afghanistan, Africa, South America, the Middle East, Chechnya, Iraq, Oceania, Syria and Ukraine) are increasing the involvement of private military companies in security tasks.

The security and defence services offered by private companies are very broad. They include, among others: advising high-level commanders, training in the application of new strategies and tactics for action on the modern battlefield, hand-to-hand combat techniques, learning to operate missile launchers for various purposes with the use of simulators and demonstrating modern military techniques. Diverse services also include the latest types of weapons and military equipment (usually of American production), which is very often related to orders placed with the American arms industry. In addition, training includes: psychological preparation of personnel for military operations, specialised training for special forces, training of state security forces and security personnel. The activities of private military companies also include

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[18]   Żebrowski, A., *Wywiad i kontrwywiad…*, op. cit., p. 289.

security education provided by private universities, where security professionals are trained in military and non-military spheres to become security officers or risk managers. Practical training takes place on the territory of, among others: France, Israel, the United States and the United Kingdom. Such services also include the protection of facilities of international organisations, embassies (consulates), diplomatic and consular staff, business representatives, economic facilities, natural resource exploitation sites, protection of transmission infrastructure and hydrocarbon extraction sites and military hostage-taking operations etc.

The unfolding negative phenomena in the global security environment require increasing investment in protection which, for private military companies, means expanding the range of services provided. Such an example is the range of services offered which includes security and armed protection in all crisis situations on land, sea and in the air.[19] The services offered include maritime security tasks that include: combat operations, apprehending smugglers, protecting vessels with armed underwater search teams and security training for the entire crew. The service is the prevention of unlawful seizure of a waterborne vessel (mainly commercial and container vessels).[20] Protection against hijacking and the release of hostages, fighting organised crime, money laundering and human trafficking are also among the services they offer.[21] Another offering is the so-called Intelligence sector, related to intelligence and espionage activities. Developments in ICT and communication techniques mean that there is a demand for services concerning interception and eavesdropping on electromagnetic signals as well as on Internet communication and e-mail.[22] The sector also deals with image-based reconnaissance, which enables the production of reconnaissance data on the basis of imaging from photographs, radio locators, infrared and thermal electro-optical instruments and other devices.[23] Particularly noteworthy is the conduct of personal penetration of the information space with the participation of agents. In addition, intelligence activities include: client protection, guarding, analysing the possible risk of an attack and planning action strategies.

An example of a company that set the course for private military services in the future (globally) was the company Executive Outcomes (EO), which was founded in 1990 in South Africa. The facts speak for themselves:
- firstly, it was one of the first private military companies in general;
- secondly, EO was something new in that it was constructed around the company's empire;
- thirdly, EO was admittedly a small, but complete, autonomous private army.

The scope of its services was comprehensive and included: advice, training, coaching, direct participation of combat units in combat, provision of armaments, logistics,

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[19]   Uesseler, R., *War as a Service...*, op. cit., p. 44.
[20]   *Ibidem*, p. 45.
[21]   *Ibidem*, p. 45.
[22]   *Ibidem*, p. 47.
[23]   Nowacki, G., *US and Russian Federation satellite recognition*, AON Publishing House, Warsaw 2002, p. 54.

technical supervision, intelligence and counter-intelligence security, as well as physical protection. Its autonomy also stemmed from having its own weapons, its own reconnaissance system (including intelligence services), supply bases and transport system. Within the structure of Executive Outcomes, there were the following organisational (executive) units: oil and gas production, geophysical, hydrogeological and water drilling expertise, investment and consulting for industrial plants, air transport, airlines, exports, imports, customs, engineering, infrastructure, logistics, NGO support services, advertising agency, advertising companies and tourism.[24]

Another example is the US private military company "Kellog, Brown & Root, offering logistics, procurement and technical supervision services during peacekeeping operations carried out by US troops since June 1999. American soldiers were provided with: more than one billion hot meals and more than 200 billion litres of water, one billion litres of gasoline and disposed of more than 90,000 cubic metres of rubbish. The services provided also included construction, transportation, engineering, technical supervision of buildings and their equipment, road construction, provision of electricity, water and gasoline, foodstuffs, cleaning of clothes and delivery of correspondence. It turns out that without the services of this company, US soldiers could neither eat nor sleep, and could not carry out their tasks due to the lack of fuel, weapons and ammunition supplies."[25]

"The main driving force behind the process of privatising security and outsourcing military services in the US was the defence budget cuts that followed the end of the so-called Cold War. The military came to the conclusion that the army would save money when certain tasks not directly related to the conduct of military operations – such as procurement, transportation, protection of property and persons or logistics in the broadest sense – were transferred to private entities. [...] The most memorable were the mercenaries involved in the protection of VIPs and important facilities. Private soldiers, for example, often had nothing to do with Iraqi law and ordinary Iraqis. They covered themselves in grim glory in their willingness to pull the trigger. Four security guards from the notorious Blackwater company were sentenced to years in prison for orchestrating a bloody fight in the streets of Baghdad."[26] It is worth bearing in mind that the Pentagon is the largest employer for the private military companies it uses. "It appears that no operation of the US armed forces can now take place without the support of civilian personnel. As the situation in regions of interest to the US administration escalates, their numbers will increase. And who says war is not conducive to doing business?"[27]

The next country that uses private military companies in the implementation of its foreign policy is Russia. "They are involved in conflicts in the former Soviet Union, as well as where it has important political and economic interests – mainly in the Middle

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[24]   Uesseler, R., *War as a service...*, op. cit., p. 103.

[25]   *Ibidem*, pp. 99–100.

[26]   Bednarzak, T., *Private military companies are getting rich from the war against ISIS*, https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/prywatne-firmy-wojskowe-bogaca-sie-nawar-with-isis6025270123840129a, [accessed: 29.05.2020].

[27]   *Ibidem*.

East and North Africa. Between several hundred and up to three thousand Russian employees of private military companies are present in each of these places. They are also employed by Russian state corporations such as: Gazprom, Rosatom, Rosneft, Russian Railways – to protect resource extraction sites and networks, construction sites or to convoy transports in African, South American and Middle Eastern countries. In addition, countries such as Syria and Libya, when asked to protect hydrocarbon extraction sites and transmission infrastructure, offer a significant (25–30%) share of the contracts concluded for the sale of energy raw materials, giving private military companies significant revenues."[28]

It is worth bearing in mind that the asymmetric international security environment will continue to evolve towards widening differences in civilizational development. Existing and emerging threats primarily relate to deliberate human activity aimed at destroying adversaries. These adversaries are not only societies, but also their natural environments, which is being degraded (very often irreversibly) through progressive erosion. These conditions include many states which, in pursuit of their particular interests, are involved in a race to access modern technologies used to control and consequently, take control of the international security environment. Accordingly, they will conduct offensive information operations by, among other things, engaging private military companies. They will continue to use information operations to influence the situation in other states. They will continue to support arms supply, training and operations in the personal and technical information space. Private military companies are an important tool of international influence; through them states are able to exert political and military influence in regions of interest (conflicts, political and military instability), without officially committing their own armed forces. Given the scale and scope of operations (including information operations) by private military companies, further conflicts between them and the armed forces and private forms of other states with interests in the region should not be ruled out.

"Private military companies (PFWs) operate in most (around 110) countries in the world. Of the 30 most important, the largest number were established and are based in the USA and the UK. Their activity is mainly visible in places of armed conflict or where the political and social situation is unstable. Their activities are generally co-ordinated with the foreign policy objectives of the country of origin. The most important tasks include: securing the activities of regular armed forces (logistical security, convoy protection), training, protection of facilities and people. They work for both state and private entities. They are also used by UN agencies – UNICEF, World Food Programme (WFP), Development Programme, International Red Cross, among others."[29]

It is worth bearing in mind that members of private military companies are active participants in the ongoing global information conflict. This is supported by the penetration of the personal and technical information space in the course of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. Information operations are

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[28]   Dyner, A.M., *The importance of private military companies in Russia's foreign policy*, PISM, 4 May 2018, https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Znaczenie_prywatnych_firm_wojskowych_w_polityce_zagranicznej_Rosji, [accessed: 29.05.2020].

[29]   *Ibidem*.

most often clandestine in nature because they very often secure the activities of the regular components of the armed forces of countries involved in armed conflicts, or provide logistical security for military-civilian participants in peace support operations.

Observation of this global services market allows one to hypothesise that private military companies have been able to grow to the point where they have, in a sense, displaced state security structures[30] from the space of many states. This situation in the private security market will further intensify as states have generally lost their monopoly on the internal and external security of the state.

An important aspect of current geopolitics is the dynamic changes in the global security environment. States that have freed themselves from the pressures exerted by the leaders of political-military blocs have become the target of rabid and pervasive propaganda. The transformations that followed brought them under the influence of globalisation processes. The mass movement of peoples causes cultures and religions to mix, which is the source of numerous problems. The cultural and religious specificities mean that the internal security of many countries is under threat. Cultures are changing, the standards of which were once clearly defined. In the culture of the 21st century, ideas, images and symbols are constantly evolving, from which only a few elements can be grasped. This conditioning means access to more and more information.

We are seeing an increasing role for national and religious factors, which have a very strong emotional impact. Fuelled and properly directed, they take the form of nationalism and xenophobia, which is evident in many countries. There is a source of danger where the use of accumulated military potentials can give rise to rash decisions.

Global propagandists are aware of this, which is used in the organisation and conduct of psychological warfare. It is accepted that the basis for the effectiveness of information conflicts is the use of force over a long distance in the shortest possible time. Such possibilities are provided by modern ICT, communication technology and the Internet. These tools allow synchronisation and coordination of actions taken in the political, social, economic and military spheres, where the terrain of confrontation is cyberspace. This allows interference in the internal affairs of other states, depriving the opponent of the will to fight. Skilfully conducted propaganda, taking into account the cultural and religious factor, can lead to the decomposition of the existing order in the sphere of security in states, regions and sub-regions. The rapid development of information technology is fundamentally changing people and their environment. It increases the flow of information, which allows offensive parties greater opportunities to influence the consciousness of the object of attack. In this process, the adversary takes into account, among other things:

1) human-information-technology relationships that are changing people's behaviour, habits and also their way of thinking,
2) human-society relations, where there are undoubtedly generational differences, which affect the perception of the security environment (individual, social group, nation and state).

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[30]   Scahill, J., *Blackwater*, Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, Wrocław 2007, pp. 88–93.

A condition for the occurrence of change is the developing information and communication systems, which increases the possibilities for information aggression. Therefore, in a world dominated by information warfare, it is necessary to try to understand the internal and external environment (near and far) of the state, the processes taking place there, but also oneself. Furthermore, it is also necessary to understand the information activity (including intellectual activity) of the adversary and the relationships occurring in order to be able to more easily decipher the challenges (opportunities and threats) to the security of the individual, social group, nation and state.

The great unknown for the level of international security is the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States. Four key questions arise: will he continue the aggressive foreign policy of his predecessor? Will he change the existing US National Security Strategy and War Doctrine? Will the policy be rational from the point of view of the global information space? These and many other questions concerning this area are likely to dominate the international political scene supported by information operations. The pandemic and the new US president, are key issues for the international security environment, and this space will evolve in fundamental ways. An evolving international security environment includes intensified negative co-option by key players in international relations and global information warfare.

We are witnessing how the dominant position of the United States on a global scale is being threatened by other states (e.g. China, Russia, Turkey and Iran) that seek to participate in shaping international security. "The foreign policy of the US administration (under President Trump) has fundamentally changed the balance of power at the time. The emergence of new players – strong above all militarily (holders of nuclear weapons) – threatened US hegemony. This qualitatively different situation was reflected in US military policy, which was reflected in the country's new national security documents and war doctrine."[31]

However, the ongoing changes in the global information space following the US presidential election, and the decisions made by President Biden, indicate that it is the continued policies of former President Trump which pose a threat to not only regional, but to global security. Continued policies take the form of concrete decisions and actions, such as:

1) The redeployment of four B-1 aircraft to Orlent airbase in Norway. This is a very important airbase where military aircraft, search and rescue helicopters and E-3A SENTRY AWACS aircraft are based. This base can accommodate 95,000 personnel at a time. B-1 US strategic bombers with variable wing geometry can carry a wide range of conventional and nuclear bombs and missile weapons in three internal bomb bays and on six external hard points. It is expected they will carry nuclear weapons in the form of B28, B61 and B83 bombs and missiles.

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[31]   Żebrowski, A., *Security and defence of the United States under President Trump*, [in:] M. Winiarczyk-Kossakowska, S. Saletra-Półgrabi, P. Skorut (eds.), *NATO w dwadzieścia lat po akcesji*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JA, Warszawa 2020, p. 281.

2) February 2021 saw the largest exercise since July 2020 in the South China Sea, with the US deploying two strike groups: the aircraft carriers USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Nimitz. Relations between China and the US have been strained for several years. Under President Trump the US started a trade war with China and now the US is accusing Beijing of human rights violations by persecuting Uighurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang. There are intersecting interests in the South China Sea: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Brunei and the US.

3) US President Joe Biden has stated that the United States will not lift sanctions against Iran until the country's authorities halt uranium eno.ichment. This is a condition for the United States to rejoin the 2015 Vienna Accords, signed by Tehran and the superpowers (the US, China, Russia, France and the UK), which aimed to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb and for the country's nuclear programme to remain civilian and peaceful. Iran's nuclear activities were intensified in response to US sanctions.

4) Very dangerous is the statement by US President Biden, who announced that he is going to confront Russian President Putin. Such a stance, combined with the existing documents adopted by his predecessor (National Security Strategy and War Doctrine) and the redelivery of B-1 aircraft to Norway, should be seen as the beginning of a confrontation, which may result in the intensification of the already ongoing arms race, the formation of new political-military alliances (e.g. Russia-China, Russia-India and Russia-Turkey), the intensification of the activities of NATO member states on the eastern flank, an increase of the US military presence in Europe, the admission of new members to the Alliance (e.g. Ukraine and Georgia), an increase of economic sanctions against Russia – which may take the form of economic warfare, an increase in the number of military operations against Russia, intensified pressure by the United States on NATO and European Union member states to renounce economic cooperation with an emphasis on natural gas supplies from Russia, expansion of NATO infrastructure in countries bordering Russia and Belarus, increased intelligence penetration and intensified psychological action supported by information operations by both Russia and the United States etc. President Biden's position has and will continue to have a significant impact on the level of regional, sub-regional and global security.

5) April 2021 is when the political activity of the United States in Central and Eastern Europe, where an open information war with Russia in the political sphere due to the accumulation of significant forces and resources near the border with Ukraine by the Russian side, led to a so-called war of nerves. The US side most likely did not withstand the pressure of Russia's information and military activity (exercises of the Western and Southern Military Districts, after which the troops returned to their permanent location sites), which, among other things, was treated by the countries bordering Ukraine as a threat of an imminent outbreak of an armed conflict. This demonstration of military force

can be seen as probing the behaviour of the actors in international relations with particular reference to the USA. The announcement and subsequent withdrawal of President Biden's decision to engage in the Black Sea basin by sending two warships may indicate an avoidance of an escalation of tensions between Washington and Moscow. Noteworthy is the US President's offer to meet with President Putin in a third country to discuss the full range of issues facing the US and Russia. However, the decisions and actions were accompanied by nervousness, resulting in an intensified information battle in the political sphere (supported by the intelligence services of the parties involved). "The White House communicated on 15 April 2021 that President Joe Biden had signed an executive order imposing additional sanctions on Russia over its interference in the 2020 US election and hacking attacks. In addition to expelling 10 diplomats, under the new sanctions the US banned US financial institutions from trading in Russian bonds and named six companies as partners of Russian services in hacking attacks. In addition, personal sanctions were introduced against 32 individuals implicated in attempts to interfere in the 2020 US election."[32] "The head of Russian diplomacy announced that Russia had expelled 10 US diplomats. This is to respond to the expulsion from the US of 10 Russian diplomats suspected of espionage. Lavrov added that the Russian authorities will prohibit the employment of Russian citizens and third-country nationals in US diplomatic representations. In addition, Russia will break with the practice of not limiting the entry of US State Department and other US ministry employees for short business visits to US diplomatic representations in Russia. Lavrov announced that Russia will propose annual parity, such as the introduction of a rule that one Russian employee may enter the US and 10 US employees may enter Russia."[33] In addition, "Lavrov announced that Russia would ban US NGO foundations that interfere in Russian domestic politics. He warned that Russia could take painful measures against American businessmen."[34] In a later announcement they said they were imposing sanctions on eight current and former US government officials. The politicians included US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, Attorney General Merrick Garland, Department of Homeland Security chief Alejandro Mayorkas, former White House National Security Advisor John Bolton and former CIA chief James Woolsey.[35] It is important to emphasise that in this confrontation in the political sphere, supported by information operations, the United States is using dependent countries that are members of NATO. Countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are taking unfriendly steps towards Russia, in consultation with representatives of the US Department,

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32 Lavrov: *we will expel 10 US diplomats, ambassador should return to US for consultations*, https://tvn24.plswiat/rosja-zapowiada-wydalenie-amerykanskich-dyplomatow-siergie-lawrow -sugeruje-ze-ambasador-usa-powinien-wyjechac, [accessed: 24.04.2021].
33 *Ibidem*.
34 *Ibidem*.
35 *Ibidem*.

leading to the expulsion of Russian diplomats. Following this, the Russian side expelled diplomats of the countries indicated. The Czech side accused Russian diplomats of being GRU members who were complicit in the blowing up of explosive magazines in 2014. The revelation of the incident comes after seven years, where a Bulgarian trail leading to an arms trafficker (Gebrev) and his links to Ukraine are indicated. The Bulgarian side reported that the said arms dealer was buying explosives from a Czech warehouse on the day the explosion took place. At the same time, there was also an explosion of explosives in a warehouse located on Bulgarian territory, which is also suspected to have been carried out by officers of the Russian military intelligence service GRU. Bulgaria, being in conflict with Russia, expelled Russian diplomats in 2019 on charges of espionage.

6) In the ongoing US-Russian political conflict, in addition to the countries already mentioned, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have also expelled Russian diplomats, thus showing their support for the US side. This is very dangerous, all the more so as the countries involved, despite being members of NATO, have small economic and defence potential. Moreover, such an attitude shows absolute subordination to the US.

7) These events involve not only the official bodies of the above-mentioned states, i.e. foreign ministries, supported by intelligence services, which may mean that these events are the result of intelligence games played by the main beneficiaries (the United States and Russia). Observation of the processes taking place, i.e. the US-Russia relationship, as well as the use of dependent states, gives global international relations a qualitatively new dimension. The ongoing information war and the political decisions taken by its participants in its aftermath have an impact on the level of security not only in Europe but also globally. It can be assumed that its consequences will be felt primarily by states that are tools of the United States. These events are accompanied by a statement made by a representative of the US embassy in Warsaw (April 2021), who stated that the US will not allow the completion of Nord Stream-2. This means that tension between the US and Russia will persist and decisions taken against Russia may lead to its escalation. If the US side, exploiting its position in the global security environment and supported by its military potential, and involving dependent states in encircling Russia, a multifaceted response from the Russian side is to be expected. It can be assumed that the strategic objective is to take control of energy resources located in the Russian Federation's sphere of responsibility.

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The state of international security is also affected by events elsewhere in the world, such as the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, where the United States is not only politically involved but supports the Ukrainian side with weapons. The course of this conflict is also important for the security of the Black Sea basin countries (Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Romania and Turkey), the Sea of Azov (Russia

and Ukraine) – a disputed area between the countries indicated and the Caspian Sea (Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan). The Black Sea is important for the global economy due to the large oil deposits underneath its sea bed and which is the cause of disputes over the division of waters between littoral states.

The Ukraine-Russia conflict has fundamentally changed the situation in the Black Sea basin, where the European Union, NATO and also the United States have interests. It is worth pointing to the EU, which has strategic economic goals and treats the region as an attractive market. The Black Sea region is also important for Europe's energy security as it is located on the transit route for oil and gas from the Caspian Sea area and the whole of Central Asia.[36] It should also be borne in mind that the Black Sea is a transport link from Asia to Europe, which is considered a route of movement for international terrorist organisations, transnational criminal groups involved in illegal migration, drug smuggling, arms trafficking and money laundering etc., which is important for the security of the European Union and NATO member states. It is also a region of political instability with ethnic, cultural and religious issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, in Georgia Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moldova Transnistria and Russia Chechnya. Russia's cooperation with Turkey is also important, including at the military level. For example, Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 system is the subject of a Turkish-American conflict resulting in Turkey's exclusion from the F-35 combat aircraft programme. It should be noted that Turkey, being a member of NATO, has the strongest army in the structures of this organisation. It turns out that the problem is more complex, because in the Black Sea basin both the states of the region and states and international organisations from outside the region have interests:

1) Western states, the United States, NATO and the European Union, which provide political, social and military assistance to countries in the region. The US and the EU want to take control of the region;
2) Russia and Turkey, the strongest states in the region, which seek to maintain their economic, military and political position in the region;
3) Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and the Caucasus countries.

In the foreign policy process, Turkey maintains contacts with the Muslim states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), which may have an impact on the shaping of security policy in the Middle East and Central Asia; it also maintains contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and thus with China and Russia. From the point of view of economic interests, the Bulgarian branch of the Turkish Stream pipeline, which runs from the Turkish to the Serbian border, should be kept in mind. It is intended to ensure the flow of Russian natural gas from Turkey, to which it is supplied via a pipeline under the Black Sea, to Serbia and via there on to Hungary, Austria and Slovakia.

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[36]   Kobieracka, A., *Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as one of the forms of multifaceted cooperation between Russia and the People's Republic of China*, "Polskie Studium Politologiczne", 2017, no. 54, pp. 371–373.

The security and stability of the Black Sea region depends on the position of Russia and Turkey, countries that will seek to pursue economic and military policies in line with their own interests. The interests of the United States, the European Union, NATO, as well as the Muslim states of the region and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation should also be kept in mind.

It turns out the Black Sea's problems are primarily related to its oil resources. For example, Ukraine has been in talks with the world's largest energy companies, Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell, about drilling south-west of Crimea. These two companies are also interested in exploiting the Skifska field, which stretches from the western coast of the Crimean peninsula to the coast of Romania. Today, exploitation is in question.

The emerging balance of power and international developments indicate that the collective efforts of UN member states, as well as non-state actors, do not always contribute to avoiding conflicts in the military and non-military spheres. It is worth bearing in mind that the development of international relations continues to take place in a pattern of political, ideological, cultural, economic, scientific and technical rivalry, although the military factor is increasingly decisive. The shift of NATO troops towards the east and the development of the organisation's military infrastructure are forcing Russia to make certain counter-movements of a military nature (strengthening the Western Military District and the Kaliningrad enclave with new means of precision destruction). The ongoing armed conflicts, the ongoing arms race, the milit-ary presence in various geographical regions (military bases), are constant tensions which, if they escalate, could lead to a conflict of much greater scope.

In the global security environment, talks, consultations (bilateral and multilateral), the influence of the UN, as well as informal actors (politicians, businessmen, scientists, social organisations), as well as mass demonstrations related to the violation of democracy, the rule of law, mass migrations and the ongoing information war, with varying results, do not inspire optimism. There are still states which, from the position of their potential: economic, scientific and technical, information technology, and above all military potential (possessors of WMD), shape the level of regional and also global security by conducting large-scale information operations. In addition to the problems signalled, in all fields of human activity, the military activities of states that are not only members of specialised political-military and financial-economic organisations, but also states that have a nuclear triad and/or are developing their own nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, should be recognised and rationally assessed. The armed forces of many participants in international relations show a constant trend of increasing war potential, especially in terms of qualitative improvement of the means of physical destruction. These activities are accompanied by the evolution of strategic and operational assumptions, as well as increased financial and economic efforts, which directly translates into the modernisation of the armed arsenals of individual states. This process is accompanied by the activities of organised cross-border crime, oriented towards the trafficking of weapons,

components for the production of WMD, radioactive materials and their means of delivery, dual-use technology and other materials for use on the battlefield etc.

In the global space of international security there are still many causes, phenomena and conditions which, due to their diversity and complexity, not only have not resolved the contradictions to date, but continue to be a source of increasing antagonism between highly developed states, states aspiring to superpower status (including regional ones), as well as states seeking to preserve and consolidate their dominant influence.

Existing political, cultural, social, economic and military relations between countries, as well as differing access to natural energy resources and safe drinking water supplies, have a key impact on the existing (not entirely sustainable) global security system. The existing disparities in the level of development must also be borne in mind, and they will widen with the processes taking place. They will be the source of many conflicts of varying backgrounds, scale and destructive force.

Such an alignment of political, economic and military forces on a global scale, with the ambiguous cocksure attitude of many states and the ongoing information war, means that we live with a permanent threat shaping our daily lives.

Every action requires access to certain information, which means that global security is closely linked to the personal and technical information space, where conducted communications are of interest to many state and non-state actors, and organisations that violate international and national law. Their penetration allows building scenarios as to the next steps in strengthening the security environment of the state, region and sub-region. The development of international relations, supported by information oper-tions, continues to take place in a system of negative cooperation in the ideological, political, social, cultural, economic and scientific-technical spheres. Increasingly, however, the military factor is decisive. These processes are accompanied by the evolution of existing strategic assumptions, operational assumptions, budgets, as well as the constant modernisation of armed arsenals.

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Summary

The article identifies the problem of defining security. In addition, the changes that have occurred in international security at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries are characterised. The final part of the article describes the current situation that affects international security.

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NATURAL HAZARDS.
CONCEPT, ESSENCE AND CLASSIFICATION
ZAGROŻENIA NATURALNE.
POJĘCIE, ISTOTA I KLASYFIKACJA

Abstract: General security is now counted among the key areas of national security. Its main objective is becoming the protection of the population from the effects of various types of threats that may arise within the territory of Poland, but also outside its borders. These threats are not only threats caused by human activity, but also threats that are caused by the forces of nature. In the article, the author has attempted to define the concept, outline the essence and present the author's classification of natural hazards from the perspective of universal security. This is the result of the author's research work, which is reflected in the monograph currently in the publishing process, entitled "Natural hazards in the ecological environment" and "Natural hazards in the ecological security space." The project received funding from the MEiN "Excellent Science" programme.

Zarys treści: Bezpieczeństwo powszechne zaliczane jest obecnie do kluczowych dziedzin bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Jego głównym celem staje się ochrona ludności przed skutkami różnego rodzaju zagrożeń, które mogą się pojawić na terytorium Polski, ale także poza jej granicami. Zagrożenia te mają charakter zarówno zagrożeń wywołanych działalnością człowieka, ale też i zagrożeń, których źródłem są siły natury. W artykule, jego autor podjął próbę określenia pojęcia, nakreślenia istoty i przedstawienia autorskiej klasyfikacji zagrożeń naturalnych z perspektywy bezpieczeństwa powszechnego. Jest to efekt prac badawczych Autora, które znalazły swoje odzwierciedlenie w będącej aktualnie w procesie wydawniczym monografii pt. „Zagrożenia naturalne w ekologicznej przestrzeni bezpieczeństwa". Projekt uzyskał dofinansowanie z programu MEiN „Doskonała nauka".

Keywords: public safety, ecological safety, security hazards, natural hazards
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo powszechne, bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne, zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa, zagrożenia naturalne

Introduction

Every day, people are exposed to various types of threats which, depending on the circumstances and scale of the occurrence of a particular phenomenon, can assume the size of a natural disaster or catastrophe. The universality of the consequences of such events and situations makes them the focus of an important area of national security, which is undoubtedly universal security.

The term "universal security" does not yet have a clear and universally recognized definition, so it is difficult to determine unequivocally what activities of a defensive, protective or rescue nature fall within the competence of institutions providing security to all citizens without exception.

In addition, the lack of an accepted definition makes it difficult to unambiguously classify all threats that fall into the space of universal security. However, there is no doubt among security theorists and practitioners that threats to universal security include environmental threats of natural origin, as well as anthropogenic threats, the source of which is human activity.

The essence of modern threats

In the lexical approach to security, which is very widespread, it is often treated as being synonymous with the absence of danger. This universality and simplicity in the perception of security through the prism of threats results in most definitions, whether of security in the general sense or in specific categories, as the threat being the causal factor of the actions taken by the subject to remove it. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the world is and always has been a source of danger for humans, and distrust of it and what each new day may bring us, performs the function of a natural defence mechanism, without which no subject would be able to survive in their surrounding reality.[1]

Hence, threat plays an important role in knowing, understanding and properly interpreting all the circumstances and conditions of security, for it is closely related to it and, as evidenced by numerous definitions, embedded in its content.[2] In commonly used terms, threat is treated as the opposite of security and means the possibility of the appearance of a phenomenon negatively valued by the subject, or, alternatively, as a potential or actual phenomenon, situation or action that harms basic interests and values and poses a danger to them,[3] or finally, as a phenomenon or disparity

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[1]   See: Urbanek, A., *Wyzwania i zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa*, [in:] *Wybrane problemy bezpieczeństwa. Teoria. Strategia. System*, A. Urbanek (ed.), Słupsk 2012, p. 71.

[2]   This view is expressed, among others, by Fehler W.; Cf.: Fehler, W., *O pojęciu bezpieczeństwa państwa*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo państw i narodów w procesie integracji europejskiej*, W. Śmiałek, J. Tymanowski (eds.), Toruń 2002, p. 166; Fehler, W., *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne – próba ujęcia modelowego*, „Myśl Wojskowa" 1997, no. 6, p. 20.

[3]   Cf.: Prońko, J., *Bezpieczeństwo państwa. Zarys teorii, problemu i zadań administracji publicznej*, 2007, p. 7; Łoś-Nowak, T., *Pokój i bezpieczeństwo w teorii i praktyce stosunków międzynarodowych*, [in:] *Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe*, T. Łoś-Nowak (ed.), Wrocław 1997, p. 135.

in resources that causes concern, fear or anxiety.[4] Understanding the nature of a threat requires distinguishing between its two essential elements: objective and subjective.

The objective element refers to those phenomena that cause a state of uncertainty, fear or anxiety. The subjective element generally refers to the feeling and perception of phenomena that are considered unfavourable or dangerous to the subject. Thus, the first element includes real threats and is subject to objective assessment, while the second focuses on their psychological perception.[5] Both elements co-shape the threat and, at the same time, allow security to be defined and better understood.[6]

But distinguishing the above elements is not enough to understand the essence of modern threats, because the diversity of processes and phenomena that determine the face of modernity causes them to interpenetrate each other, creating qualitatively new security threats.[7] Hence, modern threats can be attributed four more characteristics: complexity, ubiquity, universality and relativity.

The complexity of hazards stems from the process of mixing them and giving them a new dimension and quality, which is derived from, among other things, the effects of globalization and, in the case of natural hazards, climate change. Another feature of hazards is their ubiquity: they are massively present all around us, often taking a form that is not subject to sensory cognition. They can appear in the air, water and food as harmful and often poisonous chemical compounds (e.g. pollutants) or microorganisms and toxins (bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae and the toxins they produce, such as botulinum toxin), causing poisoning or mass illnesses for which we have no antidote. They are also common, affecting every subject, and a sense of danger or awareness of dangers accompanies every person. This gives a new perspective on the perception of security, treated not as the traditional absence of threats, but a low, acceptable level of risk of their occurrence.[8]

An analysis of contemporary security paradigms shows that threat also includes the sphere of consciousness and can be treated as a mental state expressing both collective and individual perceptions and evaluations of reality or its elements, as mentioned earlier.[9] Relationships between the objective and subjective aspects, reality and the human psyche, allow us to distinguish four basic models of threat perception:[10]

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[4]   Cf.: Zięba, R., *Pozimnowojenny paradygmat bezpieczeństwa*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie*, R. Zięba (ed.), Warszawa 2008, p. 25.

[5]   See: Prońko, J., *Bezpieczeństwo państwa*.., op. cit.*,* p. 78.

[6]   Cf.: Brzeziński, M., *Kategoria bezpieczeństwa*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państwa. Wybrane zagadnienia*, S. Sulowski, M. Brzeziński (eds.), Warszawa 2009, p. 24.

[7]   Cf.: Cieślarczyk, M., *Modele i wymiary bezpieczeństwa*, „Zeszyty Naukowe AON" 1999, no. 3, p. 43; Kaczmarek, J., *Bezpieczeństwo w świetle praskiej konferencji NATO*, „Zeszyty Naukowe AON" 2003, no. 1, pp. 112–113.

[8]   Cf.: Brzeziński, M., *Kategoria bezpieczeństwa...*, op. cit., p. 25; Beck, U., *Społeczeństwo ryzyka. W drodze do innej nowoczesności*, Warszawa 2002, pp. 12, 31, 36, 37; Wolanin, J., *Zarys teorii bezpieczeństwa obywateli. Ochrona obywateli na czas pokoju*, Warszawa 2005, pp. 13–16.

[9]   Cieślarczyk, M., *Niektóre psychospołeczne aspekty bezpieczeństwa, wyzwań, szans i zagrożeń*, „Zeszyty Naukowe AON" 1999, no. 2, pp. 232, 235.

[10]   Zięba, R., *Pojęcie i istota bezpieczeństwa państwa w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe" 1989, no. 10, pp. 49–50.

- a state of insecurity (when there is a large, real threat, and its perception is correct);
- a state of obsession (when an unknown and uno.ecognized threat is treated as a big one);
- a state of false security (when a major threat is treated as minor);
- a state of security (when the threat is slight and its perception is correct).

Hence, there is another feature of threats, relativity, which should be accepted, and when assessing the state of security, their objective dimension should be considered as important as their subjective one. A relatively uniform assessment of the state of security can be obtained only when the objective (expert, actual) assessments are adequate to the subjective (social, perceived) ones.

Here one can agree with the thesis that in making decisions it is the duty of those responsible for security to skilfully reconcile the analysis of specialists with public opinion.[11] It should also be noted that this approach to the essence of threats has not only a practical dimension, but also a methodological one, since it establishes how to approach the study of security. According to R. Zięba, when "(...) analysing threats, attention should be paid to their perception by politicians, researchers and the public. It must be a reflection of the real state of affairs (actual or potential threat) or it can be false (so-called misperception). (...) For proper cognition of threats, it is important to take into account the sphere of reality in which they arise and the sphere of consciousness in which the perception of these threats and the formation of a sense of certainty are carried out."[12] The essence and characteristics of modern threats are summarized in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1. Essence and characteristics of contemporary threats in relation to security

Source: own development.

Thus, it is possible to accept the thesis that threats are complex, ubiquitous, common and relative, multidimensional and relative phenomena, and only an equal treatment of their subjective and objective dimensions makes it possible to determine

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11   Cieślarczyk, M., *Niektóre psychospołeczne...*, op. cit., p. 15.
12   Cf.: Zięba, R., *Pozimnowojenny paradygmat bezpieczeństwa...*, op. cit., p. 26.

the real picture of security. It is worth remembering that threats trigger the defence mechanisms of the subject and stimulate them to concrete action. Thus, they are an important stimulator of the subject's activity, allowing them to take action to ensure defence and protection against the negative consequences of threats. Their awareness by the subject and the subject's knowledge of the mechanisms, sources and consequences allows them to build a kind of security system, effectively protecting them from all known dangers.[13]

The concept of hazards, due to their universality and interdisciplinary nature, is used in various contexts of security considerations. When, for example, threats are discussed in the context of a crisis management system, attention is paid to the threat as a factor causing the occurrence of an emergency situation. An exemplification of this approach to threats is the definition proposed by Eugeniusz Nowak and Maciej Nowak, according to which "(...) threats are most generally understood primarily as insecurity and viewed as negative phenomena causing the likelihood of a crisis situation and dangers to the environment leading, as a consequence, to a crisis (understood as the culminating moment of a crisis situation)."[14] For the purposes of an emergency system, on the other hand, it is assumed that a threat is the possibility of "(...) the emergence of specific losses, determined for the situation after the occurrence of an undesirable event in the human-technical-environmental system."[15]

In currently emerging security publications, threats are often combined with challenges. According to R. Zięba, "(...) when studying the security issues of various entities, it is useful at the outset to distinguish threats from similarly perceived phenomena that are merely challenges."[16] Challenges, in dictionary terms, mean actions aimed at getting an opponent to fight back, or are a call for rivalry and competition. In other terms, it is a new and difficult situation that requires a certain response and action.[17] Thus, threats cannot be considered synonymous with challenges, or the two terms be treated as the same. A challenge is only a signal that, after analysis and evaluation by the subject, can be a causal factor for specific actions, and a threat is a fully real phenomenon that requires immediate specific actions, a decisive response by the subject to avoid a situation that constitutes a serious danger to them.[18] This was aptly summarized by R. Zieba, treating challenges as new situations, "(...) in which non-negotiable needs arise that require the formulation of a response and appropriate actions. Only uno.esolved challenges can turn into threats to the security of individuals, nations and states."[19]

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[13]   Zięba, R., *Pozimnowojenny paradygmat bezpieczeństwa...*, op. cit., p. 26.
[14]   Nowak, E., Nowak, M., *Zarys teorii bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Warszawa 2011, p. 39.
[15]   Cf.: Zięba, R., *Pozimnowojenny paradygmat bezpieczeństwa...*, op. cit., p. 26.
[16]   *Ibidem*, p. 27.
[17]   Balcerowicz, B., *Pokój i „nie-pokój" na progu XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2001, p. 185.
[18]   Cf.: Huzarski, M., *Zmienne podstawy bezpieczeństwa i obronności państwa*, Warszawa 2009, p. 22.
[19]   Zięba, R., *Pozimnowojenny paradygmat bezpieczeństwa...*, op. cit., p. 26.

Natural hazards and disasters as ecological hazards

Natural hazards fit into the general category of ecological hazards. In contemporary studies related to security, ecological hazards are often limited to only those phenomena negative to the environment caused by human activity.[20] Such an approach to ecological threats is justified when viewed through the prism of ecological problems as phenomena of a social nature. Ecological threats viewed from the perspect-ive of a social problem means situations where significant social groups (groups, organizations or institutions) consider the consequences of certain actions to be negative for the environment. In this view, an environmental problem is determined by three elements:[21]
– physical facts (the physical context of the environmental problem);
– social values (values that constitute the reference point of the environmental problem);
– social behaviours (behaviours that are the cause of environmental problems).

But human activity is not the only cause of negative changes in the environment. A volcanic eruption, an earthquake or a collision of the Earth with an object of cosmic origin can have equally disastrous consequences, which, having violent characteristics, pose a direct threat to the life and health of people located in the area of the cataclysm. Therefore, it is worth looking at ecological hazards from a slightly broader perspective, and it is generally recognized that their causes can be both the activity of natural forces and human activity.[22]

In the sciences of international relations, ecological hazards are treated as " (...) changes in the environment caused by its physical, chemical or biological properties and human activities, which can lead to the inhibition of socio-economic development and even threaten the survival of human civilization as a whole."[23] This definition, which in a way refers to the understanding of environmental threats as social and global problems, does not fully correspond to the way they are interpreted in security sciences. Limiting the perception of environmental threats to their consequences of a socio-economic nature or the survival of human civilization is too narrow. Threats must also be viewed through the prism of their threat to human life and health, as well as other values inherent in the concepts of security, namely quality of life, integrity or development in other than socio-economic spheres of development of human civilization.

In summary, it can be assumed that ecological threats are changes in the environment of human life, including the natural environment, caused by the activities

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[20] Cf. Księżopolski, K.M., *Bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo państwa*, K.A. Wojtaszczyk, A. Materska-Sosnowska (eds.), Warszawa 2009, p. 173; Furman, A., *Ekologiczne, naturalne i techniczne zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa publicznego*, [in:] *Niemilitarne zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa publicznego*, S. Kowalkowski (ed.), Warszawa 2011, p. 81.

[21] See: Matczak, P., *Problemy ekologiczne jako problemy społeczne*, Poznań 2000, p. 47.

[22] See: Kitler, W., *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania, System*, Warszawa 2011, p. 53.

[23] Molo, B., *Rozwiązywanie problemów globalnych na przykładzie ochrony środowiska*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w XXI wieku. Wybrane problemy*, E. Cziomer (ed.), Kraków 2010, pp. 181–182.

of natural forces and human activities, posing threats to human health and life, as well as to values such as quality of life, the possibility of survival and development and freedom to pursue one's interests. In this view, environmental hazards can be divided into two categories: natural hazards and anthropogenic hazards. Thus, natural hazards are a type of ecological hazards that are part of the ecological security space and caused by natural forces. Of course, natural hazards can be the result of the cumulative action of physical, chemical or biological factors inherent in the natural environment and the side effects of human activity, but nevertheless, at the time of their occurrence, the main causal factor of the hazard is nature and the phenomena occurring in it or the space surrounding the Earth. These threats can be global, supra-regional, regional or local.

Natural hazards are often violent, so we often refer to them as environmental disasters or natural disasters. It is therefore worth taking a slightly closer look at the above terms.

In ecology, an ecological disaster is defined most generally "... as an irreversible change in the structure and function of ecosystems without the possibility of the formation of replacement (compensatory) assemblies or links, due to an imbalance in these ecosystems.[24]" In ecological terms, a catastrophe of this type leads to irreversible qualitative and quantitative changes in food chains, resulting in the collapse of at least one of the trophic links (producers, consumers or destructors), without which an ecosystem cannot exist. Thus, the result of an ecological disaster can be a threat to the existence and survival of various species of flora and fauna, and even the destruction of the entire ecosystem.

Environmental disasters, as mentioned earlier, can be caused by natural forces or are the result of human activity. For the purposes of civil protection systems, the concept of "natural disaster" is introduced. This concept is defined, among other things, in the Law on the State of Natural Disaster, where it is stated that a natural disaster is a natural catastrophe or technical failure, "(...) the consequences of which threaten the life or health of a large number of people, property of great magnitude or the environment in large areas, and assistance and protection can be effectively undertaken only with extraordinary measures, with the cooperation of various bodies and institutions and specialized services and formations acting under unified leadership."[25] The essence of a natural disaster is its violent characteristic, the relatively wide range of impact of its negative consequences and the need for extraordinary measures and the involvement of large forces and resources to counter its effects.

According to the aforementioned law, a natural catastrophe is understood as "(...) an event associated with the action of the forces of nature, in particular lightning, seismic shocks, strong winds, intense precipitation, prolonged occurrence of extreme temperatures, landslides, fires, droughts, floods, ice phenomena on rivers and the sea, as well as on lakes and reservoirs, mass occurrence of pests,

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[24] *Encyklopedia PWN*, keyword: *katastrofa ekologiczna*, https://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/katastrofa-ekologiczna;3921133.html, [accessed: 16.06.2017].

[25] On the state of natural disaster Act of 18 April 2002, consolidated text: Dz.U. (Journal of Laws) 2017, item 1897, Art. 3 section 1.

plant or animal diseases or infectious diseases of humans, or the action of another element."[26] The law also assumes that a natural disaster can be an event caused by a terrorist act.

It is worth noting that natural hazards and the disasters they cause have a significant impact on the modern security environment and pose a major threat to human health and life, the wider economy or the environment.

The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) has analysed natural disasters on a global scale from 1998 to 2017, and the results are truly alarming. According to the report presented by the Center,[27] between 1998 and 2017, natural disasters caused the deaths of some 1.3 million people and another 4.4 billion were injured, made homeless, displaced or in need of other forms of assistance. While most of the fatalities were caused by geophysical events, mainly earthquakes and tsunamis, 91% of all disasters were caused by floods, storms, droughts, heat waves and other extreme weather events. As shown in Figure 2, floods (43.4%) accounted for the largest number of disasters during the period under review, followed by strong winds (28.2%), earthquakes (7.8%) and extreme temperatures (5.6%). The United States of America suffered the greatest losses of about $945 billion, followed by China ($492.2 billion) and Japan ($376.3 billion). The greatest single cause of damage, with losses of $228 billion, was the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011, which consequently led to the closure of the Fukushima nuclear power plant. In contrast, the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, China, cost $96 billion and affected 46 million people.[28]

Fig. 2. Natural disasters 1998–2017

Flood
Storm
Earthquake
Extreme temperature
Landslide
Drought
Wildfire
Volcanic activity
Mass movement (dry)

| 3,148 | 2,049 | 563 | 405 | 378 | 347 | 254 | 99 | 12 |
| 43.4% | 28.2% | 7.8% | 5.6% | 5.2% | 4.8% | 3.5% | 1.4% | 0.2% |

Source: CRED, *Economic, Losses, Poverty & Disasters 1998–2017*, Report, p. 7.

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[26]   *Ibidem.*

[27]   CRED, Economic, Losses, Poverty & Disasters 1998–2017, Report. Raport powstał w wyniku współpracy pomiędzy: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Institute of Health and Society (Université Catholique de Louvain).

[28]   *Ibidem.*

The above data on the risks to human health and life and their economic impact shows how dangerous natural disasters are and why we should analyse this problem from a security perspective.

Classification of natural hazards

In order to understand the nature of natural hazards and how they are treated in modern security concepts, consideration should begin with how hazards are classified. In the literature, we encounter numerous classifications, with some being created for the purposes of security theory, others for the purposes of crisis management systems, and others for the purposes of emergency systems. The latter two are of interest to us because they deal with universal security.

Analysing the essence of threats, W. Kitler stated that "(...) threats to man and his goods and environment can arise from two sources. The first – is the activity of man against man or the laws of nature, the second – is the activity of natural forces, such as water, fire, air, space, the biological (microbial) world."[29] This simple distinction between the two basic categories of threats, taking into account their source, is now widely used in crisis management theory and practice.

Thus, according to W. Lidwa, we can distinguish four groups of threats that can quickly lead to crisis situations, which can have impacts on the territory of an entire state or its individual regions. These include:[30]

1) natural hazards, caused by the forces of nature, including floods, strong winds, droughts, weather anomalies, tectonic movements, epidemics and animal plagues;
2) technical risks, resulting from the civilizational and economic development of society (fires, chemical accidents, radiation accidents and incidents, transportation, construction and mining disasters, and technical equipment failures);
3) terrorism (terrorist attacks in the air, at sea and on land);
4) other threats, which include: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, mass migrations, civil uno.est, collective acts of public disorder and organized crime.

A clearer and more orderly classification of threats that can trigger emergencies was proposed by E. Nowak, W. Kitler, A. Skrabacz and K. Gąsiorek. According to them, one can speak of two categories of threats. The first is threats caused by the forces of nature (natural disasters), and the second is threats caused by human activity, including: technical failures, social events (uno.est) and terrorist events. Still other considerations are taken into account when classifying hazards for emergency systems. This takes into account the criterion of: the extent of the threats (local, regional, continental, global, space), the source of the threats (industry, transport, agriculture, military action, terrorism, forces of nature, etc.) and the type of

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[29] Kitler, W., *Obrona cywilna – szerokie podejście do problematyki cywilnej w obronie narodowej*, [in:] *Obrona cywilna (niemilitarna) w obronie narodowej III RP*, Warszawa 2001, p. 35.

[30] See: Lidwa, W., Krzeszowski, W., Więcek, W., *Zarządzanie w sytuacjach kryzysowych*, Warszawa 2010, pp. 7, 23.

impact (hydrosphere, atmosphere, biosphere, geosphere).[31] From the point of view of the practice of emergency operations, the basis for the distinction is the size of the area affected, hence the following are distinguished: widespread hazards (caused by chemical disasters, nuclear disasters, energy disasters, weather anomalies, epidemics, etc.) and local hazards (caused by road accidents, domestic accidents, construction disasters, explosions, local poisoning, etc.).

The above classifications show how, from the perspective of universal security practice, it is important to specify which threats we are dealing with. In all classifications, in which the basic criterion becomes their source, the division into natural and anthropogenic hazards is already widely used, although there is no unified position on what phenomena, processes or other events can be included in this category.

Analysing the above issues in the literature, one gets the impression that they are treated marginally. Speaking of natural hazards, one points more to disasters that can be the result of various factors, and not to the hazards themselves, which do not necessarily always have to lead to catastrophic consequences.

Marek Graniczny and Vladimir Mizerski[32] divide natural disasters[33] into six main groups:

  – geological – earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, mass movements, tsunamis, erosion;
  – hydrological – floods, desertification, snow avalanches;
  – oceanographic – coastal flooding, sea level changes, pollution of bodies of water;
  – meteorological – storms, cyclones, tornadoes, hurricanes, snowslides;
  – related to vegetation cover – fires, droughts, locusts;
  – cosmic – collision with the Earth of a meteor, comet or asteroid.

At the same time, as they note, there are natural disasters that are the result of the interaction of several factors, and one natural disaster generally stimulates another.

According to CRED, natural disasters are divided into hydrological events (floods, landslides and wave action), meteorological (storms, extreme temperatures, fog) and climatological (droughts, fires), which are collectively referred to as weather or climate-related, and geophysical disasters (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, massive earth movements). As can be seen, this is a fuzzy, very general classification and does not include all hazards that qualify as natural hazards.

Taking into account a kind of eclecticism in the approach to classifying natural hazards, the author of the articles proposes his own classification, useful for both cognitive and practical reasons. Similarly, as in the classification presented by M. Graniczny and W. Mizerski, natural hazards can, according to his thoughts, include six basic categories: threats to ecosystems (global and regional/local);

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[31]   Konieczny, J., Wawrzynowicz, H., Mydlarska, J. (eds.), *Psychologia bezpieczeństwa. Kompendium*, Agencja Wydawniczo-Reklamowa Esus, Poznań 2011, p. 128.

[32]   Graniczny, M., Mizerski, W., *Katastrofy przyrodnicze*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PAN, Warszawa 2009, p. 3.

[33]   *Ibidem*.

geological hazards; meteorological hazards; biological hazards; and space hazards, and additionally include mixed hazards. (See Figure 3).

Threats to ecosystems can be divided into two basic categories: global threats (climate change, ozone hole) and regional/local threats (loss of biological diversity, soil degradation, forest destruction, water pollution and scarcity, marine and ocean degradation, air pollution and large-scale fires).

Another category of hazards is geological hazards. These can be divided into five basic categories: seismic hazards (earthquakes); tsunamis (of varying extent: local, regional and supra-regional); volcanic hazards (volcanic eruptions); mass earth movements (landslides) and erosion (e.g., of seashores).

The most numerous category is meteorological hazards, which include: hazards associated with strong winds (winds associated with atmospheric circulation – hurricanes, cyclones, orcans and local winds: scowls, tornadoes, foehn winds, including hail winds); those related to precipitation (intense rain and snow, hail, acid rain, fog and haze, snow blizzards and blizzards, freezing rain and glaze); those related to air temperature (frost, ice hazards: icing, icebergs and sea ice, heat); mixed (storms, thunderstorms, once in a century winters); and weather anomalies (El Niño and La Niña).

Fig. 3. Classification of natural hazards

Source: own development.

The next threats, hydrological, are related to excess water (floods and flooding) and water scarcity (droughts: meteorological, soil, hydrological and hydrogeological).

Biological hazards, in turn, can be divided into three categories: the mass occurrence of diseases among humans (epidemics/pandemics), animals (epizootics) and plants (epiphytoses); the occurrence of pests on a massive scale; and biological contamination of water and food.

The sixth category, cosmic threats, includes: space weather anomalies (solar storms); cosmic radiation (gamma rays) and collisions of the Earth with space objects.

Finally, the last category consists of mixed hazards, which may be caused by other natural hazards or may be the result of human activity. Details of the above classifications are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Types of natural hazards

Hazard category	Subcategory	Type
Threats to ecosystems	global	climate change, ozone hole
	regional/local	loss of biodiversity, soil degradation, forest destruction, water pollution and shortages, degradation of seas and oceans, air pollution, large-scale fires
Hazards geological	seismic	earthquakes
	tsunamis	local, regional, trans-regional (Pacific)
	volcanic	volcanic eruptions (effusive, explosive, mixed eruptions)
	massive earth movements	landslides, avalanches
	erosion	coastal erosion
Hazards meteorological	related to strong winds	winds associated with atmospheric circulation: hurricanes, cyclones, squalls and local winds: gusts, tornadoes, foehn winds, including mountain winds
	related to precipitation	heavy rain and snow, hail, acid rain, fog and mist, blizzards, freezing rain and glaze
	related to air temperature	frost, frost heaves, ice hazards: icing, icebergs and sea ice, heat waves
	mixed hazards	storms, once in a century winters
	weather anomalies	El Niño and La Niña
Threats hydrological	related to excess water	inundations, floods (fluvial, precipitation, snowmelt, groundwater, seawater, water and waste water facilities)
	related to water scarcity	droughts: meteorological, soil, hydrological, hydrogeological
Hazards Biological	massive outbreaks of disease among humans, animals and plants	epidemics/pandemics, epizootics and epiphytoses
	occurrence of pests on a massive scale	pests of agricultural crops, foodstuffs, forests, spreading diseases
	biological contamination of water and food	water contamination, food contamination
Hazards cosmic	space weather anomalies	solar storms
	cosmic radiation	penetrating radiation
	collisions of the Earth with cosmic objects	collisions with meteorites, asteroids, comets

Hazard category	Subcategory	Type
Risks mixed	caused by natural hazards	e.g. an eruption of an underwater volcano can trigger tsunamis or earthquakes, storms, and especially the accompanying lightning, which can cause large-scale fires, El Niño and La Niña, both of which can cause drought or flooding, etc.
	caused by anthropogenic threats	e.g. disasters of hydraulic structures can cause floods, the use of geological weapons can cause earthquakes, etc.

Source: own development.

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Summary

Natural hazards, especially those related to climate change, are becoming an important factor that affects the operation of civil protection systems. Learning about these phenomena, systematizing knowledge about them, and finally creating effective systems to protect the population from their destructive effects is a part of the problems that should be analysed from the perspective of universal security. This problem must not be underestimated or marginalized by the relevant services in Poland, hence, it is worth attempting to draw some conclusions that emerge from the analysis of the above problem presented by the Author:

1. The risk of the occurrence of natural hazards as a result of increasing industrialization and climate change is increasing, and their effects will affect most of the inhabitants of our globe, so systematizing knowledge about them is a relatively urgent endeavour that will determine how well we are able to prepare ourselves to face their destructive impact on people, infrastructure and the environment.

2. Natural hazards are a type of environmental hazard, which are part of the ecological security space, the causes of which are natural forces. Of course, natural hazards can be the result of the cumulative action of physical, chemical or biological factors inherent in the natural environment and the side effects of human activity, but however they occur, the main causal factor of the threat is nature and the phenomena occurring in it or the space surrounding the Earth.

3. It is reasonable to divide natural hazards into six basic categories: ecosystem hazards (global and regional/local); geological hazards; meteorological hazards; biological hazards and space hazards, and additionally include mixed hazards.

4. The classification proposed by the Author is not enumerative. It is an open classification, on the basis of which further work can be carried out to systematize and generalize knowledge on the subject. It is also worth researching the impact of climate change on natural hazards, because in the near future they will determine the activities of crisis management systems and civil protection systems.

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INFORMATION SECURITY AS A GLOBAL CHALLENGE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

BEZPIECZEŃSTWO INFORMACJI GLOBALNYM WYZWANIEM XXI WIEKU

Abstract: The subject of this article is information security treated as a global challenge of the 21st century. The reason for this is the existence of many contemporary threats to information, both in the public and private spheres, which place information in a dangerous situation. The answer to this challenge is, among others, information ecology, whose info-ecological guidelines on how to make information safe in the mentioned spheres are noteworthy. The article presents appropriately categorised threats to information, as well as info-ecological principles of information security which are useful in the face of the challenges and threats of cyberspace.

Zarys treści: Przedmiotem artykułu jest bezpieczeństwo informacji potraktowane jako globalne wyzwanie XXI wieku. Powodem tego jest istnienie wielu współczesnych zagrożeń informacji, zarówno w sferze publicznej, jak i prywatnej, które stawiają informacje w niebezpiecznej sytuacji. Odpowiedzią na to wyzwanie jest m.in. ekologia informacji, której infoekologiczne wytyczne dotyczące tego jak uczynić informację bezpieczną w wymienionych sferach są godne uwagi. W wystąpieniu zostaną zaprezentowane odpowiednio skategoryzowane zagrożenia informacji, jak również infoekologiczne zasady bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego przydatne współczesnemu człowiekowi w obliczu wyzwań i zagrożeń cyberprzestrzeni.

Keywords: information security, threats to the infosphere, information ecology
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo informacji, zagrożenia infosfery, ekologia informacji

Introduction

Although information security as a subject of scientific consideration emerged in Poland in the late 1990s, it did not gain research momentum until after 2010, and it is still accompanied by a separate scientific discipline called "Security Science."[1]

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[1]   Batorowska, H., *Od alfabetyzacji informacyjnej do kultury informacyjnej*, Wydawnictwo Stowarzyszenia Bibliotekarzy Polskich, Warszawa 2012, p. 9.

In the 21st century, the role and importance of information is undeniably growing. At the same time, as the importance of information increases, so do the threats to its security. In the age of widespread computerisation, threats are emerging that did not exist before. The American programmer Edward Yourdon, who died in 2016, argued that "[...] if the 1980s were described as the decade of quality, the 1990s as the decade of productivity, then the first decade of the new century will be the decade of security."[2] Information security is now one of the key issues of the 21st century, stemming from the world's dependence on information technology and especially computer technology and the Internet. This is fostered by Poland's current geopolitical situation and the accompanying narrative about the threats generated by the information society, including the risks associated with information security governance.

Information security has been recognised as a broader term in relation to information security, thus constituting a foundation for an interdisciplinary approach to this complex of problems related to the secure collection, processing and sharing of information, and at the same time the subject of research in security and information sciences, as well as the shaping of an appropriate information security policy and culture.[3]

Information security, its essence and attributes

Colloquially, information security is defined as a desired state of harmony and absence of threats. In operational/processing terms, it is a set of processes aimed at defining, achieving and maintaining an assumed level of information security attributes, that is, confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. In ICT systems, accountability, authenticity and reliability are additionally taken into account. A breach of one of the security aspects, i.e. confidentiality, availability or integrity, can lead to huge losses and even bankruptcy.[4]

For information security, the key is the proper identification of threats, vulnerabilities and also the assessment of risk and the application of appropriate safeguards to bring this risk down to an acceptable level. There are no two identical types of information. Each type of information has its own characteristics and is accompanied by different threats. Consequently, it is impossible to apply identical safeguards to different types of information. The level of information security is therefore a product of the exposure and safeguards against them, and the threats and defences against them. Security as a characteristic of information is not binary, but a continuous characteristic. The basis for understanding the role of information security is therefore to understand the definitions of the basic terms that define it. Currently, according to ISO/IEC 27001: 2005 Information Security Management System, information security is "the maintenance

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2   Yourdon, E., *Wojna na bity*, Wydawnictwo Naukowo-Techniczne, Warszawa 2004.
3   Fehler, W., *O pojęciu bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo informacyjne w XXI wieku*, M. Kubiak, S. Topolewski (eds.), Siedlce–Warszawa 2016; Lidermann, K., *Bezpieczeństwo informacyjne. Nowe wyzwania*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2017.
4   Zawistowski, T., *Bezpieczeństwo informacji. Suplement*, Fundacja Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej, Warszawa 2011.

of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information; additionally and other properties such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and trustworthiness may be included." The increased awareness of the importance of information and its security is reflected in the dynamic development of international standards for information security management systems and the growing interest in them.

Thus, following researchers of this problem, I treat information security as a complex of undertakings designed to ensure the security of the information environment, as well as its formation, use and development in the interests of citizens, organisations and the state. The area of scientific inquiry and exchange of experience in the field of information security is not only people, information, information and communication processes and technologies, but also the infosphere itself, which is exposed to both intentional and unintentional attacks, the infosphere in which there is a constant information battle. Its defence is also carried out in the space of permanent education of the whole of society.

Information security concerns basically all characteristics of information, including such characteristics as relevance, accuracy, timeliness, completeness, consistency, appropriateness of form, accessibility, unambiguity, credibility, communicability, reliability, flexibility, redundancy, usefulness, complexity, naturalness, semantic compatibility, structural compatibility, verifiability and variability reputation.[5] It also concerns the functions performed by information. After all, information is a commodity, and often of a strategic nature, a basic element of business processes, a tool for controlling processes in automated information and search systems.[6] It is therefore not surprising that information is most often protected by law or concluded contracts.[7]

Information security is attributed with the following attributes: confidentiality, authenticity, availability, integrity (of data, system), accountability, reliability.[8] The components of information security are therefore physical security, personal/organisational security, ICT security and legal security.

The literature identifies three pillars of information security. These are confidentiality, integrity and availability. These are the cornerstones of so-called strong information protection that form the foundation of the information security infrastructure.

Information security is the practice of protecting information to prevent unauthorised access, use and disclosure. It includes the implementation of policies and procedures that are designed to protect information and help prevent data loss or theft. Information security is a set of security tools and procedures that broadly protect a company's confidential information from misuse, unauthorised access, disruption or destruction.

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[5]   Czerwiński, A., Krzesaj, M., *Wybrane zagadnienia oceny jakości systemu informacyjnego w sieci WWW*, Uniwersytet Opolski, Opole 2007, pp. 49–50.

[6]   Hetmański, M., *Świat informacji*, Wydawnictwo Difin, Warszawa 2015.

[7]   Klimek, G., *Bezpieczeństwo informacji w perspektywie rozwoju Internetu rzeczy*, [in:] *Informacja – dobro publiczne czy prywatne?*, A. Czerwiński, A. Jańdziak, M. Krzesaj (eds.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, Opole 2016.

[8]   Białas, A., *Bezpieczeństwo informacji i usług w nowoczesnej instytucji i firmie*, Wydawnictwo Naukowo-Techniczne, Warszawa 2007, p. 34.

The EN ISO 27001 standard identifies three basic attributes of information: confidentiality, integrity and availability. Information security assurance focuses on securing these three aspects through information hiding, encryption and coding.

An information security management system is an operational strategy to ensure that information is properly protected. This strategy is intended to ensure that the actions and procedures taken are continuously improved in order to optimise the risks associated with a breach of confidentiality.

Information security risks

Threats to information security arise, among other things, as a result of the creation/broadcasting/reception of information by incompetent, biased, uno.eliable persons; targeting of information to the wrong audience; manipulation of information; slowing down the process of information reaching the recipient; destruction of trust in information; relativisation of truth and uncontrolled development of artificial intelligence (chatGPT-4, BING app, DALL-E); carelessness about the quality of information; populism; promotion of a particular ideology; hypocrisy of the sender; emotional rather than rational treatment of information.[9]

Threats to information security are also threats in cyberspace, such as information pollution, an unprecedented scale of information manipulation, information distortion and information inflation. Information bubbles, hate speech, post-truth, fake news, espionage and cyber-terrorism are also threats to information security.

Information security and protection measures should consist of protecting information from unauthorised human actions, human and organisational errors, hardware failures and software defects, the effects of disasters and terrorist actions.

Countermeasures include:
- attention to information balance and sustainability of the information environment;
- individual information management as a defence tool against threats on the Web;
- multiplication/duplication of information, but without intrusive propaganda and advertising.

Abuses in this subject are countered by: information ethics, information law, information etiquette, information education, information culture and information ecology. An essential factor and foundation of information security in everyday life is information culture,[10] mutual trust between people and trust in information.[11]

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[9] Pala, M., *Współczesne zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo informacyjne w XXI wieku*, M. Kubiak, S. Topolewski (eds.), Siedlce–Warszawa 2016.

[10] Kisilowska, M., *Kultura informacji*, Wydawnictwo Stowarzyszenia Bibliotekarzy Polskich, Warszawa 2016.

[11] Sztompka, P., *Zaufanie fundament społeczeństwa*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2007; *Vademecum bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego*, vol. 1–2, O. Wasiuta, R. Klepka (eds.), Kraków 2019.

"Green" information security

Information balance and the sustainability of the human information environment as well as individual information management are tools for defence against threats on the Web.

It is also effective information security management. Information security management is particularly concerned with the secure execution of information processes such as: generating and acquiring information; collecting and storing information; processing information; sharing, distributing and disseminating information. Information security management, therefore, is primarily the appropriate control of the course of the aforementioned information processes aimed at optimising them.

In situations of threat, which can be caused by both internal factors (linguistic phenomena, changes in function and meaning) and external factors (extra-linguistic phenomena and information obsolescence), information protection is particularly important.

As such, information protection is primarily concerned with its attributes: secrecy, integrity, availability, accountability, non-repudiation, authenticity.[12] Dangerous information is false information that objectifies people. Safe information (green information), on the other hand, is "pure" (reliable), true, objective and complete information.

Information ecology, which offers solutions to optimise this process in accordance with the needs and possibilities of information users (senders, intermediaries and receivers),[13] is therefore a response to the contemporary problems of the communication process in its broadest sense, including information. Information security is a secure human being. Hence, it is necessary to consider the application of principles of prevention, hygiene and a kind of information diet, as well as the need to anticipate the consequences of one's own decisions in terms of influencing the information homeostasis of one's own body and others. The key to information ecology is to change mentalities/attitudes and build public awareness on the subject.

Information ecology proposes in this respect a practical activity consisting of:
  - basing information policy on an appropriate and broad understanding of it;
  - nurturing human information consciousness as an essential element in information processes;
  - protecting people from being objectified by means of information (manipulation);
  - developing people's information competence;
  - educating people to be responsible for creating/generating, processing, disseminating and using information;
  - balancing human development in a world of technology and information;

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[12] Liderman, K., *Bezpieczeństwo informacyjne*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2012, p. 19.

[13] Górski, A., *Informacja naukowa na tle przeobrażeń procesów komunikacji społecznej i jako wyzwanie gospodarki rynkowej*, Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Szczecin 1997.

– the skilful use of information to build individual and collective knowledge for the individual and common good of humanity;[14]
– managing information security in the human information environment.

Information, from the point of view information theory, is safe when:
– the creators of the information are competent, objective and reliable persons;
– is "immune" to all sorts of differing interpretations;
– is difficult to distort (e.g. scientific information);
– is not "long-winded";
– is provided with context;
– is not too redundant;
– is appropriately preserved in content and form;
– is made available/disseminated in an appropriate manner (on an appropriate channel);
– reaches the right audience.

Information education and information culture can be a kind of remedy to these problems.[15] Appropriate education and the nurturing of humanistic values are the most effective ways to counter information security threats. The lack of moral and social order and the tensions caused by the free market and the globalisation of capital rather than values force the protection of information as a commodity. Information is, after all, a commodity/product/value subject to special protection. The fragmentation of information and knowledge is becoming a worrying phenomenon. It is therefore necessary to introduce values into education, such as the feeling that the individual is part of humanity and not just the nation, moving away from Eurocentrism, and promoting tolerance, even though this is contrary to the neo-liberal economic model.[16]

Infoeducation is a new educational area in the field of information security, which allows the formation and improvement of information competences, the formation of social awareness of new opportunities and threats concerning information and the technologies of its generation, dissemination and reception, which is particularly important in connection with the dynamic development of the technological possibilities of digital media and the formation of a completely new quality of the human information environment.[17]

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[14]   Babik, W., *Ekologia informacji*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2014, p. 138.
[15]   Babik, W., *Kultura informacyjna – spojrzenie z punktu widzenia ekologii informacji*, „Bibliotheca Nostra. Śląski Kwartalnik Naukowy" 2012, no 2(28).
[16]   *Ibidem*.
[17]   Batorowska, H., *Bezpieczeństwo informacyjne w dyskurskie naukowym – kierunki badań*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo informacyjne w dyskursie naukowym*, H. Batorowska, E. Musiał (eds.), Kraków 2017.

Conclusions

The selected problems of information security highlighted in the article indicate, among other things, the new role and place of the global transformations currently taking place in the world of information, which have a great impact both on information itself and on human functioning in the information world. Information security is an important problem for society and the contemporary information world, not only of an epistemological (theoretical) nature, but also of a practical one. It is therefore not surprising that it has become the subject of a separate academic discipline. It would, therefore, be very useful to use the theoretical thought and actions proposed by information ecology in efforts to promote information and human security in the contemporary world. Its pronouncement is timeless and has a universal dimension. On the path of searching for new ways of human functioning in the modern world, information should be a kind of secure social keystone creating a secure information environment that is a meeting place for people, data sets and information services.[18] Information security can be ensured not only by consistent and courageous decisions on adequate data protection and copyright compliance, but above all by awareness of responsibility for information and an information security ecoculture built on it, which can help to avoid the so-called information stupidity and should be a permanent reference point for all information activities of humans, institutions and organisations.[19] Information security is one of the security dimensions in such questioning.

The key to ensuring information security is to quickly define the sources of potential threats and take action appropriate to counter the threat. It is important to be able to take appropriate action to prevent information security threats in a given area. Identifying information security threats and taking effective countermeasures is a skill without which it is difficult to function in an increasingly fast-paced information-based society.

An ecological approach to information forms the basis for the security of the information society and the knowledge economy. An element of information security culture is not only the ability to recognise a threat, but also to take appropriate action in response. These two elements also define the mental dimension of information security culture.

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[18]　Bednarek, J., *Społeczne kompetencje medialno-informacyjne w kontekście bezpieczeństwa w cyberprzestrzeni i świata wirtualnego*, [in:] *Człowiek w obliczu szans cyberprzestrzeni i świata wirtualnego*, J. Bednarek (ed.), Wydawnictwo Difin, Warszawa 2014.

[19]　Materska, K., *Informacja w organizacjach społeczeństwa wiedzy*, Wydawnictwo Stowarzyszenia Bibliotekarzy Polskich, Warszawa 2017.

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Summary

In view of the threats and challenges in the sphere of information security existing in the modern world and especially on the Internet, information ecology, including info-ecological principles of information security, is of particular importance. In this view, the basis of information security – in addition to ethics and law – is education and information culture, forming an appropriate level of information maturity based on information awareness and based on responsibility and trust in information. Undoubtedly, this is also fostered by the practical implementation of the concept of sustainable formation and development of the information environment, both on an individual (anthropospheric), local and global scale. Thus, information ecology contributes and helps both in the theoretical sphere and in the practical sphere to shape the information security awareness and culture that is so necessary and even indispensable nowadays.

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PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TIMES OF NEW CHALLENGES AND A NEW TYPES OF CONFLICT

MIĘDZYNARODOWE PRAWO PUBLICZNE W DOBIE NOWYCH WYZWAŃ I NOWEGO TYPU KONFLIKTÓW

Abstract: There is no legal definition of a hybrid war in international public law, but what is happening on the Polish border with Belarus can be called a new type of border conflict. The situation on the Polish, Lithuanian and Latvian borders is evolving in a dangerous direction for the security of these countries and the security of the European Union, but it is also a humanitarian crisis. Public international law contains norms which give guidance on what steps should be taken. However, the development of the situation depends on the decisions of the countries involved in this border conflict. This conflict on the eastern border of the European Union has many aspects. This paper will provide an overview and explanation of the most important of them. Provisions of public international law and Polish national solutions related to migration and resolving such conflict situations are also discussed. This conflict is shown in a broader perspective of other hybrid actions used by Russia.

Zarys treści: W prawie międzynarodowym publicznym nie ma legalnej definicji wojny hybrydowej, ale to, co dzieje się na granicy Polski z Białorusią, można nazwać nowym typem konfliktu granicznego. Sytuacja na granicy Polski, Litwy i Łotwy ewoluuje w niebezpiecznym kierunku dla bezpieczeństwa tych krajów i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, ale jest to również kryzys humanitarny. Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne zawiera normy, które dają wskazówki, jakie kroki należy podjąć. Jednak rozwój sytuacji zależy od decyzji państw zaangażowanych w ten konflikt graniczny. Konflikt na wschodniej granicy Unii Europejskiej ma wiele aspektów. Niniejszy artykuł zawiera przegląd najważniejszych z nich. W artykule omówiono przepisy prawa międzynarodowego publicznego, prawa Unii Europejskiej oraz polskie rozwiązania krajowe związane z kryzysem migracyjnym. Konflikt ten pokazano w szerszej perspektywie innych działań hybrydowych stosowanych przez Rosję.

Overview of the situation on the border with Belarus in 2021 and 2022

Before 24 February 2022, we could not imagine the situation that is currently taking place in Ukraine. The war has changed our reality and will have a huge impact not only on Europe but also on the world for many years to come.

However, in 2021 our attention was focused on a new type of conflict which began in autumn on the eastern border of Poland. This phenomenon, although on a smaller scale, is also observed today. Though the issue of the Polish-Belarusian border has disappeared from the media, Polish officers detain dozens of people who want to cross the border every day. Most of the migrants/refugees come from various countries in Asia, i.e. from Afghanistan, from the Middle East countries and from Africa. Refugees are people fleeing war or persecution. They are defined and protected by international law, such as the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention, and many other regulations at the international, regional or national level. A fundamental principle in international law is that refugees may not be expelled or returned to places where their life or freedom would be endangered. They must also have access to an objective and efficient asylum procedure. These are the duties of the authorities of individual states. Migrants are those who decide to leave their country not because of the immediate threat of death or persecution, but to improve their quality of life by finding a better job, school or joining family members. Migrants can safely return to their homes, whereas refugees cannot.

The regimes of Russia and Belarus organize the bringing of people from various countries to the eastern external border of the European Union. First, they arrange the travel of people to Belarus, and then the Belarusian authorities organize the expulsion of migrants to the border of Poland, Lithuania or Latvia. Migrants / refugees are encouraged by the prospect of easily crossing the border. They are not prepared for survival in the forest and for the conditions prevailing in the forest where they spend many days without food or water in bad weather conditions. They are forced out by the Belarusian authorities without the possibility of crossing the EU border. Winter, for obvious reasons, reduces the number of migrants/refugees who want to cross the border in this way, but the situation continues and there is still a lack of cooperation between NGO activists and state services working on the border (Border Guards, the Polish Army and the Police). For example, from information published by the NGO "Salvation Foundation" we have learned about the situation of a 16-year-old boy from Yemen, who was allegedly lying unconscious on the Belarusian side of the border for two days. "He was beaten by the Belarusian services, his condition was getting worse. Doctors who managed to video connect with his group

estimated that the boy must be hospitalized immediately, otherwise he might die. There are 4 adults in the group and 4 children (Yemeni citizens)".[1] Later, in another publication, we learned that Polish soldiers did not help the boy and his group, they did not even give them the water they asked for. We have heard a lot of similar stories, or even worse, about the so-called pushback, i.e. expelling migrants (adults and children) back to the forest to the border with Belarus. Due to the smaller scale of the problem and the war in the Ukraine, this problem has now become less visible. The Border Guard has reported attacks by Belarusian authorities. For instance, in the area of Czeremcha in Podlasie, Belarusian soldiers attacked Polish officers. As a result of the incident, two people were injured: a Border Guard officer and a soldier. A Border Guard vehicle was also damaged.[2] However, this kind of information is of secondary importance now.

It was very difficult to assess the situation with migrants and refugees because the actions of the Polish authorities were not transparent. The Polish authorities did not want to allow Frontex to become involved in regulating this situation, and at the time of greatest pressure, the Polish authorities made unfortunate statements about banning journalists from entering the border area. Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Piotr Wawrzyk, a deputy from the ruling Law and Justice party in Poland, said that the journalists may go to Belarus and report situation from there. Moreover, it was said the ban on journalists staying in the border zone was for their safety. This cannot be taken seriously because journalists work in more dangerous places, even where active hostilities are taking place.[3]

In addition, from the beginning of the crisis at the border to the present day the legal situation at the border has been changing significantly. The ban on staying in 183 localities near the border with Belarus, effective from 1 December 2021, was extended until 30 June 2022. As the Polish Constitution did not allow for another extension of the state of emergency, the government amended The Border Protection Act, which made it possible to introduce a temporary ban on staying in the border area. The ordinance of the Minister of the Interior and Administration confirmed the existing restrictions in this area, and the appendix contained a list of the zones that was subject to the ban. The list included 115 localities in the Podlaski Region and 68 in the Lubelski Region. Then, on 1 July 2022, a ban was introduced on approaching the Polish-Belarusian border in the Podlasie region at a distance of less than two hundred metres, first valid until 15 September, then extended until 30 November and finally until the end of 2022. This ban replaced wider restrictions related to

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[1]   Grupa Granica: Nieprzytomny nastolatek leży od dwóch dni pod granicą, po stronie Białorusi, https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114883,28332360,grupa-granica-nieprzytomny--nastolatek-lezy-od-dwoch-dni-pod.html, [accessed: 08.12.2021].

[2]   Białoruskie służby zaatakowały polskich funkcjonariuszy Straży Granicznej, https://www.msn.com/pl-pl/wiadomosci/polska/bia%C5%82oruskies%C5%82u%C5%BCby-zaatakowa%C5%82y-polskich-funkcjonariuszy-stra%C5%BCy-granicznej/ar-AAW4JW0?li=BBr5KbO, [accessed: 13.07.2022].

[3]   Wiceszef MSZ: Polscy dziennikarze mogą jechać na Białoruś i stamtąd relacjonować kryzys na granicy, https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art19087821-wiceszef-msz-polscy-dziennikarze-moga--jechac-na-bialorus-i-stamtad-relacjonowac-kryzys-na-granicy, [accessed: 15.08.2022].

the migration crisis on the border with Belarus. Regulations on the border road strip have been in force since 2023.[4]

The government claims these regulations are to ensure the effectiveness of actions taken by the Border Guard. However, this was nothing more than a state of emergency introduced by other means. Moreover, this was a permanent state of emergency, which significantly limited the possibility of movement on the territory of Poland, not only limited to migrants. Exceptions to these regulations applied, for example, to people who permanently reside in the indicated area. The introduced prohibition was marked with boards with the words: "Area prohibited from entering – entry prohibited." The provisions stipulated that, in justified cases, the locally competent commander of the Border Guard unit could allow other persons, in particular journalists within the meaning of the Press Law, to stay in the prohibited area for a specified period and on certain terms.

The amendment to the ordinance of the Minister of Interior and Administration extended the competences of the Border Guard officers. They were allowed to use chemical paralysing agents, including handheld and knapsack gas throwers and tear-gas grenades. So instead of using legal methods to solve the situation the state was preparing for forceful solutions. This situation may seem even more surprising because some of these migrants/refugees did not want to stay in Poland. Some already had their own families in Western Europe, and not all of them would be covered by international protection and so would be sent back to their country of origin. Therefore, long-standing procedures should be used. These people should be admitted to refugee centres where their requests will be considered and where they could await for decisions, rather than being pushed across the border and wandering in the forest.

The Polish Ombudsman has made critical comments regarding the response of the Polish authorities to the humanitarian crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border. Particularly critical remarks concerned the regulations introduced into the Polish legal system which established previously unknown procedures in Poland and in public international law for returning foreigners to the border or the issuing of orders by the Border Guard to leave the territory of the Republic of Poland in this specific way. Both these procedures the Polish Ombudsman considered contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and Polish Constitution. All these acts of law prohibit the collective expulsion of foreigners. Neither of these procedures guarantees the right of every foreigner to submit an application for international protection. Moreover, it is not possible to analyse the individual facts of a situation of a foreigner, including, for example, an analysis of the risk of violation of his right to life or freedom, as well as freedom from torture and inhuman treatment. Foreigners are still being returned to the border and forced to enter the territory of Belarus, despite the war in Ukraine

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[4]   Fiłończuk, R., *Zakaz zbliżania się do granicy polsko-białoruskiej na 200 metrów nie będzie przedłużony*, https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/kraj/artykuly/8621162,bialorus-zakaz--zblizania-sie-do-granicy.html, [accessed: 01.10.2022].

and the active involvement of Belarus on the side of the aggressor. The Ombudsman has asked for an immediate suspension of the use of pushback, and then for steps to be taken to eliminate these procedures from the Polish legal system.[5]

Every person who wishes to apply for international protection at the border should be admitted to Poland, and Border Guard officers are required to provide an appropriate application form to them. Otherwise, the provisions of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July1951, cannot be fulfilled. The Convention obliges states/parties to ensure fundamental rights and freedoms to people who are seeking protection from persecution in their home country. In 2020, the European Court of Human Rights issued a judgment in the case of M.K. and others v. Poland (applications no. 40503/17, 42902/17 and 43643/17). It was a complaint by Russian citizens of Chechen origin regarding the lack of access to the refugee procedure at the Terespol (Poland) border.

The European Court of Human Rights found that Poland had committed human rights violations – decisions in the applicants' cases had been taken without consideration of their individual circumstances. They were part of a broader policy of not accepting applications for international protection from people arriving at the Polish-Belarusian border and returning them to Belarus in violation of domestic and international law. This policy constituted the collective expulsion of foreigners.[6] Despite this judgment, such decisions are still common practice today.

The activities of Belarus and Russia in this regard are a part of a destabilization policy towards Poland and the European Union. Therefore, it can be predicted with high probability that this humanitarian crisis will be prolonged by Russia and Belarus for a long time. We can no longer count on any diplomatic cooperation with Russia and Belarus. Efforts, therefore, need to be stepped up in the migrants' countries of origin. EU diplomacy must act and inform people and persuade them that illegally crossing the EU border is impossible. When they are at the border, it is too late. More often than not, migrants have travel related debts and nothing to go back to. No service in the world can cope with thousands of desperate people, so problems must be dealt with in their countries of origin, and not at the border where they will be trapped.

So far many people have died in the forests at the border, on both the Polish and Belarusian sides, because of cold and exhaustion. This should not have happened in the 21st century in the centre of Europe.

Currently, there is a physical barrier on the Polish-Belarusian border. It is a 5.5 m high fence made of steel spans and it is 186 km long. The border is also protected by an electronic barrier. It protects a longer distance, including part of the border waters. The 206 km electronic barrier is equipped with 3,000 day-night and thermal cameras, as well as 400 km of detection cables and 11 telecommunications containers.

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[5]   Wstrzymać stosowanie pushbacków i wydawanie postanowień o opuszczeniu terytorium RP na granicy polsko-białoruskiej. RPO pisze do MSWiA, https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/RPO-wstrzymac-stosowanie-push-backow-granica-bialorus, [accessed: 10.09.2022].

[6]   Ograniczony dostęp migrantów do procedury uchodźczej w Polsce. Informacje RPO dla Specjalnego Sprawozdawcy ONZ, https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/ograniczony-dostep-migrantow-do-procedury-uchodzczej-informacje-rpo-dla-sprawozdawcy-onz, [accessed: 10.09.2022].

However, the problem of illegal migration on the Polish-Belarusian border has still not been solved. Alexander Lukashenko's regime continues to bring migrants from the Middle East to send them to the border with Poland. The humanitarian crisis at the border is not over and, with another winter coming, it could again take on a very dramatic scenario.[7]

The essence of hybrid conflicts

The situation described above, the border conflict on the eastern border of the European Union, may be classified as a hybrid conflict. In international law there is no legal definition of a hybrid conflict or a hybrid war, it is rather a journalistic, popular-scientific concept which has certain characteristic features. The concept itself is quite new but, from the earliest times, certain elements characteristic of hybrid conflicts have been present in historical conflicts and wars. This concept is becoming more and more popular nowadays and it is used in many different situations.

There are a number of hybrid conflict definitions under debate. Col. Gian Gentile of the U.S. Military Academy posed a number of unique insights into the debate about future threats in essay in which hybrid warfare was labelled "vague." In another monograph out of the Army War College, the hybrid threat concept was simply truncated to blurring of regular and irregular warfare. Neither author found the construct clear or of much value.

Nathan Freier of the Center for Strategic and International Studies was one of the originators of the hybrid warfare construct. According to his definition, hybrid threats are represented by the now famous "quad chart" of four threats – traditional, irregular, catastrophic terrorism and disruptive – that exploit revolutionary technology to negate military superiority. This strategy noted that in the future the most complex threats would be combinations of these four. Freier's version defines a hybrid threat as any actor who uses two of the four modes of conflict.

Frank G. Hoffman modifies the definitions used by the military. This definition is adapted from the national defence strategy and focuses on the adversary's modes of conflict. It explicitly eliminates "disruptive technology" and incorporates "disruptive social behaviour" or criminality as the fourth modality.[8]

Therefore, using many different sources, it can be assumed that hybrid conflicts are:
- a modern version of guerrilla warfare;
- a combination of four types of aggression: traditional, irregular, terrorist and cybernetic;
- a type of asymmetric conflict, including military operations, irregular warfare and propaganda;

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7   „Płot" na granicy z Białorusią ukończony. Ostatni odcinek przechodzi odbiór, https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/plot-na-granicy-z-bialorusia-ostatecznie-ukonczony-ostatni-odcinek--przechodzi-odbior-6904368464075648a.html, [accessed: 04.07.2022].

8   Hoffman, F.G., *Hybrid vs. compound war*, Armed Forces Journal, http://armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/, [accessed: 10.07.2022].

– a combination of elements of traditional warfare, irregular war, civil war, arti-
ficially induced insurrection and terrorism and criminal behaviour for political
gain.

It should be added here, based on the latest experience, that actions seemin-
gly uno.elated to a serious interstate conflict can also seriously destabilize society
and the state, threaten economic development and seriously disturb public order.
Activities such as: spreading disinformation, conspiracy theories about, for exam-
ple, a global conspiracy or using vaccines to cause depopulation around the world,
using propaganda, manipulating the results of political elections in various countries
and, of course, causing migration crises, can also be classified as hybrid activities.
These do not have a military character, but they contribute to the serious destabilization
of the politics and economies of countries. They have a similar effect to a terrorist
threat, causing fear and panic in societies.

Conflicts Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict

As long as actions do not exceed the threshold of armed conflict, in principle,
actions are legal according to international law, even if they are hostile. In such
conflicts, the following may be noticeable: hostile destabilizing actions, triggering
a migration crisis, simulated shots, intense disinformation, cyberattacks, infiltra-
tion, hostile propaganda, manipulation – nowadays with the use of mass media and
the Internet, exerting an unnoticed psychological influence on society, causing targe-
ted hostility, financing of political parties, politicians and organizations, which builds
political influence and support, and even foreign electoral intervention. In these situ-
ations, migrants/refugees are treated instrumentally and it is irrelevant how bad their
situation is. In order to manipulate one's own society, lies and dehumanizing termino-
logy are used. Only political goals count. Over time, the probability of an escalatory
action increases, both by the side which started hostile actions and also by the side
under attack.

From the beginning, this border conflict has had many aspects which we did
not appreciate before – it was the beginning of the execution of a bigger plan and it
foreshadowed something much worse – the war that Russia started six months later.
The border situation can be summarized thus: apart from the obvious goal of destabi-
lizing the European Union states, other important goals were: analysis of reaction of
states, analysis of cooperation within the European Union, assessments of the reactions
media of individual societies and finally, creating an atmosphere of hostility towards
refugees. This was potentially supposed to create hostility towards future Ukrainian
refugees and, in a broader context, was a Russian attempt to create a new world order
and to establish new zones of Russian influence on the European continent.

Hybrid warfare

Hybrid warfare is a theory of military strategy, first proposed by the already mentioned Frank G. Hoffman,[9] which employs political warfare and blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyberwarfare with other influencing methods, such as fake news, enemy propaganda, diplomacy, influencing society and foreign electoral intervention.

"To put it simply, hybrid warfare entails an interplay or fusion of conventional as well as unconventional instruments of power and tools of subversion. These instruments or tools are blended in a synchronised manner to exploit the vulnerabilities of an antagonist and achieve synergistic effects. The objective of conflating kinetic tools and non-kinetic tactics is to inflict damage on a belligerent state in an optimal manner. Furthermore, there are two distinct cha-racteristics of hybrid warfare. First, the line between war and peace time is rendered obscure. This means that it is hard to identify or discern the war threshold. War becomes elusive as it becomes difficult to operationalise it".[10] It is difficult for a regular army to respond adequately to this type of hostile action.

In July 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization officially announced that the war in southeastern Ukraine (annexation of Crimea by Russia and war in Donbas) was a hybrid war. This was carried out by using armed force (Russian soldiers without insignia, the so-called green men). In the war in Donbas there were also no clashes between regular army units. It was an armed conflict between pro-Russian separatists from eastern Ukraine, with the Russian Federation supporting them, and forces loyal to the legal authorities of Ukraine. In addition to military operations, terrorist attacks were carried out, such as the shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines passenger plane or the imprisonment of OSCE representatives.

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[9]   Hoffman, F., *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf, [accessed: 10.09.2022].

[10]   Bilal, A., *Hybrid Warfare – New Threats, Complexity, and 'Trust' as the Antidote*, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html, [accessed: 15.09.2022].

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Hoffman, F.G., *"Hybrid vs. compound war"*, Armed Forces Journal, http://armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/, [accessed: 10.07.2022].

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Summary

It is a new version of the old Machiavellian concept that the end justifies the means. This is particularly painful for Europe now when the war in Ukraine has become regular and extremely cruel. The Kremlin's earlier actions, such as the militarization of social media, propaganda, hostility towards Ukraine, repeating lies about alleged Ukrainian Nazis, ene-my propaganda against the European Union, rewarding and supporting useful politicians, and then the occupation of Crimea and the war in Donbas – referred to as a hybrid war – all these activities prepared the ground for the present war. Putin dreams of a new world order. An old man with a mania for grandeur and the belief that he can subjugate Europe will use every opportunity to achieve his goals. Using a hybrid conflict strategy is very effective in this pursuit.

How effective these activities were can be proved by, for example, the support for Putin's policy by some European politicians, a high level of support for the war in Russian society and the minds of a large part of the younger generation of Russians hypnotized by propaganda. The opinion of a young Russian is an anecdote: they prefer to live in Russia and not Switzerland because Switzerland is such a small country. Russia is indeed a very large country. However, instead of dreaming of an empire, young people should care about the country's economic development. Russia has a lot to do in this area.

It turns out propaganda is a very effective weapon in a hybrid conflict and it is not regu-lated by international law. Public international law reacts quite slowly to changing situations. As there is no international legislator, agreements are created by arrangements between states.

The long ratification procedures make the process even longer. On the other hand, the international community can respond quite quickly to threats by creating strategies and structures for cooperation. A good example relating to hybrid threats is the cooperation between the EU and NATO within Hybrid CoE. Because the speed, scale and intensity of hybrid threats have increased in recent years, being prepared to prevent, deter, counter and respond to hybrid attacks, whether by state or non-state actors, is also a top priority for NATO. The loyal cooperation of states is the best answer to the hybrid threats posed by contemporary authoritarian regimes.

The situation on the eastern border of the European Union also requires a similar approach. The basis for actions towards Russia and Belarus should be joint actions of border states and assistance from the European Union.

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TERRORISM: A CONTEMPORARY THREAT
TO THE EXISTENCE OF PEOPLE IN THE WORLD

TERRORYZM WSPÓŁCZESNYM ZAGROŻENIEM
DLA PRAWIDŁOWEJ EGZYSTENCJI LUDZI NA ŚWIECIE

Abstract: Terrorism is one of the biggest threats around the world. Academics and people associated with politics as well as the media are anticipating the next movements of organisations such as Al-Qaida, Hamas and ISIS. It is important to remember that the events of 11 September 2001 revived all sorts of conversations about terrorism and its effects not only in the USA, but all over the world. The reason for such discussions was the attack on the WTC. This incident showed and made everyone realise that terrorism is not a local but a global threat.[1] Suicide bombing is somehow no longer as big a problem as it was a few years ago, and the terrorists themselves have moved with the times and started to operate by manipulating the internet and stock markets in order to crash the economy from within. Terrorism has shown that it has links with and influences politics. Terrorist organisations have no correlation whatsoever with existing international laws and regulations within a country. It can be said that terrorist activities manifest themselves through certain arrangements within a given terrorist organisation and these are most important for its members to achieve their goals.

Zarys treści: Terroryzm to jedno z największych zagrożeń na całym świecie. Naukowcy, w tym ludzie powiązani z polityką jak i mediami, oczekują kolejnych ruchów organizacji takich jak Al-Kaida czy Hamas lub ISIS. Należy pamiętać, że wydarzenia z dnia 11 września 2001 roku ożywiły wszelakie rozmowy o terroryzmie i ich skutkach nie tylko w USA ale i na całym świecie. Powodem takowych rozmów było nic innego jak zamach na WTC. Owy incydent pokazał i uświadomił wszystkim, że terroryzm to nie jest zagrożenie lokalne a globalne.[2] Terroryzm samobójczy przestał poniekąd być już aż tak wielkim problemem jak kilka lat temu, a sami terroryści poszli z duchem czasu i zaczęli działać poprzez manipulacje w internecie jak i na giełdach papierów wartościowych, ażeby rozbić gospodarkę od środka. Sam terroryzm ma powiązania z polityką i na nią oddziałuje. Organizacje terrorystyczne nie mają żadnych

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[1]   Stemplowski, R., *Transnarodowa harmonizacja bezpieczeństwa i rozwoju ograniczy transnarodowy terroryzm*, „Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny" 2001, vol. 1, no. 3(3), pp. 5–8.

[2]   *Ibidem*.

korelacji z istniejącymi prawami międzynarodowymi jak i zarządzeniami wewnątrz danego kraju. Można stwierdzić, że działania terrorystyczne przejawiają się poprzez pewne ustalenia wewnątrz danej organizacji terrorystycznej i są one dla członków najważniejsze, aby osiągnąć wyznaczone cele.

Keywords: terrorism, security, threat, refugees
Słowa kluczowe: terroryzm, bezpieczeństwo, zagrożenie, uchodźcy

Terrorism and its significance

The definition of terrorism is difficult to define, but it should be mentioned here that A. Machowski stated that the word terrorism originates, in a way, from the ancient literary language of Sanskrit, where *tras* means *to tremble,* while the Greek word *tereo* has the same meaning. The modern word terrorism originated in France from the word *terreur*, and it means *anger* or *terror.*[3] More than 200 different definitions of the meaning of the word terrorism can be found in the literature. Why do they differ? They have different emphasis on the motives that drive organisations to commit terrorist acts. It should be remembered that K. Jałoszyński mentioned that the object of attack is at the core of terrorist activity.[4] In Prague, during the NATO summit in November 2002, it was accepted that terrorism is the unlawful use of force against individuals or the intimidation of governments or society to achieve religious or ideological goals.

Earlier, on 13 June 2002, the Council of the European Union[5] drew up a list of activities that can be considered terrorist acts, the most common being:
  – attacks on life;
  – attacks for the purpose of deprivation of life;
  – causing serious damage to government or public administration property, transport, information and IT systems and private business;
  – hijacking of public transport;
  – use of weapons of mass destruction, including explosives, and nuclear, biological and chemical materials;
  – interruption of energy supplies, including water;
  – public intimidation.

The Polish encyclopaedia PWN described terrorism as "the use of rape, cruelty to intimidate, destroy an opponent."[6] Terrorism expert A. Pawłowski understands by the concept of terrorism as "*the use of rape by individuals or groups of individuals, in order to influence both the government and public opinion, as well as groups*

3   Machowski, A., *Zagrożenia bioterroryzmem: dydaktyczno-prewencyjne aspekty zarządzania bezpieczeństwem społecznym*, Mysłowice 2008, p. 12.
4   Jałoszyński, K., *Terroryzm czy terror kryminalny w Polsce?*, Warszawa 2001, pp. 7–8.
5   Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.
6   *Encyklopedia Popularna PWN*, Warszawa 1993, p. 864.

of people and individuals."[7] It should also be mentioned that terrorism is a planned action that is well organised in a very precise manner.

According to S. Zalewska, terrorism has accompanied humanity for many years in the form of political struggles. The author is under the impression that it is, in a sense, a threat to national security which is detrimental to the good of every state.

Terrorism in history

As mentioned earlier, terrorism dates back to ancient Greece. According to the Greeks, a person who deprived a tyrant of his life could enjoy the title of hero. The great thinkers of the time, such as Aristotle and Plato, stated in their works that the murder of tyrants was justified because they were criminals. The philosopher Seneca the Younger believed that there was no better sacrifice for the gods than the blood of a tyrant.[8] In ancient literature one can also find the statement that the sicarii and the zealots also resorted to terrorist means.

The Persian association, which was founded in 1090 in Persia and whose leader was the great Hassan Ben Sabah, otherwise known as the old man of the mountains, had members who believed in the right idea. Very often the members of this association became intoxicated with hashish, which made them more aggressive and which also prompted them to murder Crusaders in the Holy Land.[9] The Persian association was so strong and recognisable that in many languages the translation came down to one word – assassins.

In the early 1990s, huge changes were taking place in the political arena in Europe. The break-up of the USSR and the collapse of people's democracy led to a great decrease in terrorist attacks. As is usually the case, the cessation of one grouping is an incendiary link for others. This was also the case here, where after communist incidents, Islamic terrorism manifested itself, which itself had its origins in Iran in 1979. According to R. Borkowski, terrorism is used in some cultural movements as well as sects with a military basis. At the end of the twentieth century, many terrorist attacks were committed to draw attention to ecology and in opposition to abortion.

The inflammatory 11 September 2001 attacks forced politicians as well as scientists to consider not only how to combat terrorism, but also how to eliminate it altogether. The terrorist attacks in Washington and New York crossed a boundary, if one can speak of any boundary in relation to terrorism, and the world and society as a whole realised how great the threat to life and health was. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO recorded a very wide range of assistance from member countries and beyond. There was concern in Europe about the attacks in the United States. It was considered whether the next step of Islamic terror would be in Europe,

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[7]   Pawłowski, A., *Terroryzm w Europie w XIX–XX wieku*, Zielona Góra 1980, pp. 9–10.
[8]   Lucius Annaeus Seneca Minor (born c. 4 BC in Cordoba/Spain, died 65 AD); Miłkowski, T., Machcewicz, P., *Historia Hiszpanii*, Wrocław 1998, pp. 29–30.
[9]   Wasserman, J., *Templars and Assassins. Two secret orders – the Christian Templars and the Muslim Assassins*, Warsaw 2007, pp. 66–68.

if only in view of the fact that the old continent is a place of living for many millions of Muslims. It was noticed that after the 11 September attacks Muslim organisations were more active, which at the time could have been a cause for concern. Unfortunately, the predictions were wrong, as evidenced by the incidents of 11 March 2004 in Madrid and 7 July 2005 in London. Scientists and experts believe that super-terrorist attacks are to be feared, which will possibly occur through the use of means of mass destruction or by paralysing systems and networks.

Types of terrorism

All actions that can be considered terrorist boil down to brutality and the atrocious treatment of those affected. A kind of traditional terrorism can be considered:
  – murders;
  – use of explosives;
  – kidnapping people;
  – hijacking of means of transport;
  – use of biological as well as chemical weapons.

However, it should be borne in mind that all terrorist acts involve a wide range of targets.[10] It is also important to realise that a small group of people or a single individual can also commit terrorist acts which lead, more often than not, to disruption. Terrorist acts carried out by a small group of people are often also linked to recordings accompanied by shouting and mass hysteria, the reason for such recordings being to show the power that the terrorists have. Thus, such recordings can be expected to be followed by extremely violent acts. An example of this can be seen in the fact that Islamic terrorists very often record victims' decapitations. This causes increased media and security service interest. Terrorist acts can be aimed at humiliating a country's government. In the past, terrorist acts have mainly targeted security institutions, showing up these institution's incompetence and lack of professionalism. Terrorists thus provoked the authorities, with the result that they were forced to take preventive action. Humiliating a security institution can have negative consequences because, in this way, the support for the country's rulers can fall and can lead to the downfall of governments.

The collapse of the USSR has also, in a way, contributed to the development of terrorism. With Russia's unjustified attack on Ukraine, we can safely call it a terrorist country that wants to pursue at all costs the uno.ealistic ideology of being both the greatest military and economic power in the world. This kind of act of barbarism can safely be called international terrorism. This is, above all, actions that are directed against various countries in the world.

In addition to international terrorism, criminal terrorism can also be distinguished. This is overly violent and rarely used. Criminal terrorism can include:

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[10]   Piątkowski, P., *Terroryzm. Nowe wyzwanie dla bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 5–7.

  – sex offenders;
  – criminals who kidnap mainly for ransom.

The use of terrorist acts can be mainly motivated by the satisfaction of one's imaginary needs. In times of crisis, this can also be likened to a lack of livelihood as well as mental disorders.

Local terrorism focuses on a particular place and on fighting the local authorities. It is mainly aimed at intimidating citizens in a given district. This is to oppose, in a sense, the decisions taken in the region.

Individual terrorism is focused on a well-defined person in order to carry out a given specific act, e.g. murder or abduction of a politically connected person.[11] According to J. Muszyński, the following types of terrorism can be distinguished:[12]

  – legal terrorism – this is used in regime countries such as North Korea. It involves subjugating an entire population to a ruling person or ruling party and forcing the population to obey;
  – illegal terrorism – used by groups to gain power and influence society; this illegality is due to the lack of legal approval for the existence of an official organisation.

On the other hand, according to K. Jałoszyński, terrorism can be divided by its basis of action such as:[13]

  – nationalist – which expresses itself both socially and politically by postulating the rightness and supremacy of its intentions;
  – separatist – seeks the separation of a national group and the creation of its own independent state;
  – fundamentalist – mainly concentrates people who consider themselves fanatics of a particular religion and want it to be the main faith in a country by supplanting other faiths;
  – racist – this is linked to expressions of contempt towards people of a different skin colour or religion.

Terrorist groups do not have a lot of resources both to sustain their activities and to create all sorts of public incidents. However, they do happen to have huge monetary resources. Where do these funds come from? In the main, they come from the sale of pirated software, computer games, films, hacking, the manufacture and sale of counterfeit white goods and household appliances. It can therefore be concluded that wealthy terrorist organisations are very technically skilled. This is evidenced by the fact that many well-educated university graduates return to their country to share their knowledge, which also leads to the development of cyber-terrorism.

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[11]   Dietl, W., Hirschmann, K., Tophoven, R., *Terrorism*, Warsaw 2009, pp. 340–341.
[12]   Muszyński, J., *Istota terroryzmu politycznego*, [in:] *Terroryzm polityczny*, J. Muszyński (ed.), Warszawa 1981, p. 23.
[13]   Jałoszyński, K., *Współczesny wymiar antyterroryzmu*, Wydawnictwo Trio, Warszawa 2008, p. 37.

How are terrorist groups organised?

Terrorist groups are always very organised and structured. Their structure is usually hierarchical and can be compared to a kind of intelligence agency when viewed as an organisation. As in an army, the highest position is occupied by the leadership, which usually includes the people who initially created the organisation. Their main task is to raise funds for the proper functioning of the organisation, and very often these funds come from illegal sources. Some members of the command are very careful, making it impossible for any security service to expose them. The overriding responsibility of commanders in terrorist organisations is to analyse and carry out attacks on designated targets as well as giving direct orders.

Terrorist organisations always act in a deliberate manner and have their own information-gathering teams, so they can be called in a certain sense an intelligence agency. The people who make up the information-gathering teams are the second most important core after the command. It is thanks to them that the commanders of terrorist organisations can take precise and well-considered steps regarding potential attacks. Intelligence activities also include the recruitment of new members, who are subjected to very thorough checks, not only in terms of their education and skills, but mainly in terms of their suitability and loyalty to the organisation.

Another part of terrorist organisations is the support group. Their tasks are no less important than the intelligence group. These include reconnoitring and analysing the terrain in search of suitable hiding places, ambush sites and shelters. They are also in charge of preparing resources for the purchase of equipment, without which the organisation could not exist. Colloquially speaking, they are a kind of accounting department.

Who then is responsible for carrying out the attacks? This is the so-called tactical group. It is always the most numerous group and its members are people who have been trained for many years to carry out all kinds of tasks. Various psychological forms have been used during training. Training includes weapons training, vehicle driving and, above all, the preparation of bombs of various designs. The training of terrorist groups can be compared to the activities of the special services, and these can include:[14]

– conspiracy of action;
– ensuring the legality of documents;
– obtaining information linked to terrorist organisations from intelligence services;
– training in countries that support the terrorist organisation concerned;
– intimidation of groups of people in order to gain adequate publicity;
– analysis of the political-economic situation in the world.

In carrying out an analysis of terrorism, it is possible to distinguish three groups at which attacks are directed, and the attacks themselves have a related goal:

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[14] Mroziewicz, K., *Moc, niemoc, przemoc*, Bydgoszcz–Warszawa 2005, pp. 398–399.

– government authorities – the aim of attacks is to force the government and governing authorities to change their views, to force changes in policy and to force authorities to release imprisoned terrorists in exchange for sensitive/secret/classified information;
– the military and the police – forcing the families of police and military officers to cooperate with terrorist organisations, making reparations for attacks carried out against terrorist organisations, and ridiculing the police and the military;
– business – terrorising business people is aimed at raising funds for the organisation's activities, terrorising business people because of their links with the authorities of a particular state.

Combating terrorism

The Republic of Poland, as well as other countries around the world, is striving to combat terrorism and prevent it from spreading across national territory. The question that needs to be asked is whether the Republic of Poland is in any way threatened by terrorism? The answer is very simple, because the threat of terrorist attacks on Polish territory is negligible, so we should not fear that this will change in the near future. According to E. Szafrańska, the possibility of terrorist attacks exists, but their actual occurrence is negligible. Potential causes of terrorist threats which may occur on the territory of the Republic of Poland include:[15]

– alliance with the United States of America;
– membership of anti-terrorist groups;
– the participation of the Republic of Poland in peacekeeping missions;
– NATO membership;
– Schengen membership;
– Iraq's poor stabilisation;
– an increase in the number of people of Chechen origin on the territory of the Republic of Poland – Chechens are considered to be one of the most violent nationalities in the whole world;
– increase in the number of Caucasian refugees.

What could be the result of more attacks? The spark and encouragement of terrorists may have been a wider opening of the borders. During the war in Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, refugees from the east entered the Republic of Poland to obtain shelter and assistance. It can therefore be presumed that there may have been people among them who are a potential threat, but it is difficult to determine whether this was/will be the case.

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[15] Szafrańska, E., *Bezpieczeństwo państwa w kontekście zagrożeń terrorystycznych*, [in:] *Wojna z terroryzmem w XXI wieku*, B. Hołyst, K. Jałoszyński, A. Letkiewicz (eds.), Szczytno 2009, pp. 156–162.

Analysing the situation in various countries where there are very great restrictions on personal freedom and freedom of speech, the citizens of these countries are forced to flee their homeland. From the point of view of the security of the Republic of Poland, it is also important to look at refugees not only from Ukraine, but also from other countries which are considered to be regimes in which freedom of speech or of the media is restricted. Such countries include Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, North Korea and Belarus. Refugees from these countries are fleeing because they want to live a normal life in a country that will not persecute them for their faith, sexual orientation or membership of any kind of organisation. Terrorist organisations can exploit this because their members can pretend to be refugees, making it all the more difficult to find them.

Conclusions

In conclusion, it can be said that terrorism has grown enormously since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991. Not only has the number of members of a given terrorist organisation increased, but most of them have decided to move with the times and have increased in professionalism as well. It has been known for a long time that quality is followed by results. This is something that all countries, regardless of their political system or orientation, should be aware of. The opening up of borders has led to an increasingly rapid spread of terrorists, and finding and combating them is becoming increasingly difficult. In relation to the situation that is taking place in the east of our country, we need to be careful who we allow into the Republic of Poland, as not every person who has refugee status is one. Terrorist organisations will do anything to achieve their aims, be they military, political or dangerous.

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Legal acts
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.

Summary

Terrorism is one of the greatest threats worldwide. Scientists, including people associated with politics and the media, anticipate the next moves of organisations such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas and ISIS. It should be remembered that the events of 11 September 2001 revived all kinds of talk about terrorism and its effects not only in the USA, but also around the world. The reason for such talk was the attack on the WTC. This attack showed and made everyone aware that terrorism is not a local but a global threat. Suicide bombing has ceased to be such a big problem as it was a few years ago, and terrorists have changed with the times and act through manipulation on the Internet and on the stock exchanges to break the economies from the inside.

Terrorism has shown that it has links with politics and political influence. Terrorist organisations have no correlation with existing international laws and ordinances within a given country. It can be said that terrorist activities are undertaken through certain arrangements within a given terrorist organisation, and these are the most important for members to achieve their goals.

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THE INFLUENCE OF RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION ON POLAND'S POLITICAL CULTURE ON VIRTUAL SPACE

WPŁYW ROSYJSKIEJ PROPAGANDY I DEZINFORMACJI NA POLSKĄ KULTURĘ POLITYCZNĄ W PRZESTRZENI WIRTUALNEJ

Abstract: Contemporary political debate – public and individual – is undergoing progressive degradation, exemplified by the growing problem of hate speech, fake news and manipulation etc. The transfer of this debate to the web – further reinforced by the pandemic period – is resulting in the increased involvement of previously relatively passive citizens. The most serious current, though not de facto modern, problem affecting the state of domestic political culture is the disinformation and propaganda of the Russian Federation, especially that part of it directed directly against Poland and its society. Paradoxically, however, apart from the decidedly negative aspects of Russian propaganda, a phenomenon of political activism of Poles is observed. An area of this activism is the Internet, through which the process of strengthening the democratically desirable "participatory" model of political culture is taking place. The text is a reflection on the current state of political culture and its role in levelling the crisis of democracy.

Zarys treści: Współczesna debata polityczna – publiczna i indywidualna – ulega postępującej degradacji, czego przykładem jest rosnący problem mowy nienawiści, fake newsów, manipulacji itp. Przeniesienie tej debaty do sieci – dodatkowo wzmocnione okresem pandemii – skutkuje zwiększonym zaangażowaniem dotychczas relatywnie biernych obywateli. Najpoważniejszym obecnie, choć de facto niemłodym problemem, wpływającym na stan rodzimej kultury politycznej jest dezinformacja i propaganda Federacji Rosyjskiej, zwłaszcza ta jej część skierowana bezpośrednio przeciwko Polsce i jej społeczeństwu. Paradoksalnie jednak, obok zdecydowanie negatywnych aspektów rosyjskiej propagandy, obserwuje się zjawisko aktywizacji politycznej Polaków. Obszarem tej aktywizacji jest Internet, za pośrednictwem którego odbywa się proces umacniania „partycypacyjnego" (pożądanego dla demokracji) modelu kultury politycznej. Tekst jest refleksją nad obecnym stanem kultury politycznej i jej rolą w niwelowaniu kryzysu demokracji.

Keywords: propaganda, disinformation, political culture, information warfare
Słowa kluczowe: propaganda, dezinformacja, kultura polityczna, wojna informacyjna

Introduction

The fact of the sharpening of public debate, especially in the area of social media, seems obvious. Its components are also well known and described, such as hate speech, confinement of users in filter bubbles, radicalisation of views and closure to dialogue etc. The virtual space of political debate is linked to its real space, but the opinions expressed online are much less balanced and more aggressive.[1] In the real space, on the other hand, there are physical attacks of violence and self-aggression.[2] It is also a fact that this state of affairs is a global phenomenon taking on, depending on the country or region, different specificities. It is part of a crisis of democracy, affecting in a multidimensional way an extremely important component of democratic systems referred to in political science as political culture. Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the earlier Covid-19 pandemic and Russia's much earlier, unspoken hybrid war against the wider West are certainly factors of great importance for the current developmental trend of political culture.

The description of the causes of the aforementioned crisis is undoubtedly an important and interesting issue, and one that is often addressed in political science. Here, however, we restrict the area of analysis to the space of social media in relation to political culture and the impact of Russian propaganda on it. Conclusions from both our own long-term research and that of other authors analysing the modus operandi and nature of the Russian propaganda machine, allow us to posit the thesis of the country's significant responsibility and participation in the architecture of the aforementioned crisis. Is the crisis of political debate and culture (or, indeed, the crisis of democracy I will mention later) planned and implemented by Russia? No. It is a phenomenon (mega-trend) which is the result of many processes (trends) which coexist. However, there is no doubt about the fact of the great responsibility and involvement of Russia and its satellite[3] and allied states in this process.

Propaganda and disinformation

Many analysts and political commentators are inclined to argue that the onset of geopolitical "problems" with Russia coincides with the US "reset", initiated by US

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[1] Stoppel, A., *War on the net, or the other face of war in Ukraine*, [in:] 'Scientific and Methodical Review: Education for Security', year xiv number 4/2021 (53), Poznań 2022, pp. 15–28.

[2] Examples of this include the assassination of the Mayor of Gdansk Paweł Adamowicz in January 2019 or the act of self-immolation by Piotr Szczęsny in protest against the Law and Justice government in October 2017.

[3] Belarus, in particular, has been particularly active in the fields of propaganda, disinformation and agenting within Europe. See: Aro, J., *Putin's Trolls*, Krakow 2020.

President Barack Obama in 2009. In my opinion, the "problems" with Russia, result-ing today in the final end of the relatively peaceful post-Cold War period, are much earlier. It is Russian imperialism, which has been present in every historical period and political form of that state. It is not the intent of this text to discuss the problem of Russian imperialism as this issue already has an extensive literature. Let us assume that the "problem" with Russia de facto never ceased to exist. It diminished after the collapse of the Soviet Union, only to grow successively after the Russian "smuta" period of the 1990s. It manifested itself again on a global scale in the first decade of the 21st century, benefiting to a large extent from the goodwill of the West (unfor-tunately sometimes also from its enormous naivety).[4]

The intentional, organised and long-term nature of the activities of Russian propa-ganda can be shown precisely with the example of digital media, and even before the year 2000, the informal caesura for the Web2.0 phenomenon. Several studies con-ducted on the commentary layer of the then leading Polish news portals (Onet.pl, Wp.pl and Interia.pl)[5] concerning online aggression and propaganda revealed a number of interesting observations. The period of analysis was immediately after the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014. At the time, the Onet.pl portal allowed both logged-in and anonymous users to comment on forum articles. This feature was eventually disabled in 2018, precisely because of the problem of Russian propaganda taking control of these platforms. When looking at the activity of Onet.pl users whose comments were clearly pro-Russian, anti-democratic and anti-Ukrainian in nature, it was noted that they operated 24 hours a day. Posts were "produced" from the accounts of these users with an average frequency of 3 to 8 minutes. Every 8 to 10 hours there was a break in posting, usually no longer than 1 hour, but most often up to 30 minutes. On the basis of the frequency of breaks, it was possible to select eight groups of accounts (a total of 96 accounts out of several hundred analysed) for which the breaks occurred at exactly the same time (with an average difference of up to 10 minutes). This made it possible to hypothesise that these accounts were handled in an organised manner by a group of people working in shifts: one copywriter or, in colloquial terms, troll, therefore handled around a dozen accounts during an 8 to 10 hour shift (it was assumed at the time that there could have been more, but not all of them were selected because, for example, a given troll might have used some of them less frequently). The continuous activity of the singled out accounts lasted for more than three years (from the Russian aggression in 2014 until the end of the observations in 2017). They were certainly still active after this period, until the media owners closed

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[4]   The example of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines should be mentioned. See: Rosicki, R., Ros-icki, G., *Significance of the Nord Stream gas pipeline for Poland*, [in:] "Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego", 2012, no. 4, pp. 139–156.

[5]   Pawlak, P., *War rhetoric in virtual space. Analysis of the content of the commentary layer of Polish information portals*, [in:] R. Sapeńko, P. Pochyły (eds.) *Wojna/pokój humanistyka wobec wyzwań współczesności*, Zielona Góra 2017, pp. 272–296; Pawlak, P., *The nature of political discussion on information portals. A case study*, [in:] 'Studia Europaea Gnesnensia', Poznań––Gniezno 2016, vol. 13, pp. 201–224; Pawlak, P., *Socializing political discussions using the example of the Internet: aggression and the search for compromise – a case study*, [in:] "News of Irkutsk State University. Psychology Series", Irkutsk 2014, no. 9, pp. 57–68.

down the discussion forums. An analysis of the history of the accounts mentioned brought even more interesting insights. About 30% of them were created in 1999, i.e. three years after the Onet.pl portal was launched, as soon as the possibility to post comments on it appeared and, importantly, even before Vladimir Putin assumed power in Russia (which happened on 31 December 1999). These accounts became active only at selected times: first on the occasion of the 11 September 2001 attacks (activity for about a year of time); again on a large scale during the Second Gulf War in 2003 (activity for about 3 years); then on the occasion of Russia's aggression against Georgia in 2008 (activity for about a year of time). In all these cases the activity lasted 24 hours a day and was also carried out in an alleged shift pattern.

The accounts in question and the content they produced are the product of just eight shift-work "positions." What is meant by "post" is both the physical workplace (which was probably still the case in the late 1990s and early 2000s) and, as is probably already the norm today, remote work, involving the transfer of operation of a network of troll-accounts from one shift to another. Certainly, many more such "posts" were set aside to handle a single information portal. How many, unfortunately, we do not know. It is also worth mentioning that the described instances of organised Russian propaganda influence significantly predate the creation of the so-called "network brigades" of the Internet Research Agency, popularly known as the "troll factory," which has been operating at Olgino since 2013. The work of the trolls in the Agency actually resembled that in a factory, with shifts of workers arriving in the building at a specific hour. From informal information[6] it can be inferred that this form of Russian disinformation production did not work from the technical point of view. The Olgino centre quickly became the target of pro-Western hackers and certainly also the target of special services' attention. From about mid-2017 onwards, the Russians therefore began to move to a mode of disintegrated remote work (otherwise closer to the nature of a network).[7] The reader may have noticed that tackling the problem of Russian propaganda is moving in the dark, so to speak, and mostly based on circumstantial evidence. For this is a front of information warfare for which the term "fog of war", coined by Carl von Clausewitz, is an apt description.

The question must be asked – why does the enormous scale of Russian disinformation not meet with a symmetrical response from the West? Well, paradoxically, the lack of a symmetrical response can be seen from the point of view of democracy and its political culture as a positive phenomenon. Democratic states and societies respond in a democratic manner. The centres and staff of Russian propaganda are beings anctioned, being analysed and, as far as possible, exposed. Numerous articles (such as this text) and formal documents[8] are being written, guidelines for the media are being

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[6]   Miloš, G., Mlejnková, P., *Challenging Online Propaganda and Disinformation in the 21st Century*, Cham (Switzerland) 2021.

[7]   In 2017, the official profiles of the Internet Research Agency were successively suspended and closed in the social media area. Among other things, this is what happened to the Agency's Twitter account.

[8]   For example, the EU Strategy 2019–2024, which includes a number of solutions to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation.

developed, certain communication canons are naturally crystallising and measures are being taken in the area of the media itself.[9] In democratic states there is a legally regulated and market-driven profession of copywriters, present primarily in advertising and political marketing. Such individuals also often do the work of moderating discussions in specific areas of the web, mostly in professional forums and social media. Political parties in democratic states use the services of marketing companies, contemptuously referred to as troll farms by political opponents. However, organising such a gigantic yet anti-democratic enterprise as the Russian propaganda machine is simply, and fortunately, impossible in democratic systems. The provision of a huge budget, uninterrupted continuity of work, personnel facilities, IT support (both in the form of software for multiplying activities – likes, for example, and IT protection against external attacks) and the freedom to enforce strict secrecy requirements (including about torture and death) are only possible if two factors are met. The first is a totalitarian or authoritarian state and the second is a society that has operated for centuries in a servile (and/or parochial) type of political culture. It is these two factors that have enabled states such as Russia, Belarus, China and North Korea to effectively control online content and impose their preferred narrative within their own countries, as well as a massive propaganda and disinformation campaign directed outwards. However, while Chinese propaganda tends to have a selective dimension, with a strong focus on selected business areas,[10] Russian propaganda is far more aggressive, ideological and political in nature and targets democratic societies and states.[11] This is how Russia's organised and long-term propaganda activity has co-created the phenomenon of the so-called crisis of democracy. An analysis of this problem based on the concept of political culture makes it possible to grasp serious differences in the cultural space of the warring parties and their allies. It is in this space that a struggle is taking place, the outcome of which will prove crucial for the future of democracy and the free world.

With regard to social media, the destructive work of the Russian propaganda machine may be frightening in its scale and systematic nature, however, it should be borne in mind that this machine was at work well before it was subjected (as it is now) to scientific and social criticism. With the increase in virtual participation in the political culture of citizens of Western countries, the problem and extent of Russian propaganda is being successively exposed, which, in my opinion, will contribute both

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[9]   Such as the removal of comments and even entire accounts identified as spreading Russian disinformation. Another example is the complete removal by the Onet.pl portal of comments to articles, or the removal by the CDA.pl portal of all Russian and Soviet war films, which took place a few days after the Russian aggression against Ukraine on 24.02.2022 (only a few films remained, which were not part of the portal's offer, but were materials added by individual users). Now, however, some Russian films have been made available again in the official part of the portal.

[10]   China's online propaganda was originally built and developed on defensive assumptions. The former "Great Chinese Firewall" was primarily used to control the information available to domestic Internet users. Krotoski, A., *Virtual Revolution, part 1*, BBC [documentary], London 2010.

[11]   Although, of course, not only, as exemplified by the parallel developing Russian propaganda targeting African or Middle Eastern countries.

to weakening its destructive influence and to minimising the crisis of democracy. Russian propaganda is still a dangerous factor, but the effectiveness of its influence is clearly waning.

At this point, it is necessary to give the reader a necessary brief overview of the concept of political culture. This concept is an attempt to categorise the psychological orientation towards social objects. This orientation is formed by the feelings, evaluations and attitudes of citizens towards the political system. The whole mechanism of bringing individuals into this system is also crucial. In terms of political science, the term political culture has been developed since the mid-1950s, although the origins of the research go back to the second decade of the 20th century,[12] and it was popularised in the 1960s. According to the first American researchers of this phenomenon, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, we can speak of political culture in the same way as economic or religious culture. It is a set of attitudes towards a specific set of social phenomena and social processes. These authors distinguished three basic ideal types of this culture:

– a parochial culture, which is characterised by a significant passivity of citizens towards the political system. Societies that function within this type of political culture are characterised by a relative lack of expectations (lack of claims) towards the political system.

– a culture of submission characterised by citizens' relative knowledge of the political system and the norms of behaviour arbitrarily assigned by that system, while having no interest in actively participating in political processes. Citizens of such, often complex, societies are aware of the existence of a particular system and function in relative conformity with the rules of conduct imposed by that system. For the most part, however, they are not, apart from a very limited number of individuals who usually belong to a narrow circle of the privileged, interested in the mechanisms of entry into the structures of such a system. The individual's approach to the system may vary here: he or she may be proud of it, he or she may not be in favour of it, he or she may consider it legitimised or not. However, the individual's relationship with the system is generally based on a one-way flow of information, from the exit mechanisms to the individuals (subjects).

– a participatory culture in which citizens have real opportunities to influence the shape of the political system and do so by participating in many ways in political phenomena. Compared to the other two, this type represents a higher developmental form of political culture that is necessary for consolidated democracies to function. The activity of citizens in the co-creation of the political system (political participation) manifests itself both at the local (regional and local government) and central (national) levels. An important factor ensuring the reproduction of this culture is the awareness of at least partial influence of individuals (their decisions and behaviour) on the shape of the system and on the quality of their own lives.

Of course, these are only basic theoretical models, which as abstract ideal entities are unlikely to exist in their pure forms. But in most contemporary political cultures it is possible to find certain elements of them, the coexistence of which in

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[12]   Siemieński, J., *Kultura polityczna wieku XVI*, Kraków 1932, p. 121.

a certain configuration is a characteristic feature of a given society. This is the essence of the canonical concept of political culture, for it should be remembered that this issue occupies a very important place in political theory, and has been and continues to be studied by representatives of political science, starting with the pioneers already mentioned, through such names as Arend Lijphart, Michaela Baun, Daniel Franklin, Peter Reichel, Jürgen Gebhardt, Ronald Inglehart, Kazimierz Biskupski, Władysław Markiewicz, Jerzy Wiatr and Marek Sobolewski, among others.

We therefore assume that we can consider the current situation through the prism of a clash of political cultures. From a theoretical perspective, then, we are dealing with a phenomenon consisting of a virtual (and not only) confrontation between subject culture and participatory culture. A culture of submission operates among communities in which not only is there no civic culture, but also anti-civic attitudes are entrenched: individualism, initiative and creativity of individuals are considered reprehensible, since the role of the citizen is to submit uncritically to a regime (a narrow group or leader) that is the embodiment of society at large. Dialogue with representatives of such a culture is extremely difficult, often even impossible. The social media space is a case in point. Enthusiasts of the ICT revolution and the information society assumed that once enlightened thought began to circulate among individuals in the world thanks to the ICT infrastructure, nothing would be able to stop it. Even at the beginning of the 21st century, a significant number of them shared this post-Cold War optimism. Stephen Frey asked the rhetorical question in 2010, "How quickly would the Berlin Wall have fallen if the Internet had existed at that time?" Today we can criticise that optimism. Indeed, a culture of submission is a communicatively closed culture. A participatory political culture, on the other hand, is characterised by an open communicative culture, accessible even to the most controversial points of view. This state of affairs exposes the communicative culture of democratic states to the negative impact of the propaganda of non-democratic states (servile cultures). There is therefore no room for dialogue. A discussion with Russian or Belarusian propaganda workers is not a dialogue or exchange of ideas. On top of that, it takes place exclusively in the "democratic part of the Internet." Despite the technical possibilities of the Net, hostile societies do not talk to each other. The network space of Russia (and to a lesser extent Belarus) can today be described in terms of a gigantic information (filter) bubble, the framework of which is determined primarily by the internal constraints of a submissive type of political culture. Of course, both Vladimir Putin's regime and some Western companies have imposed certain restrictions on the ability to access internet content, but in most cases these obstacles are relatively easy to bypass. The technical barrier is therefore not as important here as the cultural barrier.

If we relate the problem of the state of public debate within democratic states to the phenomenon of the lack of intercultural communication at the junction (front) of the democratic and non-democratic worlds, it would seem easiest to put an equal sign here: here is the problem of the fierce struggle between the feuding "political tribes" of the Western world manifesting itself in a new international dimension. However, this would be an erroneous simplification. For discussion, even at its most

heated, and conflict are inherent in the nature of democracy.[13] In the case of the relationship between the non-democratic world and the democratic world, however, there is no exchange of views or even the most heated communication: what we see here is only an organised, coordinated propaganda message directed towards the wider West, and an equally coordinated internal message, reproduced, sustained and cultivated by the Russian social media space. The discussion here, as I have already mentioned, takes place only in the democratic space and mostly as a reaction to Russian propaganda and disinformation. It would seem that such a state of affairs is undesirable for the democratic world, and yet the West, specifically the political participatory culture, has a number of advantages here, which began to become apparent even before the outbreak of war. A surprising reinforcement for the participatory type of political culture just before the full-scale, kinetic phase of the conflict began was the fact of the global and massive transfer of political discourse precisely to the virtual space, including above all the area of social media. From our point of view, this can be considered one of the few positive aspects of the decidedly negative and tragic phenomenon of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Before the pandemic, the relationship between these cultures consisted largely of a more or less visible, deliberately masked and organised influence of a serf culture whose task was (and is) to disintegrate the participating culture. In principle, we should use here a model in which one serf culture destructively influences, through propaganda and disinformation, many participatory cultures in a planned manner, but we remain with the bipolar model, assuming that the democratic states as a whole are a functioning environment for a political participatory culture, although of course internally differentiated. At the same time, we assume that it was the outbreak of |the pandemic and the ensuing months-long lock down that triggered the increased interest of citizens of democratic states in participating in political culture. Many people sat down in front of their computers and, for such various reasons as entertainment, boredom, increased exposure to virtual stimuli, observation of friends' activities on social media and the desire to express one's own opinion, began to participate more and more actively in public debate. On one hand, this has intensified the political and ideological conflict gaining momentum more or less since the middle of the second decade of the 21st century in most democratic countries. On the other hand, this intensification of virtual participation has contributed to exposing both the existence and the enormous scale of Russian propaganda and disinformation to many who were, hitherto, unconscious of or downplayed its effects. On a theoretical level, the increased interest in politics due to its transfer to the web, as an effect of the pandemic, the expansive nature of media development and generational change, can be interpreted as a strengthening of the participatory type of political culture. This amplification during the pandemic period was sudden, massive and global, which certainly translated in various ways into an exacerbation of the disputes that had been going on for years in the areas of local political cultures, much to the delight of the ruling elites of non-democratic states. Out of the chaos of these online disputes

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[13]   See: Mouffe, Ch., The *Paradox of Democracy*, Wrocław 2005.

within democratic societies, however, the first symptoms foreshadowing future stability have already begun to emerge. What about the question of the relationship between subjective and participatory culture? Well, it has changed, shifting from a mode of unilateral, covert and destructive influence to a mode of conflict. In this mode, with the conscious resistance of the participatory culture, the destructive networking action of the serf culture is doomed to failure.

Taking the thesis of the crisis of the current democracy[14] as valid, one can hypothetically assume that it will emerge from this crisis strengthened. This hypothesis is already supported by numerous phenomena in the area of political culture observed both nationally and internationally. As an example, there is widespread stigmatisation, unmasking and rejection of the Russian narrative by the majority of serious parties, politicians, institutions and, most importantly, citizens. In the Polish media space, the Russian threat has begun to be widely perceived.[15] The danger was also publicised through social media. At the same time, there was a noticeable decline in the audience of all sorts of preachers of conspiracy theories, immensely popular throughout almost the entire second decade of the 21st century, operating largely on platforms such as YouTube.[16] The widespread condemnation of Russia's war of aggression extends to the entire political and cultural component that makes up the Russian vision of the world. This component is a phenomenon that requires a separate study, and has already been undertaken many times.[17] For the purposes of this text, I will limit its description to a few terms: imperialism, nationalism, racism, intolerance, aggression, chauvinism, hatred, contempt, grandiosity mania, mythomania and falsehood.

The unequivocal rejection of such a world view by the vast majority of democratic societies is a resounding event. Importantly, this rejection has also occurred in the area of broadly defined right-wing circles, except in cases of the extreme fringe. This is all the more significant because the weight of Russian lobbying and propaganda activities, along with the whole gamut of covert operations, has been reoriented since the end of the Cold War from organisations, political parties and an electorate of left-wing provenance, towards the conservative pole. Thus, the predictions of Russian elites and propagandists regarding support among Western right-wing circles did not come true. This support has been built over the years on arousing and/or amplifying

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[14]   Numerous indicators, such as the level of democratisation, the level of freedom in the world and the level of press freedom, prove this point (Economist Intelligence, Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House).

[15]   A telling observation is one of the key motifs of the Russian propaganda message according to which 'Russia does not threaten anyone, but only defends itself'. This motif has been successfully distributed by the Russian propaganda machine in the societies and elites of Western countries. Proof of the success of Russian propaganda is the fact of unfettered de facto economic cooperation (Nord Stream 1 and 2, arms trade, etc.) lasting until the aggression of 24 February 2022 and hardly slowed down once it started.

[16]   Cf.: YouTube trends, <https://www.youtube.com/feed/trending>, [accessed: 12.04.2022].

[17]   Cf.: Dugin, A., *Essay on geopolitics. Geopolitical future of Russia*, Moscow 1999; Dugin, A., *Postmodern geopolitics. Time of new empires, essays on geopolitics of the 21st century*, Sankt-Petersburg 2007; Dugin, A., *Concept of network wars*, Geopolityka, 2, 1(2), Czestochowa 2009, pp. 187–190; Trienin, D., *Russia*, Washington 2019; Gumilov, L., *From Russia to Russia*, Krakow 2004.

resentment against neo-liberal optics. In the tasking dimension of propaganda, this translated into actions stigmatising LGBT people, ridiculing/negating the climate crisis, denying the COVID-19 pandemic, feminist thought, the development of the concept of animal rights protection and most of the characteristics of consolidated democracy such as the multi-stage process of consensus building, decision-making and law-making, and tenure of government etc.

The role of social media in strengthening a participatory type of political culture and thus bridging the crisis of democracy is particularly important. Observation of social media reveals that its users increasingly understand the need to verify sources of information.[18] It is becoming increasingly common for ordinary users to attempt and demand such verification. Users themselves, from either side of a political dispute, are also acting as verifiers. The correction of a particular pieces of information which are, for example, out of date, out of context, manipulated or untrue, is also becoming more common within one's own filter bubble.

Institutions specialising in verifying the veracity of information and the credibility of its sources are also increasingly common. At the same time, these institutions are increasingly present on social media and, interestingly, try not to identify themselves with the ongoing ideological and political dispute. An example of this is the social project FakeHunter, in operation since 2019, as well as a number of representatives of the so-called creative sector: most often sole traders or micro-entrepreneurs such as bloggers, you-tubers and instagrammers etc. who professionally earn money by verifying information. It is also worth mentioning innovative technological solutions emerging in response to the problem of fake news, such as machine learning applications. The potential for the use of artificial intelligence (AI[19]) in this area is, at present, even difficult to estimate. In the media reality of recent years, this is a revolution of sorts: these media and applications are satisfying the growing need for possibly objective information, covering an increasingly distinct segment. Perhaps the emergence of specialised solutions heralds a breakthrough for an ICT space characterised by political struggle and propaganda? Perhaps this breakthrough will result in the "bursting" of information bubbles and the return of a rational level of public debate? At this point, it is important to mention an important conciliatory process that can be observed in Poland, as well as in other Western countries. We are talking about the phenomenon of uniting in the face of a threat, joining forces against a common enemy and putting aside ad hoc political and ideological disputes. In the case of the Polish social media space, this topic is currently difficult to address, given the pre-election campaign period. Certainly, the division of the domestic electoral market and the relations between its segments are very clear and fierce, but it is impossible to exclude or minimise the impact of the "common enemy" as an identity-shaping factor. A paradoxical example could be the mutual accusation of political adversaries of being pro-Russian or subscribing to the Russian narrative. A rational example,

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18   Kupiecki, R., Chłoń, F., Bryjka, T., *Platform for countering disinformation. Building social resilience research and education*, Warsaw 2020.
19   AI (Artificial Intelligence).

on the other hand, is the common reaction of users on opposite sides of a political dispute to obvious Russian propaganda or to news from the frontline.[20]

Conclusion

What, then, is the current impact of Russian propaganda and disinformation on the political culture of Polish society? Despite the numerous negatives associated with the spread of fake-news, hatred and false stereotypes etc., this influence today paradoxically contributes to the strengthening of a "participatory" type of political culture. Summarising the considerations of this text, three phenomena in particular have influenced this state of affairs. Firstly, the pandemic period preceding the war resulted in a surge of interest in the networked form of political culture participation. Secondly, with the launch of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 22 February 2023,[21] the problem of Russian propaganda warfare took a key place in academic, popular science and journalistic analyses, thus being largely exposed, and being unmasked is a critical situation for any propaganda.[22] The first two phenomena can be regarded as the result of chance, the negative consequences of globalisation and the consequences of political bad will on one hand, and political naivety on the other. The third phenomenon, which is the ever advancing ICT revolution, seems to be less influenced by the determinants of the first two.

It cannot, of course, be said that everything changed with the advent of a pandemic or the outbreak of war. Global civic engagement began to grow almost simultaneously with the emergence of the crisis of democracy. In the case of Poland, one can point out, for example, the successively increasing interest in security issues, geopolitics and strategy etc., since 2014. However, a significant acceleration of this process occurred precisely during the pandemic, when, as a result of the lock-down, citizens shifted their activity online and with the outbreak of the full-scale, kinetic phase of the conflict. These events set in motion a whole range of social and psychological phenomena related to electronic communication, often already well understood and described in the fields of sociology, psychology and political science. Both positive and negative[23] aspects of virtual communication have therefore been reinforced in parallel. To summarise: we are becoming more and more courageous in proclaiming our views and in engaging in political debate; we are increasing our resistance to fake-news, which is greatly supported by technology initiatives of individual organisations, individual users and media owners; our tolerance of conspiracy theories is decreasing, etc. These are only the first positive symptoms on the way to stabilising the free

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[20]   This condition can be observed, for example, on the Twitter platform, in reactions to information from the front shared on the accounts of war correspondents or white intelligence personnel. See: Wolski, J., <https://twitter.com/wolski_jaros>.

[21]   It should be remembered that Russian aggression against Ukraine began in 2014. In turn, it was certainly being prepared even earlier.

[22]   See: Głowiński, M., *Jak nie dać się propagandzie*, Warszawa 2016.

[23]   E.g. increase in aggressive speech, vulgarisation of language etc.

flow of information and knowledge that the pioneers of information society theory would like to see. Despite the still numerous negative phenomena, the noticeable positive trends can be seen as a promising prognosis. The dialogue between political subject culture and participatory culture does not exist at the present time.[24] With the outbreak of war, however, the implicit, long-term and planned destructive influence of the former on the latter came to an end. This does not mean, of course, a stopping or diminishing of the propaganda message, but a gradually increasing resistance to its influence by Western societies.

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[24]   From the point of view of authoritarians, such dialogue is always a critical threat. See: Radkiewicz, P., *Authoritarianism and Ockham's razor*, Warsaw 2012.

Summary

Theorists and enthusiasts of the information society concept predicted a technologically determined, harmonious development of societies towards deepening cooperation within globalization. However, we are currently witnessing serious negative situations, such as a democratic crisis and a security crisis. These crises are especially visible in the area of social media, which are a digital field of competition between different types of political culture. Despite the still difficult situation, in this competition the subservient political culture is in a losing position compared to the participating political culture, which is represented by broadly understood democratic societies.

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DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL IDENTITY OF UKRAINIANS AS A RESULT OF THE WAR WITH RUSSIA

DYNAMIKA ZMIAN TOŻSAMOŚCI POLITYCZNEJ UKRAIŃCÓW W WYNIKU WOJNY Z ROSJĄ

Abstract: Russia's military invasion of Ukraine provided the impetus that radically contributed to the consolidation of Ukrainian society and the formation of new valuable identity structures for citizens. The massive transformation in the social consciousness of Ukrainian society caused by the military aggression is still ongoing. The results of sociological research indicate that significant value transformations have been recorded in the social consciousness, the content of which gives grounds to conclude that a process of formation of new socio-cultural identity structures is taking place. Therefore, there is a need to study the dynamics of political changes and value attitudes of social consciousness under the conditions of resistance to the military aggression of the Russian Federation. The research task is to determine the direction of the formation of new identity components under conditions of military aggression. Also, there is an urgent need to investigate the conceptual basis for the formation of a renewed identity in the post-war period, which will aim to restore the economic and social foundations of society. Therefore, attention should be paid to identifying the strategic directions of identity politics in the post-war period. The conclusions obtained will be useful in the formation of state identity policy, which is relevant for Ukrainian society in the context of the implementation of the state's integration with the EU.

Zarys treści: Wojskowa inwazja Rosji na Ukrainę stała się impulsem, który radykalnie przyczynił się do konsolidacji społeczeństwa ukraińskiego i ukształtowania nowych wartościowych struktur tożsamości obywateli. Wciąż trwają ogromne przemiany w świadomości społecznej ukraińskiego społeczeństwa, spowodowane agresją wojskową. Wyniki badań socjologicznych wskazują, że w świadomości społecznej odnotowano istotne przemiany wartości, których treść daje podstawy do stwierdzenia, że zachodzi proces kształtowania się nowych struktur tożsamości społeczno-kulturowej. Istnieje zatem potrzeba zbadania dynamiki zmian politycznych i wartościowych postaw świadomości społecznej w warunkach oporu wobec agresji wojskowej Federacji Rosyjskiej. Zadaniem

badawczym jest określenie kierunku kształtowania się nowych komponentów tożsamości w warunkach agresji wojskowej. Również istnieje pilna potrzeba zbadania koncepcyjnych podstaw kształtowania się odnowionej tożsamości w okresie powojennym, która będzie miała na celu przywrócenie ekonomicznych i społecznych podstaw społeczeństwa. Dlatego należy zwrócić uwagę na określenie strategicznych kierunków polityki tożsamościowej w okresie powojennym. Uzyskane wnioski będą przydatne w kształtowaniu państwowej polityki tożsamościowej, która jest istotna dla społeczeństwa ukraińskiego w kontekście realizacji państwowego kursu integracyjnego z UE.

Keywords: Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukrainian identity, identity politics in Ukraine
Słowa kluczowe: wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska, tożsamość ukraińska, polityka tożsamościowa na Ukrainie

Methodology and empirical data

In this article the concept of "national identity" is used as a dynamic set of indicators of values and meanings through which the individual and society define themselves in the context of a political, cultural and historical process. The concepts of "personal identity" and "social identity" indicate how an entity (personality or social group) relates to more general social entities by means of certain values and meanings.

National identity denotes a specific system of political, cultural and social patterns of action and values created by the state, public institutions and national elites. The national identity is the basis for the formation of the cultural-historical and political space in the context of which individuals and social groups correlate (identify themselves) with society and the state.

A significant component of national identity is also the set of perceptions of individuals and social groups regarding the historical past and models of future social development. National identity settings determine the goal-setting vectors that determine the economic, security and social policies of the state.

The state and social institutions implement identity politics, which is a set of historical, linguistic, ethnic and cultural policies for the construction of the nation. In this respect, the concept of "identity politics" is used as a system of mobilisation activities on the part of the state and social institutions to shape certain value attitudes and models of action that form the basis of identity. Identity politics aims to consolidate different social groups in order to achieve socially meaningful goals.

The importance of national identity for the preservation of the state is pointed out by the famous ideologist of modern liberalism, F. Fukuyama. He sees in Ukraine's struggle against the aggression of the Russian Federation an example of combining attitudes of national identity with the foundations of the liberal state system, which have a universal supranational character. Fukuyama notes that the initiators of the aggression believed that Ukraine had no identity of its own, separate from

Russia, and that the Ukrainian state would cease to exist as soon as the invasion began. Instead, the stable national identity of the Ukrainian people and their loyalty to the liberal-democratic system formed the basis of resistance to external military aggression. Fukuyama assumes that if the war succeeds in undermining Ukrainian independence and democracy, the world will return to an era of aggressive nationalism reminiscent of the early 20th century. However, if the aggression is defeated and "Putin leads Russia to military and economic defeat, then there will be a chance to re-learn the liberal lesson that power uno.estricted by law leads to national catastrophe and to revive the ideals of a free and democratic world."[1]

The empirical basis of our research was the use of data from representative sociological opinion polls to determine the dynamics of changes in the socio-political views of Ukrainian citizens, which allowed us to draw conclusions about the transformation of their socio-cultural identity.

Dynamics of change in the identity structure of Ukrainians

Throughout the years of state independence, from 1991 onwards, the consciousness of Ukrainian society comprehended the enormous social, economic and political changes brought about by the destruction of the Soviet system. The process of the formation of the socio-cultural identity of Ukrainians was complex and full of contradictions. Many layers of the population had to abandon their usual values inherited from the Soviet era.

Resistance to Russia's military aggression contributed to the consolidation of society and the strengthening of identity values. This is especially true in the regions of southern and eastern Ukraine. In these dramatic times, Ukrainians have shown unprecedented examples of consolidation.

In support of this, we cite the results of a survey conducted by the RATING Sociology Group, which showed a significant increase in consolidation attitudes in the public mind. If, prior to the start of the armed invasion in August 2021, 34% of respondents indicated that they felt proud of the state, according to the survey conducted after the start of the war, in April 2022, there was an overwhelming 80% majority for such a view. The conducted survey showed that such a feeling dominates the minds of respondents, regardless of age or region of residence. The aforementioned survey showed that the number of citizens who identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine increased from 75% in August 2021 to 98% in April 2022, and as Europeans from 27% to 57% respectively. At the same time, the level of self-identification of respondents within the "Soviet person" matrix decreased significantly from 21% in August 2021 to 7% in April 2022. The indicated trends dominate across all age,

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[1]   Fukuyama, F., *A Country of Their Own. Liberalism Needs the Nation. Foreign Affairs*, May/ June 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-01/francis-fukuyama-liberalism country?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20220505, [accessed: 22.08.2022].

and regional groups. The survey also showed that the population does not support the narrative that "Russians and Ukrainians are one nation." The vast majority of respondents (91%) disagree.[2]

The Russian-Ukrainian war has provided the public consciousness with an impetus to reassess the importance of Ukraine's European integration course. All the arguments of the proponents of the notorious Eurasian vector disappeared. Broad layers of the population clearly realised the urgent need for Ukraine's European integration. According to the results of opinion polls, the number of supporters of Ukraine's accession to the EU increased significantly during the period of armed aggression. As of January 2023, 87% of respondents supported Ukraine's accession to the EU and 86% to NATO. It should be noted that support for EU and NATO accession is virtually unanimous among citizens by region, age and wealth. This is an unpre-cedented level of support for the entire period of the sociological survey. Ukrainians are also positive about Ukraine's possible participation in military-political alliances outside NATO. Thus, 85% of those surveyed support the idea of creating a military-political union consisting of Ukraine, Poland and the UK. 80% have a positive attitude towards the idea of creating a military-political union composed of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania.[3]

The trends recorded indicate that a critical majority of supporters of Ukraine's European integration course has formed in society. It can be argued that, in general, there has been a historic choice by citizens in favour of a pluralistic society, solidarity-based social relations and the rule of law, i.e. those social and state values with which the European community is identified.

Nevertheless, there are many gaps in Ukrainians' understanding of the specific problems we will have to deal with along the way. Thus, according to the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, 62% of respondents are convinced that Ukraine should defend its interests and disagree with the demands made during European integration. At the same time, 31% of respondents agree that Ukraine should approve all necessary laws and meet all EU requirements in order to join the EU as soon as possible.[4]

Signs of significant changes in public awareness include, in particular, changes in Ukrainians' attitudes towards the Soviet past. The results of the opinion poll show a drastic decrease in the number of respondents with nostalgia for the Soviet past – from 46% in 2010 to 11% in 2022. The vast majority of respondents, 87%, do not regret the past USSR. As is well known, the values inherited from the Soviet era have had a long-term impact on the behavioural attitudes of the Ukrainian

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[2]   Eighth national survey: Ukraine in war conditions (April 6, 2022). Sociological group "Rating&quot, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/vosmoy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_ukraina_v_usloviyah_voyny_6_aprelya_2022.html, [accessed: 22.08.2022].

[3]   Twentieth national survey: foreign policy attitudes of the population (January 14-16, 2023), Sociological group "Rating&quot, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/dvadcyate_zagalnonac_onalne_opituvannya_zovn_shnopol_tichn_nastro_naselennya_14-16_s_chnya_2023.html, [accessed: 22.08.2022].

[4]   Should Ukraine fulfill all the requirements of the EU in order to join as soon as possible? KyivInternational Institute of Sociology, July 2022, https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1126&page=4, [accessed: 01.09.2022].

population, giving rise to all sorts of propaganda speculation about a "shared" historical past. As can be seen, this valuable and significant legacy has indeed been overcome.[5]

Countering Russian military aggression has contributed to the political consolidation of society. As the results of opinion polls show, the alienation of power and society has significantly decreased. As is well known, this problem has long been a feature of political discourse and has often negatively affected the effectiveness of state policy. As the poll results show, during the period of armed aggression, 80% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. Only 10% have the opposite opinion. The perception of the state of affairs as correct is dominant in all regions and age groups.[6] The data obtained can obviously be seen as evidence of the high degree of consolidation of society.

A sign of consolidation is also the high level of citizens' support for the government's actions. Thus, prior to the start of military action in November 2021, when assessing the efficiency of the state, 44% of citizens noted that the central authorities were struggling to fulfil their duties. In contrast, in December 2022, only 9.3% of people were reported to have negatively assessed the work of the authorities. In November 2021, the statement that "central authorities cope with almost all their duties" was agreed with by 5.2% of respondents. In December 2022, this figure was 41%.[7]

The military aggression contributed to the strengthening of mutual assistance among Ukrainians. Thus, 95% of respondents stated that during the war they did not have enough material resources to live comfortably. At the same time, 81% of respondents indicated that they made monetary donations to the Ukrainian army, 63% donated money or other items to internally displaced persons, and 60% donated to humanitarian needs.[8]

One sign of political consolidation is the unprecedented level of support for Ukraine's democratic path. According to the results of a survey conducted in May 2022, 95% of respondents said it was important or very important to them for Ukraine to become a democratic society. This compares to 76% before the war began in December 2021. Freedom of speech, fair justice, and free and fair elections were named by respondents as the most important features of democracy.[9]

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[5]   Tenth National Survey: Ideological Markers of War. April 27, 2022. Sociological group" Rating&quot, Adres URL: https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/desyatyy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_ideologicheskie_markery_voyny_27_aprelya_2022.html, [accessed: 22.08.2022].

[6]   Ninth National Survey: Assessments of International Partnerships. Sociological group " Rating&quot, April 26, 2022. URL, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/devyatyy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_ocenki_mezhdunarodnogo_partnerstva_26_aprelya_2022.html, [accessed: 22.08.2022].

[7]   Public opinion in Ukraine after 10 months of war. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 15.01.2023, Adres URL: https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1175&page=1, [accessed: 22.08.2022].

[8]   Opportunities and obstacles on the path of democratic transition of Ukraine, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 20.09.2022, https://kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20220920_o/August%202022_wartime%20survey%20Public%20fin%20UKR.pdf, [accessed: 22.08.2022].

[9]   *Ibidem.*

There are significant changes in identity based on linguistic features. The position of the Ukrainian language in society is strengthening, especially in the sphere of interpersonal communication. According to the results of a study by the sociological group RATING in 2022, 51% of respondents said that they speak Ukrainian at home (compared to 37% in 2012). There was also a significant decline in the level of consumption of Russian news content. For example, 46% of respondents said they had stopped watching Russian TV series and 43% had stopped listening to Russian music artists.[10]

Finally, it is important to note that despite the huge losses and destruction caused by the war with Russia, 95.7% of Ukrainians express a firm belief in victory.

Cultural and educational policies in identity formation

The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine has initiated a review of educational curricula in the general secondary education system to counteract the influence of the "Russian peace" ideology that accompanied armed aggression. In particular, significant revisions have been made to history curricula aimed at students' understanding of contemporary events. For example, the updated curricula present the USSR as an imperial-type state. Recent history curricula have undergone significant changes. In particular, innovations have been made that point to the genocidal actions of Russia's political leadership and the Russian army against Ukrainians, national resistance to aggression and international support for Ukraine. In addition, updated educational programmes for fiction will study the works of classics of world literature instead of Russian.[11]

As part of the decommunisation and Russification policy, in 2015-2016, more than 51,000 toponymic objects (streets, squares and plazas) and 991 settlements were renamed, and about 2,500 monuments were demolished. Since the beginning of the war, approximately 2,200 toponyms in 33 cities have been renamed on a large scale.[12]

In the area of cultural policy, let us identify a few initiatives that were aimed at developing socio-cultural identity.

After the start of the war some Ukrainian creative collectives and cultural institutions abandoned names containing the word "Russian", the names of Russians in the names of these institutions, as well as repertoire of Russian origin. According to the Ministry of Culture and Information of Ukraine, in 2022, more than 2,500

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[10]   Seventeenth nationwide survey: identity, patriotism, values Sociologcalroup &quotRating", (August 17-18, 2022), https://ratinggroup.ua/researchukraine/s_mnadcyate_zagalno-nac_onalne_opituvannya_dentichn_st_patr_otizm_c_n_nost_17-18_serpnya_2022.html, [access: 22.08.2022].

[11]   The content of general secondary education curricula has been updated. Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, August 16, 2022, https://mon.gov.ua/ua/news/onovleno-zmist-nav-chalnih-program-zso, [accessed: 22.08.2022].

[12]   Onyshchenko, V., *De-Russification and decommunization of names: how Ukrainian cities are-changing*, https://transparentcities.in.ua/articles/derusyfikatsiia-ta-dekomunizatsiia-nazv-yak--zminiuiutsia-ukrainski-mista, [accessed: 22.08.2022].

artistic actions and projects in support of Ukraine were realised abroad, and more than 500 concerts of national artistic groups and theatres were held abroad. There are more than 20 different cultural studies projects on the United Digital Platform of Culture and Media, created by the Ministry of Culture together with partners and volunteers. More than 120 tonnes of humanitarian aid were delivered to more than 230 museums and libraries in Ukraine through the Heritage Rescue Headquarters. The Cultural Heritage Restoration Fund became operational. In 2023, projects such as "Ukrainian Youth is a European Book!" on the restoration of library funds of cultural and educational institutions, and "Tales of EUkraine" printing of more than 300,000 children's books by Ukrainian authors abroad and distribution of these books in schools and kindergartens abroad are planned.[13]

It should be noted that the given list of projects and activities aimed at using educational and cultural means in the formation of socio-cultural identity is not complete.

The importance of identity politics

The elimination of various forms of alienation between citizens and the state during the dramatic trials of armed aggression, the significant changes in foreign policy directions, the re-evaluation of the historical past, in particular the destruction of the value matrix of the "Soviet (soviet) man", as well as the support for the course of European integration point to significant changes in social consciousness and, consequently, to the formation of a renewed identity of Ukrainian citizens.

The high level of consolidation around certain value attitudes, which is determined by both regional and age characteristics, is indicative of the generally historical choice of Ukrainian citizens in favour of a democratic social system. There are no grounds for seeing Ukraine as a "failed state" or a "torn state". Regional, linguistic and political differences have proven to be secondary to the threat of military aggression. Consolidating structures prevailed. Values of solidarity, a sense of common destiny and common culture prevailed. At the same time, attempts to "denazify" society, to discredit the cultural values and historical meanings of Ukrainian society, as sought by the Russian political leadership at the beginning of the military aggression, were defeated.

Attention was drawn to the factor of consolidated support for the values of democracy and the course of European integration, as evidenced by sociological research. This means that the image of the future Ukrainian society, associated with a set of European values and forms of organisation of public life and the state, has become consolidated in the consciousness of broad sections of society, regardless of region of residence and age.

As is well known, before the Russian invasion, Ukrainian society was characterised by the fact that large social strata of the population sometimes adhered to opposing

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[13]   Ministry of Culture and Information Policy: 2022 victories and plans for 2023, https://mkip. gov.ua/news/8390.html, [accessed: 22.09.2022].

values, and political and ideological stances. It is natural for any society to have a variety of political attitudes and ideological preferences in the social consciousness. However, the conditions of pre-war Ukraine were characterised by the fact that political forces, in order to secure electoral support, in some places deliberately fuelled these differences and artificially created confrontations on ideological grounds. This was particularly evident in the confrontation between the East-South and Mid-West regions. In reality, the political process took place as a long-term rivalry between the parties controlling the electorate of the south-eastern and mid-western regions. Many times this rivalry went beyond electoral contests and threatened destructive conflicts. This, in turn, led to political authorities and institutions operating under conditions of low trust of the population in them, which in many respects made social and economic reforms impossible. Under these conditions, the phenomenon of so-called "negative consolidation" gradually took shape in the public consciousness, when citizens were united by a negative attitude towards the activities of state bodies, political parties or individual politicians.

The aforementioned contradictions of the pre-war period appeared to have been offset by military aggression. Particular attention has therefore been paid to factors that indicate the consolidation of Ukrainian society with regard to democratic values and the course of European integration. Before the military aggression, such a high degree of consolidation simply did not exist.

However, it cannot be stated unequivocally that these value transformations have become irreversible. You can agree that there is a "high probability of new socio-political divisions associated with numerous human losses, migrations, mass impoverishment, etc. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that Ukraine prepares the necessary safeguards in advance in order not to fall back into identity conflicts, now on the basis of new demarcation lines."[14] The war is not over yet, there is a difficult post-war period ahead with the need to overcome social and psychological trauma. Thus, the examination of social consolidation is not yet over. The social and state stability achieved should become the basis for both overcoming aggression and rebuilding the economy, social relations and cultural development.

It can be argued that the high degree of consolidation around the state policy of resistance and the course of European integration are signs of the transition of Ukrainian society to a qualitatively new level of development. It is clear that this transition requires Ukraine's political class to create an institutional basis for social, political and economic relations aimed at reinforcing the changes registered by sociological research. The complexity of these tasks actually creates the importance of identity politics.

Ukraine's political class is taking the first steps in this direction. In particular, attention should be paid to the Law of Ukraine on the Basic Principles of State Policy on the Formation of Ukrainian National and Civic Identity, adopted in December

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[14]   Zelenko, G., Kononenko, N., *How Russian military aggression changed the political identity of Ukrainians*, National Security and Defence, no. 3–4, 2022.

2022.[15] This law defines the mechanisms for the implementation of identity policy and the key indicators of its effectiveness, and the powers and directions of action of state and local government bodies in the implementation of identity policy.

In the context of the issues addressed in this article, it is worth noting that the law states that "The aim of the state policy on the formation of Ukrainian national and civic identity is to achieve the unity of Ukrainian society by overcoming social contradictions of a cultural, linguistic, regional nature on the basis of the European and Euro-Atlantic course, ensuring compliance with the constitutional guarantees of human and civil rights and freedoms."

Identity politics is thus related to the need to strengthen the consolidation of society by overcoming various contradictions in society on the basis of the European integration course. This, in turn, means mastering the complex of values and social practices that are associated with the concept of "European identity".

Conclusions

1. Public opinion polls conducted after the start of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine show the destruction of established identity markers of Ukrainians inherited from the post-Soviet era. At the same time, there was unprecedented support for attitudes indicating support for inclusive, pro-Western, vectors of social development.

This finding is important in the sense that Ukrainian society has long suffered from various regional, linguistic and political contradictions and divisions. This, in turn, has led to political authorities and institutions operating under conditions of low trust of the population in them, which in many respects has prevented social and economic reforms. As a result, a phenomenon of so-called "negative consolidation" arose in society, which was based not so much on support for certain perceived social goals and values, but on negative perceptions of political actors. This "negative consolidation" has been largely fuelled by certain political factions for decades, hindering the implementation of effective social and economic policies.

2. Russia's military invasion was the impetus behind the consolidation of Ukrainian society and the creation of new identity value structures for Ukrainian citizens. Many layers of the population had to abandon familiar values inherited from the Soviet era. In particular, the so-called Eurasian vector of integration, on which pro-Russian political parties speculated, eventually lost supporters. The results of current sociological research convincingly point to the destruction of the myths of the post-Soviet past. Regional differences in support for the basic foundations of state policy, in particular the construction of a democratic system and the state-led course of European integration, have also blurred.

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[15]   The Law of Ukraine "On the Basic Principles of State Policy in the Field of Affirming Ukrainian National and Civil Identity", https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/pubFile/1585 134, [accessed: 22.08.2022].

3. The turnaround in the formation of a renewed identity for Ukrainians that took place in a short period of time was in many ways caused by destructive Russian propaganda, justifying armed aggression with efforts to impose a "Russian peace", as well as a policy of genocide in the occupied territory. Millions of Ukrainians clearly faced the threat of losing their own state and identity.

At the same time, it is important to note that the rationale for the formation of a renewed identity has evolved throughout the years of the country's independence, starting in 1991. This rationale was the result of years of efforts by advocates of the European vector of development among political forces and civil society institutions.

4. Although the transformation of values in social consciousness registered by sociological studies indicates the destruction of many ideologies inherited from the post-Soviet past, it cannot be stated unequivocally that the values and norms on which the European community is based, in particular the rule of law and respect for human rights, have become irreversible. Since the factors contributing to the destruction of the socio-cultural identity have not disappeared, in particular the psychological traumas caused by military aggression, the destruction of the economy, mass migration and the spread of poverty etc., it is not possible to say that the European community has become irreversible. Thus, the examination of social consolidation is not yet over. Therefore, there is a need for state humanitarian and cultural work aimed at fostering new trends in the formation of the identity of Ukrainian citizens.

5. Despite the support of the State course of European integration, in the public consciousness there remains a deficit of understanding of the content of many norms on which the European community was founded (human rights, rule of law, etc.). So on the agenda is the task of shaping identity politics, one of whose priorities should be the mastery of pan-European values and social practices.

The Ukrainian political class and leadership establishment face the task of creating a model of post-war social development, a new strategic project of state policy, preserving the consolidation potential and strengthening the identity value structures of Ukrainian society.

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Zelenko, G., Kononenko, N., *How Russian military aggression changed the political identity of Ukrainians*, National Security and Defence, no. 3–4, 2022.

Summary

It is proven that the resistance to the military invasion of the Russia has become an impetus that contributes to the consolidation of Ukrainian society and the strengthening of identity values. The directions of transformation of the components of national identity are determined, in particular, rejection of post-Soviet identification markers, and understanding the need for a European integration course. The fundamental changes in Ukrainian society caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war put on the agenda the need to formulate a state identity policy for the conditions of military aggression and the post-war period. It is proven that the content component of the national identity should be a set of values on which the European identity is based.

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FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF UKRAINE IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR WITH RUSSIA: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT

POLITYKA FINANSOWA I GOSPODARCZA UKRAINY W WARUNKACH WOJNY Z ROSJĄ: AKTUALNE PROBLEMY I PERSPEKTYWY ROZWOJU

Abstract: The article is focused on the examination of the current problems of financial and economic policy of Ukraine in the conditions of war with Russia. The authors highlight that logistical challenges related to the war continue to put strain on the economy, particularly those related to the operation of ports, transport networks and energy infrastructure. The war has also caused an imbalance in the foreign exchange market and an unprecedented increase in the budget deficit. Tax revenues were limited due to declining economic activity. The authors suggest ideas for the further development of the financial and economic policy of Ukraine. In particular, the import of luxury goods can be a good alternative to direct conversion of funds into foreign currency. It is already noticeable that there are various restrictions on the import and purchase of foreign exchange assets. These measures are already beginning to be applied, but they need to be expanded and deepened. It is also necessary to limit people's desire for savings, because in conditions of instability, savings will inevitably flow into the currency.

Zarys treści: Artykuł koncentruje się na analizie bieżących problemów polityki finansowej i gospodarczej Ukrainy w warunkach wojny z Rosją. Autorki podkreślają, że wyzwania logistyczne związane z wojną nadal obciążają gospodarkę, szczególnie te związane z funkcjonowaniem portów, sieci transportowych i infrastruktury energetycznej. Wojna zaburzyła równowagę na rynku walutowym i bezprecedensowy wzrost deficytu budżetowego. Dochody podatkowe były ograniczone z powodu malejącej aktywności gospodarczej.

Autorki proponują perspektywy dalszego rozwoju polityki finansowej i gospodarczej Ukrainy, w szczególności import towarów luksusowych może być dobrą alternatywą dla bezpośredniej konwersji środków na walutę obcą. Już teraz zauważalne jest wprowadzenie różnych ograniczeń dotyczących importu i zakupu aktywów walutowych. Środki te już zaczynają być stosowane, ale należy je rozszerzyć i pogłębić. Konieczne jest również ograniczenie chęci ludzi do oszczędzania, ponieważ w warunkach niestabilności oszczędności nieuchronnie wpłyną do waluty.

Keywords: financial and economic policy of Ukraine, war, currency exchange rate, export, import, unemployment
Słowa kluczowe: polityka finansowa i gospodarcza Ukrainy, wojna, kurs wymiany walut, eksport, import, bezrobocie

Introduction

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which began a year ago, has led to great loss of life, mass displacement and significant damage to infrastructure. The impact on economic activity has also been huge: real GDP has fallen sharply, inflation has risen sharply, trade has been seriously disrupted and the budget deficit has risen to unprecedented levels.

Immediately after the invasion, the authorities quickly adapted monetary policy to maintain financial and exchange rate stability. More recently, in order to compensate for the significant loss of international reserves, an exchange rate devaluation was carried out, which helped to stabilize foreign exchange reserves and maintain overall macroeconomic and financial stability.

Fiscal policy focuses on priority defence spending, welfare payments, humanitarian needs and, where possible, some rebuilding of critical infrastructure.

Uncertainty about the size of funding needs remains extremely high and depends on the duration of the war and its intensity, and economic risks loom large, including related to potential additional damage to critical infrastructure or new disruptions in the agricultural and energy sectors.

More than 7 million Ukrainians, about a fifth of the population, have left the country or become internal immigrants, which puts pressure on the social protection system.

There are also problems in the labour market due to changes in the size and composition of the labour force because of the large external migration and mobilization. The number of registered unemployed people per vacancy has jumped from 6 to 12 since the beginning of the war, and research data indicates that the unemployment rate has risen to 40%. Real wages have dropped significantly.

The state budget of Ukraine

Rapid estimates show that GDP growth declined by 37.2% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2022.[1]

However, the IMF notes, along with the fact that active hostilities have moved to the eastern and southern regions, activity in non-combat zones has stabilized and the economy is adapting to the conditions of war.

However, private consumption and investment remain weak due to declining purchasing power, financial constraints and large-scale migration abroad.

The IMF still predicted that Ukraine's GDP would shrink by about 35% over the year. Inflation would reach 30% by the end of 2022.[2]

Logistical challenges related to the war continue to put strain on the economy, particularly those related to the operation of ports, transport networks and energy infrastructure[3].

The war also caused an imbalance in the foreign exchange market, but after the National Bank devalued the exchange rate peg by 25%, the pressure eased.

The war is causing an unprecedented increase in the budget deficit. Tax revenues are limited due to declining economic activity. Meanwhile, despite the reduction in secondary spending, the deficit has continued to rise, mainly due to defence spending. As a result, the budget deficit excluding external grants is estimated to have reached 13.9% of 2022 GDP at the end of August. Thanks to a significant increase in non-tax income, which is provided by external grants, the total budget deficit at the end of August was lower and amounted to about 8% of GDP.

Among the payments charged by tax and customs authorities, the main revenues were received from: value added tax on goods imported into the customs territory of Ukraine, UAH 26.8 billion; corporate income tax, UAH 23.6 billion; personal income tax and military duty, UAH 13.7 billion; value added tax on goods produced in Ukraine, UAH 12.0 billion (collected – 25.6 billion, reimbursed – 13.6 billion UAH); rent for subsoil use, 5.8 billion UAH; excise tax, 5.5 billion UAH; and import and export duty, 2.7 billion UAH (Table 1).

Table 1. The main revenues to the State Budget of Ukraine in 2022

Source of revenues	Amount, billion UAH
value added tax on goods imported into the customs territory of Ukraine	26.8
corporate income tax	23.6
personal income tax and military duty	13.7
value added tax on goods produced in Ukraine	12.0

[1]   https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-risks-report-2023, [accessed: 07.02.2022].
[2]   https://www.imf.org, [accessed: 17.02.2022].
[3]   Strulik, H., *Capital Tax Reform, Corporate Finance, and Economic Growth and Welfare*, "Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control" 2003, vol. 28(3), pp. 595–615.

Source of revenues	Amount, billion UAH
rent for subsoil use	5.8
excise tax	5.5
import and export duty	2.7

Source: https://index.minfin.com.ua/ua/finance/budget/gov/income.

At the same time, given that the war has become protracted, the IMF called the prospects for 2023 low-key and extremely uncertain.

The problems of the currency exchange rate

Judging by the number and radical nature of the economic changes made, we can say that at the moment the government of Ukraine is mostly struggling with two things:

1. Exchange rate growth (devaluation) of the hryvnia. At first a law was passed on critical imports (banning the import of goods except those on a permitted list) and along with this all customs duties were abolished. This law was subsequently repealed and customs duties reinstated. Serious currency restrictions were imposed. Also, to maintain the exchange rate, the National Bank of Ukraine was forced to sell almost $14 billion from reserves (this is almost 40%). However, recently it was still forced to raise the hryvnia exchange rate by 25%. The measures that indirectly put pressure on the currency exchange rate included raising the key rate to 25%. It is also now planned to introduce a 10% fee for foreign exchange transactions, i.e. for any purchase of goods from abroad.

2. Labour rights. Back in March, law 2136 was passed, which allows employment and collective bargaining agreements to be suspended due to hostilities, essentially leaving workers without pay indefinitely. This seemed little and the following draft laws were accepted:

  – draft law 2352, leaving mobilized workers without salary;
  – draft law 5161, which allows concluding employment contracts that do not guarantee the permanent provision of work;
  – draft law 5371, which essentially abolishes the Labour Code for small and medium enterprises (fewer than 250 people).[4]

Ukraine has a huge import dependence even in its main export industries, for example, food. Therefore, the devaluation of the hryvnia itself is neither bad nor good. In a war, it is just a necessity.

Moreover, even before the Russian invasion, it was obvious that the Ukrainian currency was too overvalued. The invasion destroyed the usual logistics, blocking

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[4] https://rev.org.ua/finansovo-ekonomichna-politika-ukra%D1%97ni-pid-chas-vijni, [accessed: 15.02.2022].

seaports, destroyed many production chains – exports fell significantly, while imports recovered very quickly. Exports of goods decreased by 35% in 2022 and imports decreased by 19.6% (Fig. 1, 2).

Fig. 1. Dynamics of changes in the export of goods from Ukraine during 2011-2022, $ billion

Source: https://www.ukrstat.gov.ua.

Fig. 2. Dynamics of changes in the import of goods into Ukraine during 2011–2022, $ billion

Source: https://www.ukrstat.gov.ua.

Devaluation makes things worse for importing enterprises as prices for all imports increase, but it creates better conditions for exporting enterprises. For the same amount of foreign currency they receive a larger amount of hryvnia, and salaries, taxes and other expenses are paid in hryvnia. Additionally, a 10% tax on the purchase

of currency for imports is already being worked out, which will make the situation of all importers even worse.[5]

Businesses have, for many years, become accustomed to cheap imports and the lack of necessity to produce many important components within the country.

This behaviour is called the "entrepreneurs strike" when, in response to the inconvenient demands of society, entrepreneurs respond with public disobedience. If we do not want to further imbalance the economy of Ukraine, the deterioration of conditions for importers of consumer goods is necessary, since almost all military products are supplied from abroad and are almost impossible to import, unlike many consumer goods. Every imported consumer good bought reduces the amount of military items we could buy.[6]

If we want to steadily reduce imports we will have to move in one form or another to deploy a full import substitution which will result, in many cases, in a deterioration of the quality of the finished product, this being normal for any import substitution in the initial stages. The war is for a long time. Accordingly, we will be in a situation of foreign currency deficit for a long time. Drastically reducing imports and replacing them with domestic goods or, alternatively, changing consumer habits, is an uncontested policy for us for many years to come.

Unfortunately the correct, albeit belated, steps to reduce imports are combined in the current policy with an extremely high key rate of 25%, which will make any large-scale changes in the structure of the economy impossible.

The key rate is, in fact, the interest rate that affects bank loan interest. If the state raises the rate, credit becomes more expensive, aggregate demand and investment slows, it is more expensive for businesses to take credit for enterprise development and it is more expensive for people to take loans for purchases.

The rate increase reduces aggregate costs in the economy, which reduces demand and slows price growth. Of course, this comes at the cost of economic growth; enterprises reduce investment and people reduce purchases. Businesses either do not launch new projects and do not hire people, or even reduce employee numbers and cut back on existing projects.

Obviously, import substitution still requires a fairly large-scale investment. That is, in order to pay the loan taken for new production, it is necessary that it shows a yield of 25%, and it is unlikely that in wartime many entrepreneurs can boast of such results.

[5]   Cloyne, J., Hürtgen, P., *The Macroeconomic Effects of Monetary Policy: A New Measure for the United Kingdom*, *"American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics"* 2016, vol. 8(4), pp. 75–102.

[6]   Le Manh Vu, Suruga Terukazu, *Foreign Direct Investment, Public Expenditure and Economic Growth: The Empirical Evidence for the Period 1970–2001*, "Applied Economics Letters" 2005, vol. 12(1), pp. 45–49.

The possibilities of economic restructuring

The need for a large-scale structural change is obvious to everyone. The official justification is the fight against inflation. The logic is the following: to reduce demand, prices for goods will also be reduced. However, two forces participate in the formation of the price, supply and demand, and therefore inflation is divided into demand inflation and supply inflation.[7]

Supply inflation is caused by supply-side constraints such as the cost of logistics, administration, raw materials and credit. Changes in demand do not directly affect this inflation.

For example, some product costs 100 units, including 10 units which were the cost of its delivery to the place of sale. If tomorrow due to some kind of shock (for example, restrictions at borders, as during COVID; blockades of ports, as now we have) the cost of delivery increases by 5 times, it will become 50 units and the price of the product will increase to 140 units. At the same time, even a drop in demand is unlikely to make the price fall as, after all, this will not make the costs less, but rather the contrary (larger lots can be profitable).

Is it possible to blame the side of demand, not supply, for rising prices? Of course, the first reaction of sellers to the increase in demand is to increase prices. But then new sellers come in, or the old ones expand production, supply catches up with demand and price growth stops. Of course, such a production rise is not rapid and then the increase in demand may chronically outpace the growth of supply. In this case, prices will not rise until they destroy most of the demand.

This mechanism allows not only the eno.ichment of sellers of scarce goods, but also prevents the appearance of a commodity deficit, replacing it with a reduction in the number of those who want to buy the goods.[8]

In what situation can demand growth definitely not be satisfied with the growth of supply in any near term, because of which inflation will grow continuously? In the most general form, this is a situation of lack of resources and production capacity. When all people are fully engaged, all production facilities are at full capacity and raw materials are used as efficiently as possible.

The current situation is not at all like this as unemployment, despite the outflow of the population, is breaking records. If a high rate does not help reduce price growth, then why is it needed? Most likely, the main reason is an attempt to reduce the demand for imported goods and foreign currency in general. The logic is simple: a high rate reduces the amount of money in the private sector. After all, if there is a lot of money, then it will inevitably be converted into currency either directly bypassing various currency restrictions or in the form of imports. All the talk about the need to return "confidence in the hryvnia" is absurd – while there is a war, no one will consider any

7   Blasselle, A., Poissonnier, A., *The Taylor Principle Is Valid Under Wage Stickiness*, "Journal of Macroeconomics", vol. 16(2), pp. 581–596.
8   Barakchian, S., Crowe, C., *Monetary Policy Matters: Evidence from New Shocks Data*, "Journal of Monetary Economics" 2013, vol. 60(8), pp. 950–966.

assets in hryvnia as a reliable investment. The more money people have on hand, the more they will try to convert into foreign currency.

Moreover, the import of luxury goods can be a good alternative to direct conversion of funds into foreign currency. You cannot transfer more than 200 thousand hryvnias per month to a foreign account, but you can safely buy, for example, a car worth several hundred thousand dollars and use it as an investment.

It is already noticeable that raising the rate is too indiscriminate a weapon to combat the flow of funds into the currency. More effective would be to use the point constraints. For example, various restrictions on the import and purchase of foreign exchange assets. These measures are already beginning to be applied, but they need to be expanded and deepened.

It is also necessary to limit people's desire for savings, because in conditions of instability, savings will inevitably flow into the currency. The most interesting point arises here: the tendency to save in different groups of the population is different, so a more selective approach is also needed.[9]

Instead of such continuous measures as raising the rate, it is recommended to use more selective measures, for example, to introduce progressive taxes, i.e. those in which the percentage of tax increases at higher levels of income. So that tax growth does not interfere with investments, tax deductions for investments in production should also be introduced. This system, when money is spent on investment in production, can be offset from taxes paid earlier. Such a system operates in the United States for projects in the field of renewable energy.

Raising taxes in this way will help to do the same as raising the key rate, in that they reduce the amount of money in the private sector, thereby reducing the demand for foreign currency. This measure will be selective, reducing funds from those who are more inclined to buy expensive imports and foreign currency. It would also be possible to introduce luxury taxes on expensive cars, real estate and jewellery etc.

Conclusions

In general, everything can be used as an investment to save funds from inflation. If we want to not only make rich people a little poorer, but also make poor people a little richer, we can directly influence the value of salaries by introducing, for example, community service for unemployed people.

In this case, the amount of wages will determine the minimum wage in the country. Such programmes are already planned, but the level of payment for them is extremely low, corresponding to the minimum salary of 6700 hryvnia. By increasing this threshold, the private sector could be forced to compete for an employee and, accordingly, raise salaries.

In order for such programmes to be successful, it is better to move the decision-making centre on the implementation of such work to the local level of

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9   Le Manh Vu, Suruga Terukazu, *Foreign Direct Investment...*, op. cit., pp. 45–49.

the municipality. As a result, various local initiatives, including volunteer ones, could apply for the need for labour and do useful things for society, such as weaving camouflage nets, delivering humanitarian aid and helping in refugee centres etc. As long as we have tasks that need to be completed to improve our defence capability, we cannot allow the situation of unemployment.

After these measures, it is possible to reduce the key rate and introduce additional programmes of preferential lending and financing for investments in production. Such grant and loan programmes are already being prepared, but so far, they do not exceed several billion hryvnias per year, which, of course, is very small. After that, the state should help with all the necessary resources (finances, administration, etc.) in areas that become a greater priority for us, such as import substitution of basic consumer goods and dual-use goods etc.

First, if we believe that the new reality associated with shock is with us for a long time (several years at least), then it is necessary to completely rebuild the economy:

- – close one production and create new ones;
- – retrain employees;
- – completely change the structure of import and export;
- – change the ratio of different industries, geographical location of labour and production capacities.

Obviously, such actions require the mobilization of all possible resources. After all, in such a situation we cannot afford:

- – a large amount of free finances (savings) in the private sector;
- – unspecified means of production;
- – and even more so, unused labour.

The second option, if we believe that the external shock is temporary and everything will end soon, then our task is the opposite:

- – to preserve the former structure of the economy by all forces; to do this, it is necessary to reduce investment and allow many enterprises and employees to idle to reduce costs;
- – it is necessary to encourage those who try their best to preserve production as it existed, for example, by subsidizing them. Such a "subsidy" of imports can be considered a long support of the hryvnia exchange rate by NBU due to reserves in the first months of the invasion.

Of course, we will not win without Western support, and we must fully promote the need to help Ukraine at all levels. However, we ourselves are obliged to do everything possible to successfully withstand the long war of attrition. Instead of half-hearted and late steps, we need to recognize the need for changes in our economic model and start using all possible resources to rebuild it.

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Summary

Uncertainty about the amount of funding needs remains extremely high and depends on the duration of the war and its intensity, and economic risks loom large, including related to potential additional damage to critical infrastructure or new disruptions in the agricultural and energy sectors. Various local initiatives, including volunteer ones, could apply for the need for labour and do useful things for society, such as weaving camouflage nets, delivering humanitarian aid and helping in refugee centres etc. As long as we have tasks that need to be completed to improve our defence capability, we cannot allow the situation of unemployment.

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MECHANISMS OF INFORMATISATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

MECHANIZMY INFORMATYZACJI ADMINISTRACJI PUBLICZNEJ DZIAŁAŃ WOJSKOWO-POLITYCZNYCH

Abstract: The authors note that informatisation of public administration of military-political activity has as its ultimate goal the creation of conditions that ensure more efficient use of information to achieve the best functional results, namely; increasing the efficiency of accessed to information resources, determination of better parameters and characteristics of the military-political situation, development and assessment of various alternatives to military-political solutions, intensify and streamline the organisation of information interaction between the subject and object of military policy, and the use of mathematical models for making military-political decisions.

Zarys treści: Autorzy zauważają, że informatyzacja administracji publicznej działalności woj-skowo-politycznej ma na celu stworzenie warunków zapewniających bardziej efektywne wykorzystanie informacji w celu osiągnięcia najlepszych wyników jej funkcjonowania, a mianowicie zwiększenie efektywności dostępu do zasobów informacyjnych; określenie lepszych parametrów i cech sytuacji wojskowo-politycznej, opracowanie i ocenę różnych alternatyw dla rozwiązań wojskowo-politycznych; zintensyfikowanie i usprawnienie organizacji interakcji informacyjnych między podmiotem a przedmiotem polityki wojskowej, wykorzystanie modeli matematycznych do podejmowania decyzji wojskowo-politycznych.

Keywords: informatisation, public administration,mechanisms, military-political activities
Słowa kluczowe: informatyzacja, administracja publiczna, mechanizmy, działania wojskowo-
-polityczne

Formulation of the problem

Informatisation of public administration of the military-political activities of the state should fundamentally solve the main problem of information support for modern control systems, which is to eliminate the contradictions between the increase in the volume of necessary information and the urgent need to reduce the time for processing it. The fact is that any attempts to increase the amount of information for a more objective and comprehensive analysis of the situation inevitably lead to an increase in the time spent on processing it. At the same time, redundant and overly detailed information can lead to the same harm as its lack, since its processing and analysis requires additional time which, as a rule, leads to a decrease in public administration efficiency, as well as an increase in the likelihood of missing important information at the time of decision making.

Resolving this problem in information support of the military-political activities of the state leads to the objective need to have a flexible and effective methodological apparatus, tools capable of combining the latest achievements of modern science and the ever-increasing capabilities of information technology and computer technology.

It is important to note that in the most economically developed countries of the world, scientific programmes are consistently and actively developed to improve the information capabilities of the political and military public administration of the state.

In our view, the tasks of strengthening the theory of information support for public administration of military-political activities of Ukraineshould be; development of a conceptual apparatus; methods of analysis and synthesis of information streams which allow determination, confirmation and agreement for each level of public administration and for critical efficiency of information security of control bodies; development of tools for combining determination of information needs and uses by systems and control bodies; identification of quantity and quality characteristics of sufficient information for successful functioning of control systems; development of the main directions for the strengthening of information support of military and political activities of the state in times of peace; as well as various stages of development of the military conflict;determination of the entire set of events for optimization of the information system of different levels of control in the Armed Forces; and specific methods of information work.

Analysis of recent research and publications

Analysis of domestic and foreign literature on the topic of research shows that all accumulated research material can be conditionally divided into four main blocks.

The first block consists of works on the methodological problems of military policy, as well as directly the military-political activities of the state, which were the most important source and point in identifying the essence and content of the information support of the military-political activities of the state.

The second block includes works that make up the general theoretical base of the i-sequence of such categories as "information," as well as the roles and place of information processes in social activities. In these scientific papers, a wide range of issues are covered by the essence, content, functions of information and its relationship with other categories. Such works include the following authors: J. Kääriäinen, S. Teppola, P. Parviainen, M. Tihinen, M. Wallin and M. Woerter etc.

The surge in scientific interest in the study of information support and related problems at the end of the 20th century in Ukraine is not accidental. The rapid development of the information sphere throughout the world and in Ukraine is leading to the emergence of new forms and methods of interaction in the life of modern society.

Information is an objectively necessary attribute of human activity. The role and importance of the information factor is constantly increasing, since modern social development is characterized by a significant increase in information needs, which affects the organization and implementation of any social activity in general, and military-political activities in particular. All the above mentioned emphasizes the relevance of the selected research topic.Today the question remains open of how to achieve a higher level of informatisation of Ukrainian society and the state.

Presenting the main material

Improving of information support for the military-political activities of the state is an important factor in increasing its effectiveness. This statement is based on the fact that the rationality and adequacy of the state's military-political actions in achieving military-political goals is largely determined by the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the information possessed by the decision makers of the state's military policy, as well as the effectiveness of its use. At the same time, modern information processes, which are becoming a powerful engine of social progress, can significantly influence the consciousness and behaviour of both individuals and society as a whole.[1]

The effective functioning of information support for the military-political activities of Ukraine depends on many conditions and factors, both objective and subjective, the study of which can be very useful for its improvement.

Based on the previously identified trends in the development of the information sphere of society and the features of information support for the military-political activities of Ukraine, it is useful to identify the following directions for improving the information support for the military-political activities of the state:

- – informatisation of public administration of military-political activities of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
- – formation and development of an integral system of information security of Ukraine in the military sphere;

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[1]   Garrison, D.R., *Online community of inquiry review: social, cognitive, and teaching presence issues*, "J. Asynchron. Learn. Netw" 2007, 11, pp. 61–68; Martin, A., *Digital literacy and the "digital society"*, "Digital Literacies Concepts Policies Practices" 2008, 30, pp. 151–176.

– improving the organization, forms and methods of information support for the military-political activities of the state;
– optimization of interaction between the state's security forces and the media on military-political issues;
– improvement of regulatory and legal mechanisms regulating information relations in the field of military policy of the state.[2]

Let us look at these areas in more detail. In modern conditions, humanity as a whole is experiencing a turning point associated with an avalanche-like increase in the amount of information flow and the volume of information. It is no coincidence that experts started talking about problems associated with the information barrier, which can only be overcome with a qualitative change in the mechanism of information processing itself. There are objective and subjective information barriers. The first, for example, include spatial, temporal, technological, historical, political, terminological and other barriers. The latter, as a rule, include mainly psychological barriers. Therefore, one of the most important tasks of any information system is the timely overcoming of information barriers, that is, negative factors affecting the processes of collection, distribution, perception and consumption of information.[3]

It is obvious that widespread informatisation in the military sphere helps to overcome information barriers and significantly improves the effectiveness of the military-political activities of the state.

Solving the problems of information support for the military-political activities of the state in a timely manner and also with a quality high enough to satisfy the information needs of the decision makers of military policy in modern conditions naturally requires the accelerated development of the process of informatisation of the military sphere of society.[4]

Today, our society has abandoned simplified views and approaches to informatisation only as extensive computerization has provided the population with wide accessed to information. It has now become generally accepted that this is not just the introduction of computer technology into various areas of socio-economic practice, but the formation of integral automated technologies and their mass "incorporation" into societaluse whichhas lead to basic models of activity. The experience of developed countries that have entered the post-industrial stage of development shows that informatisation necessarily includes the following interrelated processes:

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[2]   Horbyk, R., *The war phone: mobile communication on the frontline in Eastern Ukraine*, Digi War 2002, 3, pp. 9–24; Martin, A., *Digital literacy...*, op. cit., pp. 151–176.

[3]   Kirschner, P.A., Sweller, J. & Clark, R.E. *Why Minimally Guided Teaching Techniques Do Not Work: A Reply to Commentaries*,"Educational Psychologist" 2007, 42(2), pp. 115–121; Trantopoulos, K., Krogh, G. von, Wallin, M., Woerter, W. & M., *External knowledge and information technology: Implications for process innovation performance*, MIS Quarterly 2017, 41(1), pp. 287–300.

[4]   Mann, R., *Beyond the military sphere*, "Media History" 2003, p. 19; Westerman, G. & Bonnet, D., *Revamping your business through digital transformation*, MIT Sloan Management Review 2015, 56(3), pp. 2–5.

- development, creation and use of new generations of electronic computer technology;
- development of information technologies based on this technology in various spheres of human activity;
- creation of a wide and diverse network of data and knowledge banks;
- qualitative change in the overall communication network and communication processes;
- formation and maintenance of an information environment that allows satisfying the information needs of people in society and of society as a whole.[5]

Of course, these directions are also acceptable for informatisation of the military-political activities of the state.

It is absolutely clear that the use of new information technologies in information support of the military-political activities of Ukraine increases the level of awareness and intelligence of the military-political leadership of the country and can positively influence the effectiveness of their functional duties. The fact is that new information technologies, unlike traditional ones, make it possible to widely use the modelling of military-political processes in the preparation and adoption of military-political decisions, to take into account various connections and requirements in order to organize optimal interaction between the subjects and objects of military policy, as well as immediate and long-term consequences of a particular military-political course.[6]

In the dynamically changing conditions of the transition period in modern Ukrainian society, the need for effective technologies for analysing and forecasting possible trends in the development of the military-political situation is sharply increasing. This encourages us to look for opportunities to formalize methods for studying real relationships that determine the direction of development of the military-political activities of the state, translated into the language of strict logical and then mathematical procedures. At the same time, the widespread use of modern computers and new information technologies makes it possible not only to process extensive empirical data quickly, but also to develop possible scenarios for the development of events, to make a more accurate military-political forecast, and therefore more effectively carry out the military-political activities of the state.

The active penetration of computer tools and information technologies into military-political practice has, at the same time, deeper reasons that cannot be reduced either to the peculiarities of the military-political process or to the specifics of Ukrainian conditions.[7]

[5] Parviainen, P., Tihinen, M.J. Kääriäinen & Teppola, S., *Tackling the digitalization challenge: How to benefit from digitalization in practice*, "International Journal of Information Systems and Project Management" 2017, 5(1), pp. 63–77; Martsenyuk, T. *Gender and Revolution in Ukraine: Women's Participation in Euromaidan Protests of 2013–2014*, Perspectives on Europe 2014, 44(2), pp. 15–22.

[6] Martin, A., *Digital literacy...*, op. cit., pp. 287–300.

[7] Dandeker, C., *New times for the military: Some sociological remarks on the changing role and structure of the armed forces of the advanced societies*, "The British Journal of Sociology" 1994, 45/4, pp. 637–54; Garrison, D.R., *Online community of inquiry review: social, cognitive, and*

Unfortunately, domestic information technologies, either in the form of scientific and technical documents and information software, or in the form of automated systems, are uncompetitive in the world market. Despite the fact that in Ukraine there are scientific and experimental developments in the field of information technology and technologies that meet the highest standards, in general, in methodological, organizational and technical terms they are at a relatively low level and do not correspond to the required level of informatisation of modern society.

Conclusions

Finally, it seems that the strategically correct direction should be the development of our own information and technology potential, which in the future will allow us to get rid of strict dependence on foreign manufacturers in the field of high technologies and knowledge-intensive industries, especially in strategic areas.

However, at present there are very few truly competitive domestic producers in this area, so relying only on domestic producers will lead to the preservation of Ukraine'stechnological and economic backwardness.

It seems that the most optimal solution is the widespread attraction of foreign and domestic capital and the creation of preconditions for the gradual formation of numerous financial and industrial groups with a predominance, as a rule, of the latter, capable of successfully entering high-tech domestic and world markets.

In addition, in our opinion, among the main areas of government activity that contribute to the informatisation of Ukrainian society, it is necessary to highlight the following:
  – support for national scientific schools with world-class fundamental scientific results in the field of computer science and communications;
  – support for the promotion of final software and hardware products of domestic development and production to the domestic and global markets;
  – creation of preferential conditions for developers and manufacturers of high-tech software and hardware domestic products for the military-industrial complex of Ukraine.

In general, all this gives (according to the multiplicative law) a new impetus for the successful development of scientific, technical and production potential, and, therefore, will allow in the future the achievement high levels of informatisation of the military sphere of the state and society.

Among the main directions of military-political activity of Ukraine which are directly subject to informatisation, the following should, in our opinion, be highlighted:
  – systems for managing the military-political activities of Ukraine;
  – The Armed Forces of Ukraine as a whole.

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Summary

The ultimate goal of informatisation of public administration of military-political activity is mainly based on creating conditions that guarantee the most effective use of information to achieve the best outcomes of its functioning. These conditions include improving the efficiency of information resource access, identifying better parameters and characteristics of the military-political situation, developing and evaluating alternative military-political solutions, intensifying and streamlining the organisation of information interaction between the subject and object of military policy, and using mathematical models to make military--political decisions.It seems that the most optimal solution is the widespread attraction of foreign and domestic capital and the creation of preconditions for the gradual formation of numerous financial and industrial groupscapable of successfully entering high-tech domestic and world markets.

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CIVIL DEFENCE IN POLAND IN TERMS OF NEEDS AND LEGAL REGULATIONS

OBRONA CYWILNA W POLSCE W ASPEKCIE POTRZEB I PRAWNYCH REGULACJI

Abstract: In this study, the author presents Civil Defence in Poland with regards to needs and legal regulations. Research on the state and needs of civil protection in Poland is carried out by state institutions, social institutions and researchers from various academic centres. The state of civil protection is not consistent in legal and organisational terms. One example is the failure to enact a new draft Law on Civil Protection and Civil Defence. Although Poland has ratified international conventions, many of their standards have still not been implemented in practice.

Zarys treści: W opracowaniu Autor podjął próbę przedstawienia obrony cywilnej w Polsce w aspekcie potrzeb i prawnych regulacji. Badania stanu i potrzeb ochrony ludności w Polsce prowadzone są przez instytucje państwowe, społeczne oraz naukowców z różnych ośrodków akademickich. Stan ochrony ludności nie jest spójny pod względem prawnym i organizacyjnym. Jednym z przykładów jest nieuchwalenie projektu nowej ustawy *O ochronie ludności i obronie cywilnej*. Pomimo, tego iż Polska ratyfikowała konwencje międzynarodowe, to w dalszym ciągu wiele ich norm nie wdrożono do praktycznego stosowania.

Keywords: civil defence, security, threats, law
Słowa kluczowe: obrona cywilna, bezpieczeństwo, zagrożenia, prawo

Introduction

One of the most important tasks of the Polish state, carried out by its public authorities, is to ensure the safety of the population. The problem of protecting the civilian population from threats is important in social terms. Consistent improvement and maintenance of conditions for effective protection against threats in times of peace and war is a current task. The principles of the functioning of civil defence in

Poland were regulated by the act *O powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,*[1] which was repealed after the entry into force of the act *O obronie ojczyzny.*[2] In the repealed act, the chapters of Chapter IV entitled "Civil defence" contained general provisions about service in civil defence, education for safety and about general protection of the population. It is to be expected that these will be included in the new law *On Civil Protection and the State of Disaster.*[3] The solutions and regulations proposed therein have been and are the subject of many discussions and considerations regarding the improvement of civil protection activities in Poland. This paper presents the results of part of the research from the doctoral dissertation "Preparation of civil protection against threats during peace and war" prepared at the Federation of Military Academies.[4] Recent events in Ukraine related to Russian aggression show the atrocities of the aggressor against the Ukrainian civilian population. The systemic preparation of the protection of the population is of fundamental importance here. It allows us to assess its condition and the preparedness of civil protection in Poland at the same time.

The Chief Commandant of the State Fire Service is at the same time the Head of the National Civil Defence. This has been the situation in Poland since 2007, and according to the current legislation such a solution should not exist. In practice, as the Head of the OCK, the Chief Commandant can and should demand that central authorities implement the required, necessary solutions. However, this may cause disruption in the cooperation with public administration bodies, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. The research shows that the Head of the OCK should report directly to the Prime Minister. By law, the Head of the OCK should have the authority to influence, in a supervisory mode, the institutions which deal with population security. The state bodies responsible for population security and crisis management are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. State bodies responsible for civil security and crisis management

Administration Level	Civil defence, Civil protection	Crisis management
Central	Chief Fire Officer of the State Fire Service (since 2007 has been Head of National Civil Defence)	Council of Ministers, Prime Minister, competent ministers

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1 *On the general duty to defend the Republic of Poland* Act of 21 November 1967, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 1967, no 44, item 2399, as amended.
2 *On the defence of the Fatherland* Act of 11 March 2022, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2022, item 655.
3 The draft law *On Civil Protection and the State of Disaster* has been notified to the list of legislative and programmatic works of the Council of Ministers, website https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/prezentacja-projektu-ustawy-o-ochronie-ludnosci-oraz-o-stanie-kleski-zywiolowej--konferencja-z-udzialem-kierownictwa-mswia, [accessed: 01.10.2022].
4 Military Academy Federation website; https://bip.faw.edu.pl/faw/doktoranci/postepowania-ws-nadawania-stop/postepowania-doktorskie/zawiadomienia-o-obronach/8517,mgr-inz-Euge-niusz-Kolpaczynski.html, [accessed: 29.09.2022].

Administration Level	Civil defence, Civil protection	Crisis management
Resort	competent ministers, directors of central offices	competent ministers, directors of central offices
Voice	Governor	Governor
County	Starost	Governor
Gmine	Mayor	Mayor

Source: compiled on the basis of the provisions of the Acts of Competence.

Civil Defence has requirements that are greater than the capabilities and competences of the State Fire Service, which is assigned to rescue operations of various kinds. However, it has a great capacity for action, having at its disposal specialised firefighters and appropriate equipment, with the units of the State Fire Service being properly distributed throughout the country. The heads of OC of the provinces,[5] districts and municipalities are in charge of civil defence preparedness. This applies to all institutions, domestic and foreign companies and social organisations within their area of administrative responsibility. Citizens within OC are obliged to serve, educate and train,[6] and to participate in the response to natural disasters. Existing legal regulations[7] define the competences of the Head of OC,[8] as well as those of the heads

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[5] When managing defence matters, the voivode performs the following tasks for the benefit of civil defence, among others: – defines detailed directions for the heads of combined services, inspections and guards, organs of non-associated administration and local government units in the execution of defence tasks; – manages the execution of undertakings related to the raising of state defence readiness performed by marshals of voivodships, starostes, mayors (city presidents), entrepreneurs and other organisational units and social organisations; – manages the implementation of undertakings related to the preparation of management positions for territorial bodies; – organises the use of local forces and resources for the needs of state defence and the voivodship area; – controls and evaluates the performance of defence tasks by bodies, entities, organisational units and organisations; – organises the education of the public on defence preparedness and conducts defence training and exercises.

[6] Citizens' duty in civil defence consists of performing: – civil defence service; – education for security; – training in the general protection of the population.

[7] Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 25 June 2002. *On the detailed scope of activities of the Head of Civil Defence of the Country, heads of civil defence of provinces, districts and communes*, Journal of Laws of 2002, no. 96, item 850.

[8] The responsibilities of the Head of National Civil Defence include: – initiating, preparing, issuing and issuing opinions on draft normative acts concerning civil defence; – agreeing the draft plan of national civil defence with the Ministry of Defence and other relevant ministers; – defining assumptions for civil defence plans of provinces, districts, municipalities and entrepreneurs; – developing programme assumptions and directions for education and training of employees, rescuers and the population in the field of civil defence; – assessing the state of civil defence preparedness in voivodships, districts and municipalities; – planning needs in terms of financial and material resources necessary to fulfil their own tasks in the field of civil defence; – defining assumptions for evacuation of people and property in case of a mass emergency – to initiate scientific and research activities concerning civil defence, as well as to participate in unification and standardisation works in this field; – to prepare, for the needs of the minister responsible for internal affairs and the Prime Minister, information concerning civil defence; – to organise and coordinate civil defence exercises – to control the preparation of civil

of OC of provinces, districts and municipalities.[9] From these regulations stem their interdependence.[10] OC formations can also appoint personnel from private business entities. Organisational rules and the manner of performing service in civil defence are determined by the Minister of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration.[11]

In case of war, natural disasters or environmental threats, the Minister of KiDN establishes civil defence formations.[12] The framework for the supervisory control of

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defence formations and rescuers to carry out rescue operations; – to control the conditions for performing basic service in civil defence; – to establish normative requirements for supplying civil defence bodies and formations with equipment, technical means and uniforms necessary to perform civil defence tasks.

[9]   The responsibilities of the heads of civil defence of provinces, districts and municipalities include: – assessing the state of civil defence preparations; – developing and giving opinions on civil defence plans; – developing and agreeing action plans; – organising and coordinating civil defence training and exercises; – organising training of the population in civil defence; – preparing and ensuring the operation of the detection and alarm system and the early warning system of the detection and alarm system and the early warning system for threats; – setting up and preparing civil defence organisational units for operation; – preparing and organising the evacuation of the population in the event of a mass threat to life and health over a wide area; – planning and providing transport facilities, living facilities, and pre-medical, medical and social assistance to the evacuated population; – planning and ensuring the protection of agricultural and livestock crops and food and fodder products, as well as water intakes and facilities in the event of a threat of destruction; – planning and ensuring the protection and evacuation of cultural and other property in the event of a threat of destruction;– designating health care facilities obliged to provide medical assistance to those affected by a mass threat to the life and health of the population; – ensuring the supply of drinking water to the population and designated food establishments, and water for special equipment for the elimination of contamination and for fire-fighting purposes; – to supply civil defence bodies and formations with equipment, technical means and uniforms necessary for the performance of civil defence tasks; – to integrate civil defence forces and other services; – to give opinions on drafts of local laws concerning civil defence and affecting the performance of civil defence tasks; – to initiate scientific and research and standardisation activities concerning civil defence; – cooperating with territorial bodies of military administration; – providing conditions for performing basic service in civil defence; – giving opinions on proposals for the creation of civil defence formations; – preparing information on the tasks to be performed; – cooperating with voivodes' plenipotentiaries for emergency medical services and with territorial bodies of military administration; – inspecting the preparation of civil defence formations and rescuers to carry out rescue operations; – establishing a list of state institutions, entrepreneurs and other organisational units and social rescue organisations intended to carry out civil defence preparations and undertakings; – organising and carrying out training of rescuers doing basic service in civil defence; – preparing and providing necessary forces for emergency assistance in burying the dead.

[10]   The heads of civil defence set tasks and control their implementation, and coordinate and direct activities in the preparation and implementation of civil defence undertakings: – The Head of National Civil Defence for the heads of civil defence in the provinces; – The Head of Civil Defence in the provinces for the heads of civil defence in the districts; – The Head of Civil Defence in the districts for the heads of civil defence in the municipalities; – The Head of Civil Defence in the municipalities for the heads of civil defence in institutions, entrepreneurs, social rescue organisations and other organisational units operating in the municipal area.

[11]   Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of 26 September 2002. *On service in civil defence*, Dz.U. (Journal of Laws) 2002, no. 169, item 1391, as amended.

[12]   Regulation of the Minister of Culture and National Heritage of 8 July 2008. *Amending the Regulation on the establishment of civil defence formations*, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2008, no. 131, item 833.

government administration bodies and local government bodies is defined by the Council of Ministers.[13] The correctness of the implementation of defence tasks and the state of their preparations is assessed through substantive inspections.[14]

In case of war, natural disasters or threats to the environment, the Minister of KiDN appoints civil defence formations.[15] The provision of Article 140 has been repealed. Thus, the basis for specifying civil defence tasks, powers and duties of individual institutions has been abolished. The Council of Ministers issued a Regulation specifying the scope of competences of the Heads of OC at particular levels.[16]

Knowledge of the obstacles to the smooth functioning of administrative bodies makes it possible to eliminate unwanted impediments in advance and reduces the costs of action. It allows one to get to know the processes and phenomena occurring in the state related to the security of the population. The assessment of the completeness and substantive correctness of the functioning of state institutions is based on the preparation of framework recommendations and laws which comprehensively regulate the issue of population security.

The most important security threats presented in the *National Security Threats Report* and actions to counter them should be used in the further planning process.[17] Such a solution is supposed to be conducive to informing state bodies about the current state of security and the requirements for individual public administration units.[18] The conclusions of the Report are used in the *National Crisis*

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[13] Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 13 January 2004. *On control of performance of defence tasks*, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2004, no. 16, item 151.

[14] The check consists of establishing the facts, in particular with regard to: – implementation of operational planning and defence programming preparation of the state defence system enabling mobilisation development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland; – preparation for the realisation of tasks resulting from civil-military cooperation; – preparation for the realisation of tasks resulting from host state duties performed for the benefit of allied troops; – preparation of the state defence management system; – planning and realisation of economic and defence tasks; – planning and organising services for defence; – taking into account defence needs in spatial management plans; – preparing personnel reserves for the needs of military units; – carrying out tasks in the scope of preparing specific organisational units for militarisation; – preparing special protection of objects important for national security and defence; – planning and carrying out defence training.

[15] *On Amendments to the Act on Universal Obligation to Defend the Republic of Poland and Amendments to Certain Other Acts* Act od 29 October 2003, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2003, no. 210, item 2036.

[16] Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 25 June 2002. *On the detailed scope of activities of the Head of Civil Defence of the Country, heads of civil defence of provinces, districts and communes*, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2002, no. 96, item 850.

[17] The sub-report covers the most important threats and the consequences of their occurrence by creating a risk map that includes a listing of the types and characteristics of threats: – with a significant impact on the functioning and development possibilities of the state; – the effects of which may: harm the security of the state, its constitutional order, threaten the life or health of a large number of people, property in large amounts or the environment in large areas or affect other states and affect the territory of the Republic of Poland or its citizens; – occurring in areas of international tensions, conflicts and crises, affecting the security of the state or whose need for monitoring and elimination results from signed international agreements and treaties; – of a terrorist nature that may lead to a crisis situation.

[18] The report includes the following elements: – the identification of the most important threats

Management Plans. The Government Security Centre[19] strengthens crisis manage-
ment at the national level. In the event of an emergency, its director becomes the
secretary of the Government Crisis Management Team.[20] The RCB has the ability
to carry out threat analysis based on public administration data. Civil protection is
one of the important tasks of the authorities along with inspections specialised in
the protection of security and public order,[21] rescue, justice[22] and crisis management.

The Council of Ministers[23] designs the self-defence of the population[24] in Poland.
It establishes the organisation and indicates to the population their responsibilities
for defence. An important activity is to teach participants practical behaviour. Ini-
tiating and carrying out the necessary training of the population is the competence
of the heads of civil defence. According to the Guidelines of the Chief of Civil
Defence[25] they should be implemented at all levels of administration. Practice also
shows the need to organise them in workplaces.[26] The Head of OCK, in Annex 4 to

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through the creation of a risk map; – the identification of strategic objectives; – the prioritisation
of the response to specific threats; – the identification of the forces and resources necessary to
achieve the strategic objectives; – the programming of security improvement tasks by taking
into account regional and local initiatives; – conclusions containing a hierarchically ordered list
of undertakings necessary to achieve the strategic objectives.

[19]   The Government Security Centre operates on the basis of Article 10 of the Act of 26.04.2007.
On crisis management, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2007, no. 89, item 590, which is detailed in
the Ordinance of the Prime Minister of 11 April 2011. On *the organisation and course of action
of the Government Centre for Security*, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2011, no. 86, item 471.

[20]   Order No. 67 of the Prime Minister of 15 October 2014. *On the organisation and working pro-
cedures of the Government Crisis Management Team*, M.P. 2014, item 926.

[21]   The task of the public security and order services is to prevent and prosecute perpetrators of
attacks on life, health and property. The tasks of public authorities in the field of public security
and order are defined in laws, including, inter alia, on: *Police, Border Guard, Special Services*
and *State Protection Service*.

[22]   The judicial power is one of the three elements of the systemic separation of powers. It follows from
the wording of Article 175 of the Polish Constitution that the administration of justice is exercised
exclusively by the courts. They are: Supreme Court, ordinary courts, administrative courts and
military courts. The judicial power also includes the Constitutional Tribunal and the State Tribunal.

[23]   Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 28 September 1993 *on general self-defence of
the population*, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 1993, no. 91, item 421.

[24]   In preparation for self-defence, persons of Polish nationality may be required to:
– prepare for the protection of a building or dwelling and personal and individual property;
– protect their own sources of drinking water and foodstuffs from contamination or pollution;
– maintain and preserve their own and assigned equipment and protective measures; – maintain
and preserve domestic protective premises; – carry out other undertakings to protect their own
life, health and property and provide assistance to the injured.

[25]   Guidelines of the Head of the National Civil Defence of 11 January 2016. *On the principles of or-
ganisation and manner of conducting civil defence training*, Official Journal of the KG PSP of 2016.

[26]   Educational content for basic training at the field level in civil defence includes: – international
humanitarian law in its aspects concerning civil defence and protection of goods necessary for
survival; – civil defence in the national defence system; – tasks and competences of public ad-
ministration bodies, services, inspections, guards in the field of civil defence and goods necessary
for survival; – selected issues in crisis management in crisis situations; – civil defence formations
– tasks, method of organisation, equipment, principles of achieving readiness to act; – psycho-
logical aspects of crisis situations; – ways of dealing with the media in crisis situations, the role
of the media in crisis situations; – practical implementation of civil defence tasks; – tasks of non-
governmental organisations in the civil defence system.

the Guidelines,[27] defines a closed catalogue of teaching establishments that can implement civil protection and civil defence training. At present, these are only fire service training centres. The above indicates the role of the State Fire Service in the field of civil protection. Among other things, this is a negative consequence of combining the position of the Chief Fire Officer of the State Fire Service with that of the Chief of Civil Defence of the Country.

The PSP plays a leading role in emergency management, and firefighters are trained in the field of civil protection. The provision of modern transport and specialist equipment and specialised equipment enables rescue operations to be carried out efficiently. Firefighters participate in rescue operations at the scene of disasters and coordinate the work of other services, including police officers and paramedics. The State Fire Service[28] extinguishes fires, deals with the consequences of natural disasters and carries out other activities for the benefit of the population.[29]

The Minister of SWiA in the Regulation[30] defined the standards and norms of equipment of individual PSP units. Statutory provisions[31] define fire protection as protection of life, health, property and the environment[32] within the KSRG,[33] and the Chief Commandant of the State Fire Service[34] is primarily responsible

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[27] The Head of Civil Defence of the Country in Appendix 4 to the Guidelines of 11.01.2016. *On the principles of organisation and manner of conducting civil defence training*, has included a list of teaching establishments that can provide civil protection and civil defence training.

[28] *On the State Fire Service*, Act of 24 August 1991, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 1991, no. 88, item 400, as amended.

[29] The basic tasks of the State Fire Service include: – identifying fire hazards and other local threats; – organizing and carrying out rescue operations during fires, natural disasters or elimination of local threats; – carrying out auxiliary specialist rescue operations during natural disasters or elimination of local threats by other rescue services; – supervising the observance of fire regulations; – cooperating with fire services and rescue services of other countries and their international organisations.

[30] Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs of 21 November 2014. *On detailed principles of equipment of organisational units of the State Fire Service*, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2014, item 1793.

[31] *On fire protection* Act of 24 August 1991, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 1991, no. 81, item 351, as amended.

[32] Fire protection consists of undertakings by: – preventing the occurrence and spread of a fire, natural disaster or other local hazard; – providing forces and resources to combat a fire, natural disaster or other local hazard; – carrying out rescue operations.

[33] In order to protect life, health, property and the environment, a National Rescue and Firefighting System has been established to: – fight fires or other natural disasters; – technical rescue; – chemical rescue; – ecological rescue; – medical rescue; – cooperation with the units of the State Medical Rescue System.

[34] The tasks of the Chief Commandant of the State Fire Service include: – managing the work of the National Headquarters of the State Fire Service; – managing the national rescue and firefighting system; – analysing fire hazards and other local hazards; – initiating undertakings and scientific and research work in the field of fire protection and rescue; – initiating and preparing draft normative acts concerning fire protection and rescue; – supporting social initiatives in the field of fire protection and rescue; – supporting public initiatives in the field of fire protection and rescue. cooperation with the Head Board of the Association of Volunteer Fire Brigades of the Republic of Poland; – conducting international cooperation, participation in the preparation and implementation of international agreements, sending PSP organisational units to rescue and humanitarian actions beyond the state border; – introducing increased operational readiness in the State Fire Service in

for the use of this potential. On the other hand, the Minister of SWiA, in the Regulation *on the detailed organisation of the national rescue and firefighting system,*[35] has detailed the organisation of the KSRG. In particular, it concerns the fight against: fires[36] and natural disasters,[37] as well as dispatching[38] and managing rescue operations. The organisation and management of the PSP includes: technical rescue,[39] chemical rescue, ecological rescue[40] and medical rescue[41]. Volunteer fire brigades are involved in these activities.[42] The Regional Chief of the PSP is responsible for fighting fires, natural disasters and other hazards.[43] At district level, the district chief of the PSP

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situations of increased probability of a natural disaster or technical failure; – organising national and international rescue exercises.

[35]   Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of 17 September 2021. *On the detailed organisation of the national rescue and firefighting system*, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2021, item 1737.

[36]   In fighting fires, CRSG involves planning, organising and implementing the actions necessary to extinguish a fire.

[37]   In terms of dealing with other disasters, the CRSG covers the planning, organisation and execution of rescue operations necessary to save life, health, property or the environment.

[38]   In terms of technical rescue, KSRG includes: planning, organising and executing the rescue operations necessary to search for and reach endangered or injured persons and animals, and to reduce or eliminate the threat to life, health, property or the environment.

[39]   In terms of chemical and environmental rescue, the CRSG includes: planning, organising and executing the rescue operations necessary to reduce or eliminate the immediate risks posed by hazardous substances to people, animals, the environment or property.

[40]   Dispatching to rescue operations includes: – reconnaissance and identification of the hazard; – securing the rescue zone; – switching on or off installations, equipment and utilities affecting the safety of endangered or affected persons and rescuers; – performing activities to reach and perform access to endangered or affected persons, preparing evacuation routes for endangered or affected persons and rescuers; – Elimination of hazards associated with the disaster; – Adaptation of equipment and rescue techniques to the size and type of the disaster; – Elimination, reduction or increase of the danger zone; – Mobilisation of additional forces and resources of the KSRG entities; – Assessment of the extent of the disaster that has occurred.

[41]   Rescue activities in the field of medical emergency include, in particular: – recognition of the state of health emergency in the injured persons and conducting primary segregation and participation in secondary segregation; – application of techniques and equipment necessary to save life and health depending on the type, scale and place of the incident and the number of injured persons; – ensuring the continuity of the process of rescue of persons in a state of health emergency carried out by CRSG entities at the scene of the incident; – determining the method of handling medical equipment.

[42]   The tasks of the voluntary fire brigades include in particular – fighting fires, natural disasters or other local dangers; – organising projects to promote sport and physical culture that allow the development of skills used in rescue operations; – organising educational and cultural projects to promote knowledge and skills in fire protection; – promoting and supporting forms of cooperation between local social and economic partners in the field of fire protection; – promoting the principles of first aid for victims of fire, natural disaster or other local danger.

[43]   The tasks of the regional commander of the State Fire Service include: – managing the regional headquarters of the State Fire Service; – developing rescue plans in the voivodeship area; – organising the national rescue and fire-fighting system; – disposing and directing the forces and means of the national rescue and fire-fighting system in the voivodeship area through his/her command post; – directing the organisational units of the State Fire Service from the voivodeship area to rescue and humanitarian operations beyond the state border; – analysing rescue operations; – carrying out operational readiness inspections; – introducing increased operational readiness in the State Fire Service on the territory of the voivodeship and districts, in a situation of increased

is responsible for fire safety and protection against the effects of other local threats.[44] The service obliged to protect the population is the Police, functioning under the regulations set out in the *Police* Act,[45] as a uniformed and armed formation serving the public. It is also designed to maintain public safety and order and is to perform a servant role towards the public.[46] The scope of tasks and competences of the Police is specified in many lower-level legal regulations.

The study of the functioning of Civil Defence and the use of its activities for the protection of the population in peacetime has been the subject of research by many scientists and specialists. It is therefore legitimate to draw on this body of work, including the results of our own research. Among the functions of the state, the internal function is mentioned, which includes ensuring public safety and order, protecting human life, health and property, and ensuring the sustainability of the property system in the internal structure of social relations.[47]

The doctrine points out that the effective targeting of public order policies affecting a local community can take place not only at the local level, as the threats addressed by these policies also have supra-local characteristics, following a bottom-up pattern.[48] Local authorities are in the best position to assess the nature and scale of the hazard and the appropriate countermeasures appropriate to the nature and scale of the hazard

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probability of a natural catastrophe or technical failure, the effects of which may endanger the life or health of a large number of people, property in large amounts or the environment in large areas; – organising voivodeship rescue exercises; – controlling the agreement of construction projects in the field of fire protection; – supporting social initiatives in the field of fire protection.

[44] The tasks of the district chief of the State Fire Service include: – organising rescue and fire-fighting units; – organising the national rescue and fire-fighting system on the territory of the district; – dispatching and directing the forces and resources of the national rescue and fire-fighting system on the territory of the district through his command post; – directing the organisational units of the State Fire Service from the territory of the district to rescue and humanitarian actions beyond the state border; – organising and conducting rescue operations; – cooperating with the commander of the commune association of voluntary fire brigades; – identifying fire hazards and other local threats; – developing rescue plans in the district area; – supervising the observance of fire regulations; – carrying out rescue tasks; – determining the causes and circumstances of the origin and spread of fire and local threats; – training members of voluntary fire brigades; – implementing heightened operational readiness at the district headquarters of the PSP in situations of increased likelihood of natural disaster or technical failure.

[45] *On the Police* Act of 6 April 1990, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 1990, no. 30, item 179, as amended.

[46] The basic tasks of the Police include: – protection of human life and health and property against unlawful attacks violating these goods; – protection of public safety and order; – initiation and organization of activities to prevent the commission of crimes and offences and criminogenic phenomena and cooperation with state and local government bodies and social organizations; – conducting counter-terrorist activities; – detection of crimes and misdemeanours and prosecution of their perpetrators; – protection of the premises constituting the seats of the members of the Council of Ministers; – supervision of specialised armed security formations; – control of observance of order and administrative regulations related to public activities or in force in public places; – cooperation with the police of other countries and their international organisations; – processing of criminal information.

[47] Kitler, W. (ed.), *Koncepcja systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 2014, pp. 23–24.

[48] Wolanin, J., *Wybrane zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa*, „Zarządzanie bezpieczeństwa. Wybrane zagadnienia ochrony ludności" 2003, z. 3, pp. 33–34.

and the perception of the local population. This is particularly true of emergency management. It is difficult to justify the relevance of seeking to centralise security management, e.g. in relation to the threat to the population of a municipality or district. Over-protectiveness and omnipotence on the part of the state authorities leads to indifference and the lack of concern for matters of one's own security and that of the population, and to treat it as a problem of central authority.[49] This is what happens when local affairs are "taken into their own hands" by the central administration, or even at a county level, where the decisions are made by the governor who controls the entire emergency response in the county area. The term "public order" is a state of stability and tranquillity resulting from the observance of the law. It can be disturbed by individuals or groups.[50]

Research into the meaning of the term "universal security" has led to the conclusion that it is understood as protection against hazards caused by the forces of nature, such as fires, earthquakes, floods, droughts, strong winds, landslides, precipitation and other elements, as well as those arising from technical failures caused by human activity, such as transport, construction and energy disasters.

The police have a statutory duty to protect general security and public safety and order. At the voivodship level, this task is performed by the voivod with the assistance of the regional police chief or the regional police chief acting on their own initiative. At the district and municipality level, these tasks are performed by the district (city) police chief and the chief of a police station. A good solution is the planned and implemented extension of this structure to the lowest level, i.e. police stations. A network of such police stations would bring citizens closer to the police units operating at the municipal level. The efforts of the police authorities are justified.

An important activity is to guarantee medical assistance to everyone in states of health emergency. For this purpose, the State Medical Rescue Service was established and the principles of its organisation and functioning are regulated by the law.[51] The PRM operates on the basis of a provincial plan and the provincial governor is responsible for organising and planning.[52]

The Supreme Chamber of Control, while assessing the *functioning of the medical rescue system*[53], stated that the government administration bodies responsible for

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49   Bosek, M., *Kilka uwag o myśli społecznej Rafaela Termesa*, [in:] *Studia polsko-hiszpań-skie. Wiek XX*, J. Kieniewicz (ed.), Warszawa 2004, p. 224.

50   Cf.: Pikulski, S., *Podstawowe zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa publicznego*, [in:] *Prawne i administracyjne aspekty bezpieczeństwa osób i porządku publicznego w okresie transformacji ustrojowo-gospodarczej*, W. Bednarek, S. Piskulski (eds.), Olsztyn 2000, p. 101.

51   *On National Emergency Medical Services*, Act of 8 September 2006, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2006, no. 191, item 1410, as amended.

52   The action plan of the State Medical Rescue Service includes: – the number and distribution on the territory of the voivodship of the units of the system; – the areas of operation and operational regions; – the method of coordination of the activities of the units of the system; – the calculation of the costs of the activities of the medical rescue teams; – the method of cooperation with the public administration bodies and the units of the system; – the method of cooperation of the units of the system; – data on the medical dispatch centre.

53   *Informacja o wynikach kontroli. Funkcjonowanie systemu ratownictwa medycznego, LWA.430.005.2020, reg. no. 176/2020/P/19/105/LWA*, Najwyższa Izba Kontroli w Warszawie, Warszawa 2020, p. 8.

organising, planning, coordinating and supervising the implementation of the tasks of the State Medical Rescue did not create conditions for its efficient operation. Such an assessment was influenced by the irregularities found in the functioning of the Command Support System of the PRM and in the treatment of patients in hospital emergency wards.[54] Such a situation will have negative consequences for civil defence and the population in case of disasters, calamities and during war.

The statutory competences of the individual services indicate that during natural disasters the Fire Brigade would take over the overriding role, and during public disorder the Police. In the event of war, the role overriding the other services would be assumed by the Military Police, which in peacetime has a supporting role in public life. Its involvement in solving social problems is decided by the highest government officials.

The population must also be protected during a state of war, which is a category of international law regulated, inter alia, by the *Hague Convention*.[55] The security of the population should also be ensured during a state of war, which is a state of emergency categorised under domestic law regulations. In the event of the declaration of a state of war[56] between the Republic of Poland and an enemy country, the law of war applies.[57] Legal changes should result in the population being provided with civil defence of the required standards, as well as the right to protection from the effects of disasters of various kinds and from the dangers of warfare.[58]

For the safety of the population, tasks are also carried out by the rescue entities defined in the *Law on Associations*.[59] Securing the needs of the population are the tasks of the power, gas, water, sewage, heating and other municipal entities.[60] The services and guards in their current state cannot cope with the tasks that will arise during disasters and war. It is therefore important to rebuild the Civil Defence and to define the responsibility for protecting the population under conditions of danger, not only of war, and especially a Civil Defence ready to support the actions of local public authorities in situations of disasters and catastrophes.

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[54]   The Supreme Audit Office found in the audit that: – the problems that have existed for years have not been eliminated: the shortage of emergency physicians, the burden on the ED of patients whose life and health do not require emergency medicine intervention and the long waiting times for ambulances; – the development of the Command Support System has been entrusted to the Air Ambulance, an entity without experience in this regard.

[55]   *Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land*, OJ 1927, no. 21, item 161.

[56]   Article 116, paragraph 2. of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland stipulates that "the Sejm may adopt a resolution on the state of war only in the event of an armed attack on the territory of the Republic of Poland or when international agreements imply an obligation of joint defence against aggression."

[57]   Prokop, K., *Stan wojny a stan wojenny w Konstytucji RP*, [in:] „Państwo i Prawo" 3, Warszawa 2003, pp. 23–34.

[58]   Kitler, W., Skrabacz, A., *Bezpieczeństwo ludności cywilnej. Pojęcie, organizacja i zadania w czasie pokoju, kryzysu i wojny*, Wydawnictwo Wiedzy Obronnej, Warszawa 2010, p. 60.

[59]   Act of 7 April 1989. *Law on Associations*, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 1989, no. 20, item 104, as amended. These include: Mountain Volunteer Rescue Service, Tatra Volunteer Rescue Service, Water Volunteer Rescue Service and Volunteer Fire Brigades, Polish Scouting and Guiding Association, Polish Red Cross, Polish Association of Short Riders, Search Volunteer Rescue Service, as well as other associations, foundations and the voluntary sector.

[60]   Public utilities meet the collective needs of the population on an ongoing basis by producing or providing services directed at the general public or a large collective of the population.

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Summary

In the planned changes in the functioning of civil protection in Poland, it is necessary to adopt solutions resulting from a new law regulating the functioning of civil defence in Poland. It is reasonable to make appropriate use of the results and conclusions of scientific research, and then to develop a comprehensive and systemic law on civil protection. The expected result will be an increase in the safety of the population through the optimal use of universal new structures for times of peace and war.

1. Experience and scientific output lead to the following conclusions and demands:

2. There is an urgent need to enact a *Civil Protection* Act appropriate to the threats by redefining the civil defence and civil protection system;

3. Civil Defence in Poland remains under the direction of the State Fire Service, which is for various reasons not an optimal solution, but rather an attempt to combine civil protection in peacetime with Civil Defence in wartime. The time of reconstruction of the socio-economic system in Poland since 1990 has not been used to adapt OC to the new conditions. It is necessary to have a general understanding that Civil Defence is an activity within the scope of the conventions and the capacities specified therein must be obtained.

3. It makes sense to separate the duties of the Head of National Civil Defence and the Chief Fire Officer of the State Fire Service but to maintain cooperation between these institutions in the field of civil protection and civil defence;

4. Safety regulations are scattered and clearly departmentally aligned, and do not facilitate cooperation and collaboration between the various law enforcement, rescue and relief services. The State Fire Service has been burdened with various tasks from technical rescue, chemical rescue, water rescue, etc. – in fact, it has transformed itself into a state rescue service.

The current state of civil protection against real threats shows many short comings in practical operation. This is mainly due to the lack of statutory regulations, the inconsistency of the laws governing the competences of the various dispatch services, insufficient and outdated infrastructure and specialised management functionaries.

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FIREARMS PERMITS FOR PERSONAL PROTECTION PURPOSES

POZWOLENIE NA BROŃ PALNĄ W CELACH OCHRONY OSOBISTEJ

Abstract: The most difficult weapon permit to obtain in Poland is a permit for a weapon for personal protection. The leading cause of the rejection of most applications in the administrative proceedings department of the provincial police head quarters is the requirement to document a constant, relative and above-average threat to life, health and/or property. The question of proper documentation is not so clear cut.

Zarys treści: Pozwoleniem na broń, które najtrudniej w Polsce zdobyć jest pozwolenie na broń do ochrony osobistej. Główną przesłanką odrzucającą większość wniosków w wydziale postępowań administracyjnych Komend Wojewódzkich Policji jest zapis o udokumentowaniu stałego, realnego i ponadprzeciętnego zagrożenia życia, zdrowia i/lub mienia. Kwestia właściwego udokumentowania nie jest taka oczywista.

Keywords: fire arms, personal protection, permit, danger do life, ammunition
Słowa kluczowe: broń palna, ochrona osobista, pozwolenie, zagrożenie życia, amunicja

Introduction

The principles of issuing and withdrawing permits for arms, acquisition, registration, storage, disposal and deposition of arms and ammunition, transport through the territory of the Republic of Poland and the import from abroad and export abroad of arms and ammunition, as well as the principles of possession of arms and ammunition by foreigners and the principles of operation of shooting ranges are defined in the Act of 21 May 1999 on arms and ammunition.[1] According to the Act, a permit for

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[1]   *On arms and ammunition* Act of 21 May 1999, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 1999, no. 52 item 549, as amended.

firearms (including combat, hunting, sport, gas, alarm and signal firearms) is issued by the Provincial Police Commander with jurisdiction over the place of permanent residence of the person concerned. The organisational unit dealing with matters related to weapon permits in the Provincial Police Headquarters is the Administrative Proceedings Department. Therefore, all applications (requests) for firearms permits should be submitted to the Administrative Proceedings Division of the Voivodship Police Headquarters in person or by mail to the address of the respective WPA.

Requirements for obtaining a firearms licence

According to the Weapons and Ammunition Act,[2] a person applying for a firearms permit should draw up an application for a firearms permit addressed to the Provincial Police Commander, indicating in it: the purpose for which the permit is to be issued, the type of weapon applied for, the number of weapons and provide a valid reason for having the weapon. In addition, the application must be accompanied by:

1. A medical and psychological certificate issued by an authorised doctor and psychologist, stating that he or she does not belong to the persons listed in Article 15(1) (2–4) of the Weapons and Ammunition Act and confirming that he or she may dispose of weapons (Article 15(3) of the Weapons and Ammunition Act of 21.05.1999). The cost, for example, at the Military Specialist Medical Clinic in Bielsko-Biała, 2a Willowa Street, is PLN 700 (as of April 2022). The examinations are carried out within one day and end with the issue of a medical and psychological certificate.

2. Proof of payment of stamp duty in the amount of PLN 242 for the issuance of the permit, paid into the account of the indicated City Office, in accordance with the Act of 16 November 2006 on stamp duty.

A valid reason for possessing a firearm for personal protection is considered to be, in particular, a permanent, real and above-average threat to life, health or property.

Personal case

After fulfilling the statutory obligations, I received correspondence:

On 12 April 2022, I received a decision under Article 36, Article 123 § 1 and Article 268a of the Law of 14 June 1960, Code of Administrative Procedure (Journal of Laws of 2021, item 735, as amended),[3] and setting a new deadline of 23 May 2022 for completing the administrative proceedings[4] for issuing me a permit to possess a combat firearm for personal protection. In the justification, I was informed that the proceedings could not be completed within the statutory deadline due to the need to obtain proof of my place of residence, information from the National Criminal

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2   *Ibidem*.
3   *Code of Administrative Procedure* Act of 14 June 1960, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 1960, no. 30, item 168, as amended.
4   *Ibidem*.

Register, as well as to perform inquiries with a third party. These circumstances made it impossible to substantively complete the administrative proceedings within the statutory deadline for reasons beyond the control and fault of the authority. According to Article 36 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, any failure to complete a case within the time limit specified in Article 35 of the Code of Administrative Procedure[5] shall be notified to the public administration body. The public administration body is obliged to notify the parties, stating the reasons for the delay and indicating a new deadline for handling the case.

In view of the above, the Head of the Administrative Proceedings Department of the NPC set a new deadline for the completion of the proceedings. Note, a party is not entitled to complain about this decision and may challenge it only in an appeal against the decision. Attached to the above decision was a document, with a request to provide any evidence to prove the existence of the threat referred to in the original application, dated 21 March 2022. If there were any other circumstances indicating the existence of a threat to life, health or property, the request was to be presented and documented within the time frame mentioned. The above is necessary because the police authority shall only issue a gun permit if the applicant does not pose a threat to themself, public order or safety, and presents a valid reason for having a weapon. A valid reason is considered, in particular, a permanent, real and above-average threat to life, health and property. The evidence referred to above (copies of documents, in the form of certified copies of documents which had the same evidential force of the originals) had to be sent, within 14 days of the date of delivery of this letter, to the address of the Provincial Police Headquarters Administrative Proceedings Department. Pursuant to Article 79a § 4 of the Code of Administrative Procedure,[6] I was informed that failure to document the above may result in the issuance of a decision inconsistent with the party's request.

On 23 May 2022, a decision was sent which set a new deadline of 21 June 2022 for the completion of administrative proceedings for the issuance of a permit to possess combat firearms for personal protection. An additional justification which was given was the impossibility of completion within the statutory deadline due to the need to obtain information from the Police Station in Łodygowice, as well as to perform inquiries with a third party. The rest of the order was the same as the previous letter.

On 21 June 2022, a second decision was sent which set a new deadline of 21 July 2022 for the completion of administrative proceedings for the issuance of a permit to possess a combat firearm for personal protection. An additional justification which was given was the impossibility of completion within the statutory deadline due to the need to obtain information from the Police Station in Zywiec, as well as to perform inquiries with a third party. The rest the order was the same as the previous letter.

On 13 July 2022, a third decision was received, setting a new deadline of 22 August 2022 for the completion of the administrative proceedings for the issuance of a permit to a party to possess a combat firearm for personal protection. As on the two previous occasions, the additional justification was the impossibility of completion

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[5]   *Ibidem*.
[6]   *Ibidem*.

within the statutory deadline due to the need to carry out inquiries with a third party. Again, as before, the rest of the order was the same as the previous letters. A document was attached to this third order, with the information: "realizing the obligation set forth in Article 79a § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,[7] I inform you that you still have not documented a valid reason for possession of combat firearms for personal protection, as referred to in the provisions of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition. This may result in the issuance of a decision inconsistent with the request. Therefore, within 7 days from the date of delivery of this letter, there is still an opportunity to provide evidence of a valid reason for possession of weapons for personal protection, i.e. the existence of a permanent, real and above-average threat to life, health or property. At the same time, I would like to inform you that in accordance with Article 10 of the Code of Administrative Procedure[8], you have the right to make statements, explanations and submit requests for evidence in the administrative proceedings, and before the decision is issued, you have the opportunity to comment on the evidence and materials collected and the demands made".

In view of the above, in accordance with Article 10 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, I was invited to actively participate in the proceedings within 7 days of the delivery of this letter. The above-mentioned entitlement can be exercised in the Weapons Permits Team of the Administrative Proceedings Department of the Regional Police Headquarters. Failure to participate in the ongoing proceedings would result in a decision based on the materials available to the WPA in this case. The person in charge of the proceedings was also given.

On 22 August 2022, I was notified of a decision to refuse to issue a permit to carry one combat firearm for personal protection.

Reasons for the refusal decision

On 21 March 2022, the police authority received my application (third party, plus applicant) for a permit to carry one combat firearm for personal protection. In support of the application, the third party, among other things, stated that they are engaged in a business which involves the complex execution of public orders and auctions of movable property from bailiffs, tax offices and receivers. During the course of the proceedings, the third party further submitted additional justification for the application for the issuance of the permit, indicating, among other things, that I personally convoyed cash. As an example of a threat to property, a call to a police patrol on 31 January 2022, in the village of Belk, was pointed out. A medical and psychological certificate of fitness to dispose of a weapon was also submitted. The Police Authority also determined that the party had a positive reputation in their place of residence and was a person with no criminal record.

According to the information collected, it additionally emerged that incidents at their place of residence indicating a threat to life, health or property were not reported.

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[7]   *Ibidem*.
[8]   *Ibidem*.

Additionally, the Police Station reported that the police intervention in the village of Belk was as a result of the party's report concerning the collection of a vehicle bought in a bailiff's auction. During the incident, there was no danger to the party's life, health or property. The party did not file a notice of a crime or offence in connection with the incident. In accordance with Article 10 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, the party was assured of participation in the administrative proceedings, as well as being informed of the provision of Article 79a § 1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure.[9] Within the prescribed time limit, the party failed to provide the police authority with evidence of a valid reason for possessing a combat firearm for personal protection. However, the arguments cited in the party's application and the materials collected in the course of the proceedings do not, in the opinion of the authority of the first instance, provide grounds for issuing a combat firearm permit.

According to Article 10(1) of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition,[10] the competent police authority shall issue weapons permits if the applicant does not pose a threat to himself, public order or safety, and presents a valid reason for owning weapons. Weapons permits are issued in particular for personal protection purposes. The provision also stipulates that a valid reason for a gun permit for personal protection purposes is considered, in particular, a permanent, real and above-average threat to life, health or property. The aforementioned prerequisites must exist cumulatively, and the threat must arise from objective circumstances, and not just from the belief of the person applying for a gun permit. The burden of proving that such a state of facts exists is on that person. This does not relieve the police authority of the obligation to take all steps necessary to establish the facts of the case and gather evidence to freely assess whether the request is justified and a gun permit should be issued. Thus, the applicant may cite any circumstance that, in their opinion, indicates that they are at risk, but the assessment of whether it meets the requirements of Article 10(1) and (2)(1) and (3)(1) of the Law on Arms and Ammunition,[11] belongs to the Police authority. The Police Authority, in evaluating the evidence, does not have to share the applicant's view of the need to protect their life, health or property with weapons.

This means that although a party (the applicant) has the right to invoke any, in their point of view, relevant circumstances that, in their view, prove a threat, it is up to the authorities competent for weapons permits to determine whether these circumstance justify consideration of the case in accordance with the applicant's wishes. Indeed, it should be noted that the provision of Article 10 of the Law does not even specify exemplary circumstances indicating the existence of a threat giving grounds for equipping the applicant with a private combat weapon. Therefore, in police practice resulting from the rationing nature of the Law on Arms and Ammunition, it has been assumed that these must be special circumstances, distinguishing the applicant from the general public. In the case of a combat firearm, and thus a particularly dangerous tool, these must be circumstances confirming that their life, health or property is in such danger that protection with a weapon of this particular type is

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9   *Ibidem*.
10   *On arms and ammunition* Act of 21 May 1999, op. cit.
11   *Ibidem*.

required. At the same time, the danger of an attack on these goods must be constant, real and above average in comparison with other citizens in a similar situation, and therefore cannot be based only on the subjective belief of the applicant. Thus, a mere feeling of danger is not sufficient for the issuance of a permit for a combat firearm for personal protection. What is important, however, is for the applicant to indicate that the threat to their life, health or property is constant, real and above average. The right to own combat firearms for personal protection should be granted if the evidence cited by the applicant proves the existence of these circumstances, and means other than combat firearms would be insufficient for protection. Indeed, Polish law does not provide for a citizen's right to possess weapons, and this is strictly regulated by the provisions of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition (see, the judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 21 August 2012 ref. act II SA/Wa 935/12).[12]

In the administrative proceedings conducted, it was not established that the party posed a threat to themselves, public order or security. The party is a person with no criminal record, as evidenced by information obtained from the National Criminal Register. They also have a positive reputation in their place of residence. However, the above circumstances do not allow the party's application to be granted in accordance with their request without the existence of a valid reason for possession of combat firearms for personal protection, which is considered, in particular, a permanent, real and above-average threat to life, health or property.

In the course of the proceedings, a valid reason for the possession of weapons was not established. The arguments presented by the party in the application for a gun permit and in the course of the proceedings, in the opinion of the first-instance authority, do not constitute a valid reason for owning combat firearms. The party indicated that they conduct business activities and that in connection with these activities they reported an intervention by the Police in Bełk on 31 January 2022. The party also stated that they escort cash in connection with the business. In the opinion of the authority of the first instance, these are not circumstances that confirm the applicant's current above-average danger. This is because they do not prove a direct, constant and real threat to the party's life, health or property. A party's concern for their safety related to the running of a business and carrying cash cannot prejudge the granting of a firearm permit for personal protection. Indeed, the mere fact of conducting business and the associated transportation of cash, as well as subjective feelings of danger, does not imply the existence of a threat to life, health and property that would justify the issuance of a firearm permit for personal protection. Concerns such as the applicant's are held by many business people, and such an interpretation would make it necessary to also equip them with firearms. Moreover, carrying cash is not an unusual phenomenon and does not distinguish the party from other entrepreneurs. It should be pointed out that insecurity for various reasons is declared by a great many people. However, this does not imply an obligation to issue a gun permit to anyone who applies for one. Permits for firearms for personal protection are issued to people who present a valid reason for owning a weapon, which, according to the legislation, is in particular a permanent, real and above-average threat

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[12]   Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 21.08.2012, ref. no. II SA/Wa 935/12.

to life, health or property. A party's belief that it is in danger from its activities, as well as the subjective fears indicated by the party, cannot therefore prejudge the granting of a combat firearms permit. It is still important for the applicant to demonstrate that they are in a situation of particular danger. However, there is no evidence of such a threat. Otherwise, the police authorities would be obliged to issue a permit to any person conducting business and personally transporting cash, regardless of whether there is a constant, real and above-average threat by virtue of their business and duties. The party, on the other hand, may use cashless trading and if, for some reason, the party chooses not to, they do so at their own risk. Indeed, the threat justifying the need to carry a weapon for personal protection must be above-average, distinguishing the person in question from the general population in a similar life situation, and, moreover, constantly and realistically existing. In turn, the type of circumstances that the party claims are invoked by most people who, by virtue of their activities, want to obtain a combat firearms permit for personal protection. Thus, these are not special circumstances, but typical ones, and as such they cannot prejudge the issuance of a weapons permit. Similarly, the police intervention of 31 January 2022 in the village of Belk, indicated by the party, also cannot prejudge the granting of such a permit. Indeed, the information obtained from the Police Station shows that the intervention concerned the surrender of a vehicle bought in a bailiff's auction. The report also indicated that the previous owner did not want to hand it over. In the presence of the officers, however, the individuals came to an agreement. There was no danger to the life, health or property of the party during this incident. Therefore, this event cannot be considered as a basis for issuing a combat firearm permit for personal protection. Furthermore, the party has not demonstrated any other grounds justifying the need for a weapon for personal protection. In turn, the subjective belief that they may become a victim of an attack on life or health is not sufficient. In the course of the administrative proceedings, the party did not present evidence to establish that there is currently a clear above-average threat of criminal action, which would justify the possession of a means of self-defence in the form of a firearm for personal protection. It was not proven that their life, health and property are currently under constant, real and above-average threat. The existence of the threat in question was only inferred from the fact that the business operates and deals with substantial cash sums. This inferred threat, which the party tried to demonstrate, does not bear the characteristics of a permanent, real and above-average threat, but only the characteristics of a hypothetical threat. This is also pointed out in their rulings by administrative courts. Thus, for example, the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 29 August 2013, ref. no. II SA/Wa739/13[13] indicated, among other things, that the lack of a sense of security, for a variety of reasons, is declared by many people. However, this does not imply an obligation to issue a gun permit to anyone who applies for such a permit, and

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[13] II SA/Wa 739/13, Stałe, realne i ponadprzeciętne zagrożenie życia, zdrowia lub mienia jako przesłanka ubiegania się o pozwolenie na posiadanie broni. Wyrok Wojewódzkiego Sądu Administracyjnego w II SA/Wa 739/13, Stałe, realne i ponadprzeciętne zagrożenie życia, zdrowia lub mienia jako przesłanka ubiegania się o pozwolenie na posiadanie broni. – Wyrok Wojewódzkiego Sądu Administracyjnego w Warszawie – LEX no. 1367770.

the assessment in these matters is up to the police authorities, who may pursue a more or less stringent policy in this regard. In turn, the Supreme Administrative Court, in its judgment of 6 June 2014, ref. II OSK 32/13,[14] indicated that the iden-tification of only combat firearms as a means of protection is not justified, since there are such instruments of financial trading that allow, if not to eliminate completely, then at least to minimize the possible threat associated with cash trading or products of significant value. There is also nothing to prevent the applicant from using the services of a security company for the company's headquarters, or for providing protection at the place of residence, if they feel the need to do so. If, for some reason, a party does not choose these solutions, it does so at its own risk. In other judgments it is pointed out that the issuance of a permit to possess firearms must be justified in each individual case by special factual circumstances, and these must not be subjective circumstances, but objectively existing ones (e.g., the judgment of the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw of 6 November 2014, ref. Akt. II SA/Wa1188/14).[15] The Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw in the judgments of 13 June 2012, Akt. no. II SA/Wa621/12;[16] of 30 March 2012, Akt. no. II SA/Wa2603/11;[17] of 26 February 2014, Akt. no. II SA/Wa2068/13[18] and of 25 July 2014, Akt. ref. II SA/Wa893/14[19] also indicated that a threat to life, health or property constituting a valid reason for possessing weapons, in order to be considered permanent, must manifest permanence and timeliness, while its reality must be real and objective, and not characterized by subjectivity. A real threat is a foreseeable or highly probable hreat. It must arise from a sequence of events that have occurred in the applicant's life and have affected them. Above-average, on the other hand, cannot be reduced to a hypothetical situation, but must be extraordinary and unprecedented. Similarly, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled in the judgment of 25 June 2015, ref. II OSK2836/13,[20] indicating, among other things, that the condition for granting a gun permit for personal protection purposes is a strictly, defined by law, relationship of circumstances that, occurring together, can constitute a valid reason justifying the granting of the permit. One of these prerequisites is a permanent, threat to the life, health or property of the applicant. Therefore, it cannot be a circumstance that existed in the past and no longer exists today, because then the element of permanent occurrence of danger is missing. Since all three of these prerequisites characterizing the threat (permanence, reality and above-average) must be present together, then the determination that one of them is not present results in the other prerequisites losing their raison d'être in the sense that they cannot justify successfully applying for a gun permit. Thus, even a real and above-average threat, which, however, is not permanent, but has occurred in the past and no longer exists today, cannot be considered a valid reason for granting a firearm permit for personal protection. In the opinion of the courts, the applicant's subjective assessment of a threatening danger cannot be the basis for issuing a combat

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14   Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 06.06.2014, ref. no. II OSK 32/13.
15   Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 06.11.2014, ref. no. II SA/Wa1188/14.
16   Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 13.06.2012, ref. no. II SA/Wa621/12.
17   Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 30.03.2012, ref. no. II SA/Wa2603/11.
18   Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 26.02.2014, ref. no. II SA/Wa2068/13.
19   Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 25.07.2014, ref. no. II SA/Wa893/14.
20   Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 25.06.2015, ref. no. II OSK2836/13.

firearm permit for personal protection. It is particularly clear in view of the need to interpret as restrictively as possible the provisions regulating access to a deadly weapons in a situation where human life is under special protection (Article 38 of the Polish Constitution).[21] The degree of danger must be proportionate such that the issuance of a gun permit is an appropriate preventive and defensive measure against it. A party applying for the issuance of a permit should prove that they are in a situation of constant, real and above-average danger to life, health or property, or alternatively, they should show that certain types of events affecting them demonstrate such a danger. Therefore, it follows from the above case law that the granting of the right to own weapons cannot be based solely on the subjective belief of the applicant. It is necessary to provide a valid reason for such a decision, because a gun permit is not issued for a purely preventive purpose. Weapon permits cannot be issued beyond a real and necessary need arising from the purpose for which the weapon is to be used. The party has failed to prove that their life, health or property is under constant, real and above-average threat of unlawful attack. A valid reason supporting the issuance of a firearm permit for personal protection was also not established during the proceedings. Therefore, in a situation where no events have been established that could justify a party's fear of an attack on their health, life or property, the decision to refuse to issue a firearm permit for personal protection must be considered valid. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the refusal to issue a firearms permit does not prevent a party from ensuring their own safety with means of personal protection that are not subject to restriction, and therefore do not require a permit from the police authority, and which will successfully fulfil the preventive role expected by the party (these include, for example, hand-held gas throwers or electric stun guns within certain parameters). After all, a gun permit is not issued just in case, but only when the factual findings concerning the applicant for the permit irrefutably indicate that other measures to protect his life and health are insufficient or ineffective.

Applications

The denial of a gun permit is an unpleasant surprise that many applicants face. They may have already learned to shoot, passed the medical and psychological examinations and have in hand a certificate of no criminal record. What is more, they may have fulfilled the formalities justifying the "purpose" of issuing the permit, so they are only a formality away from buying their own gun; an administrative decision. However, the WPA's correspondence shows that, according to the Police, they may nevertheless pose a threat, which justifies the refusal to issue a positive decision. The Police's assessment invariably has a key influence on whether one will gain the "privilege" of owning a gun. Until 2011, Article 10 (1) of the UBiA read as follows: "The competent police authority shall issue a gun permit if the circumstances claimed by the applicant justify the issuance of the permit." This provision gave the police authorities full discretion in

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[21]   Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Dz.U. (Journal of Laws) 1997, no. 78, item 483, as amended.

assessing whether the applicant should be allowed the privilege in question. This, of course, led to much controversy. Each Provincial Police Chief or Military Police Chief had their own local policy on issuing permits. As a result, in one province it was easier to get a permit, while in another it was more difficult. This differentiated the legal situation of citizens, who could not count on equal treatment. This was at the root of the 2011 amendment, which introduced the wording of Article 10(1) of the UBiA, which remains in effect today: "The competent police authority shall issue a gun permit if the applicant does not pose a threat to himself, public order or safety, and presents a valid reason for having a gun."

Some "important" reasons take a rather "Kafkaesque" form. In order to become a collector one has to become a member of a collectors' association, but to own a weapon for a commemorative purpose it is enough to show, for example, that it was donated to us. Importantly, the catalogue of purposes is open. That is, we can apply to possess a weapon for any other purpose that those listed in Article 10(2) of the UBiA. Moreover, even within the scope of the purposes listed in Article 10(2) of the UBIA, we can prove a valid reason by other means of evidence than those indicated in Article 10(3) of the UBIA. This is indicated by the words "in particular" used in both of these paragraphs of Article 10. Police authorities refuse to issue a permit for the purposes indicated in Article 10(2) solely on the grounds that the applicant has not shown the evidence indicated in Article 10(3). In my opinion, this practice is wrong. The authority should consider all the evidence provided and take into account all the circumstances. Only on the basis of these should it assess whether they are sufficient to establish a valid reason. This applies primarily to a sports permit. Here, however, the applicant always runs the risk of encountering the past, well-known, full discretion of the police authorities. It must be taken into account that the Administrat-ive Courts are reluctant to challenge the competence of the Police authorities in their assessment. However, the revocation of such decisions is possible. In practice, however, this is limited to situations in which the police authority has clearly exceeded the limits of its discretion or made procedural errors involving, for example, the omission of important evidence. Merely showing a valid reason is not enough to obtain a permit. Refusal to issue a gun permit can be dictated by security reasons, in which case the discretion of the police is even greater than in the case of a valid reason. his is confirmed by the Administrative Courts, which explicitly confirm universally that it is the Police who have the right to make this assessment. Of course, judicial overturning of a refusal decision is possible, but this is limited to exceptional failures of administrative procedure. After all, any evaluation must be based at least minimally on the evidence presented in the proceedings. Thus, the Administrative Court may overturn the decision if it finds that the police authority exceeded its administrative discretion. In practice, this will mean issuing a decision that is completely disconnected from the reality documented in the proceedings. On the other hand, it is doubtful the Administrative Court would consider whether a person convicted of a series of minor offences is dangerous or not. That is what the police are for. This is where another problem arises, as in practice a clean Criminal Record and a positive psychological

examination alone are not sufficient proof that a person is not a danger. Police authorities consider the situation cross-sectionally, analysing the person's attitude to obeying the law in a broad sense. For example, if a person notoriously endangers the life and health of others in traffic there is also no guarantee that he or she will behave differently when in possession of a weapon. It should be borne in mind that such a decision is made by an official who, if in doubt, will refuse to issue a gun permit. Such an attitude is hardly surprising to see. How do the police know about our past? First of all, from the KSIP (National Police Information System). This contains all the information of our infamous past, even that which is expired or time-barred. The Polish legal system does not provide for automatic deletion of data on expired convictions from KSIP. They are removed from the KRK (National Criminal Register), but remain in the KSIP, which is administered by the Police Chief in Warsaw. So, before applying for a permit to carry a gun, it is worth first applying to the Chief of Police for the deletion of data on expired or time-barred crimes and misdemeanours, thanks to which our records in the KSIP should be cleared. Bear in mind, however, any fine within two years of a previous offence causes the expiry or time-barred date to reset and start running anew. In such a case, our request to erase the data on offences will be rejected.

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Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 25.07.2014, ref. no. II SA/Wa893/14.

Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 25.06.2015, ref. no. II OSK2836/13.

Summary

The refusal to issue a gun permit is an unpleasant surprise that many applicants face. A police authority will issue a weapons permit if the circumstances relied upon by the applicant justify its issuance. However, this is an evaluative decision and is often based on the data contained in the KSIP. In order to help avoid a refusal, it is worth ensuring that the time-barred data in this register is removed by submitting an appropriate application.

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THE EASTERN BORDER SECURITY SUBSYSTEM OF THE PRL BY BORDER PROTECTION FORCES AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE SECURITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY. SELECTED ISSUES. Part 1

PODSYSTEM ZABEZPIECZENIA GRANICY WSCHODNIEJ PRL PRZEZ WOJSKA OCHRONY POGRANICZA I JEGO WPŁYW NA BEZPIECZEŃSTWO PAŃSTWA W DRUGIEJ POŁOWIE XX WIEKU. WYBRANE PROBLEMY. CZ. 1

Abstract: The eastern border protection subsystem of the People's Republic of Poland (with the USSR) was one of the four subsystems protecting the Polish state border, which in the years from the end of World War II until the dissolution of the Border Protection Forces (WOP-15 May 1991) secured the protection of this section. The first part of the article discusses such issues as: tasks performed by WOP, organisation and changes in the system of border protection of the People's Republic of Poland in the years 1945–1991, forces and means of WOP participating in the protection of the border of the People's Republic of Poland until the mid-1980s and the division of the borderland, as well as crimes committed on the borderland and the border between the People's Republic of Poland and the USSR.

Zarys treści: Podsystem ochrony granicy wschodniej PRL (z ZSRR) był jednym z czterech podsystemów ochrony polskiej granicy państwowej, który w latach od zakończenia II wojny światowej do rozwiązania Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza (WOP–15 maja 1991 r.) zabezpieczał ochronę tego odcinka. W części pierwszej artykułu omówiono takie zagadnienia jak: zadania realizowane przez WOP, organizacje i zmiany w systemie ochrony granicy PRL w latach 1945–1991, siły i środki WOP uczestniczące w ochronie granicy PRL do połowy lat 80. XX w. oraz podział pogranicza a także przestępstwa popełniane na pograniczu i granicy PRL–ZSRR.

Introduction

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, in the People's Republic of Poland, a military formation was established to protect the state border. Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza (WOP) was created on 13 September 1945 by the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces (WP) No. 0245. Initially, the organisational structure of the new formation consisted of a chief institution, which was the WOP Department, WOP Departments were established at the military district commands, and units protecting the border directly at the border: divisions, section commands and watchtowers. This first order did not yet take into account the functioning of the Transition Checkpoints (TPCs).

By 1991, the formation had undergone numerous reorganisations, with which the system and sub-systems (in individual sections) of border protection of the People's Republic of Poland had changed[1] .

WOP was reformed after more than 45 years of service on the border on 15 May 1991, and the documents, property and posts of the formation were handed over to the Border Guard (SG) on the order of the Minister of Internal Affairs (no. 47/91) of 16 May 1991 on the organisation of the Border Guard and the reformation of WOP, and on 16 May 1991 a new formation, the Border Guard, was organised.[2]

Tasks of the Border Protection Forces

Throughout the life of this formation, its core tasks have been concentrated in a few basic levels such as:
   – State border protection[3] and border traffic control;

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[1]   Bieniecki, I., *Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza w systemie ochrony i obrony granicy morskiej Polski w latach 1965–1991*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej w Słupsku, Słupsk 2015, pp. 1–480; Prochwicz, J., *Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza 1945–1965. Wybrane problemy*, Naukowe Wydawnictwo Piotrkowskie, Piotrków Trybunalski 2011, pp. 1–563; Wasilewski, A., *Granica lorda Curzona. Wschodnia granica Polski od Wersalu do Schengen (traktaty, umowy, przejścia graniczne, podróżni, wizy)*, Adam Marszałek Publishing House, Toruń 2003, pp. 1–210.

[2]   Kancelaria Morskiego Oddziału Straży Granicznej (MOSG) w Gdańsku, Rozkazy i Zarządzenia Komendanta Głównego SG z latach 1991–1992, vol. 3, Order no. 47 of the Minister of Internal Affairs H. Majewski of 16.05.1991 on the organisation of the Border Guard and the standing down of WOP, p. 1.

[3]   State borders are the boundary lines defining the territorial extent of the sovereignty of the respective states signifying the exclusive sovereignty of a state over that territory

– Performing border state administration functions;
– Socio-political activities in the borderlands;
– Training, education and preparation of soldiers of the border subdivisions and the retreats to carry out their tasks;
– as well as the specialised and material-technical safeguarding of the service process.[4]

Protecting the national border came down to:
– direct protection of the border with the forces of border guard sub-units and WOP posts, using ships and aircraft;[5]
– direct border protection through counter-intelligence control of the hinterland;
– performing tasks for the Ministry of the Interior (MIA) on border traffic control (KRG) at commercial ports, fishing ports and border crossings;
– conducting pursuits of border criminals on land and sea;
– implementing investigative functions in relation to border offenders;
– active management of the border surveillance process, collection of experience, research, development of essential documents and rules of procedure for border surveillance;
– close cooperation with the Border Traffic Control Service, the Citizen's Militia (MO), the Military Internal Service (WSW) and the Navy (MW) in the sphere of border protection;
– close cooperation with the border protection authorities of neighbouring countries at specific sections of the border.

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and the impermissibility of the authority and rights of the other states to act in that territory. The total length of the state borders of the People's Republic of Poland was 3,538 km, including with: CSRS-1 310 km, USSR-1 244 km, maritime 524 km and GDR-460 km. See: also the entry "State borders", *Lexicon of military knowledge*, collective compilation dir. M. Laprus, MON Publishing House, Warsaw 1979, p. 132.

[4] Archiwum Straży Granicznej (hereinafter ASG) w Szczecinie, Akta DWOP, sygn. no. 1839, vol. 2, Zadania Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza w okresie pokoju (zał. no. 1 do pisma no. 02314 z 1969 r.), pp. 1–3.

[5] Bieniecki, I., *The Border Protection Forces' Floating Units and Their Use for the Security of the Maritime Border of the People's Republic of Poland in the Second Half of the 20th Century*, „Studia Nad Bezpieczeństwem" 2019, no. 4, pp. 77–93; Bieniecki, I., The vessels of the *Morska Brygada Okrętów Pogranicza w latach 1966–1991*, „Biuletyn Historyczny" Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej w Gdyni, Gdynia 2009, no. 24, pp. 172–191; Bieniecki, I., *Wykorzystanie jednostek pływających Morskiej Brygady Okrętów Pogranicza w ochronie polskiej granicy morskiej w latach 1965–1971*, „Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego", Wydawnictwo „Marpress", Gdańsk 2008, z. 47, pp. 54–67; Bieniecki, I., *Jednostki pływające Morskiej Brygady Okrętów Pogranicza i ich wykorzystanie w ochronie granicy morskiej w latach 1966-1991*, [in:] *Militarne i gospodarcze aspekty polityki morskiej Polski XX wieku* (materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej przez AMW w Gdyni 11–12.05.2000 r.), J. Przybylski, B. Zalewski (eds.), Gdynia 2001, pp. 177–188; Bieniecki, I., *Eskadra lotnictwa rozpoznawczego Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza (1958–1970)*, part 1, „Przegląd Wojsk Lotniczych i Obrony Powietrznej" 1999, no. 4, pp. 93–97; Bieniecki, I., *Reconnaissance Aviation Squadron of the Frontier Protection Forces (1958–1970)*, *part 2*, „Przegląd Wojsk Lotniczych i Obrony Powietrznej" 1999, no. 6, pp. 81–85.

Border traffic control included:
– control of local border traffic at category II and III border crossing points;
– control of fishing traffic from coastal harbours;
– organisation and control of simplified border traffic with the USSR;
– organising and controlling the movement of troops across the border.

The exercise of border state administration functions was related to:
– maintaining the border, border signs[6] and marking the borderland;
– keeping and updating of delimitation and other state border demarcation documents;
– organising and conducting periodic joint inspections of boundary surveying;
– current regulation of administrative regulations at the border and the borderland on the basis of the Border Protection Act in close consultation with the field authorities;
– border businesses and institutions, particularly in the fields of tourism and leisure, water management, shipping, communication agriculture and forestry, and legal relations;
– cooperation with local authorities of neighbouring countries with regard to matters and interests of border residents, matters of institutions and enterprises operating in the border area and border issues within the framework of the institution of a border plenipotentiary.[7]

Socio-political activities in the borderlands concerned:
– organising border population, youth, paramilitary and social organisations and Territorial Self-Defence Squads (TOS) to assist WOP in border protection;[8]
– conducting border crime prevention activities;
– close cooperation with political and prosecutorial authorities in the sphere of penitentiary policy;
– cultural and educational activities in the border region.

The training, education and preparation of the personnel of the border subdivisions and retreats to perform their tasks included:
– training of young soldiers in retreats for border subdivisions;
– training of soldiers in watchtowers;
– training of non-commissioned officer and ensign cadres;
– border training of professional staff;
– training of personnel reserves.

6   See: entry 'Boundary signs', *Lexicon of military knowledge...*, op. cit., p. 525.
7   See: the entry 'Border Commissioner of the People's Republic of Poland, *ibidem*, p. 299.
8   Bieniecki, I., *Koncepcja wykorzystania granicznych oddziałów samoobrony Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza w ochronie i obronie polskich granic*, [in:] *7. Łużycka Dywizja Desantowa 1963—1986. Miejsce, rola i zadania Wojsk Obrony Wybrzeża w systemie obronnym Polski*, B. Pacek, A. Polak, W. Mazurek (eds.), Materials from a conference organised at the Central Maritime Museum in Gdańsk, Wydawnictwo AON-BELLONA, Warszawa 2014, pp. 152–157.

Specialised and material and technical security for the use of the service was related to:
- – construction of observation towers and their equipment;
- – provision of resources to maintain the control lane;
- – provision of boundary signs and plaques;
- – provision of radar (r./loc.) and infrared equipment used in the service.[9]

On the other hand, for the war period ('W'), the tasks of the WOP were as follows:
- – Direct protection of the border with the forces of guards and outposts (according to "W" time rules);
- – Strengthened and intensified traffic control in the border area;
- – Indirect border protection by counter-intelligence control of the hinterland to the depth of the border districts;
- – Protection and defence of special facilities in the borderlands;
- – Conduct counter-insurgency operations in the border district belt and participate in securing order and security in the border districts, in close coordination with the internal operations of the District Defence Committees (PKOs) and the Provincial Defence Committees (WKOs);
- – Securing the march of the armies of the then allied countries through the borderlands of the People's Republic of Poland and carrying out tasks for their benefit, under a unified system of directing the movement of troops;
- – Participate in combating air and sea landings according to Military Districts (OW) action plans;
- – Assisting in dealing with the effects of WMD strikes on the civilian population of the border region;
- – Regulation of policing issues in the borderlands under special laws;
- – Collaborating with neighbouring countries on border protection,[10] fighting diversion and securing the movement of troops;
- – Border traffic control.[11]

Organisation and changes in the border protection system of the People's Republic of Poland between 1945 and 1991

Until 1991, the subordination of state border protection in Poland varied and changed frequently. At various times it was the responsibility of the Ministry

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[9]   ASG in Szczecin, Akta DWOP, ref. no. 1839, vol. 2, Tasks of the Border Protection Forces in peacetime (appendix no. 1 to letter no. 02314 of 1969).

[10]   Bieniecki, I., *Współpraca Sił Ochrony Pogranicza PRL z formacjami ochrony granicy ZSRR i NRD na południowym Bałtyku w latach 1960–1991*, [in:] *Morze nasze nie nasze. Zbiór badań*, P. Kurpiewski, T. Stegner (eds.), (materials from the All-Polish Scientific Conference entitled "Our sea not ours". "Morze nasze i nie nasze" zorganizowanej przez Muzeum Miasta Gdyni w dniach 18–19.10.2010), Publishing House of the University of Gdańsk, Gdańsk 2011, pp. 419–441.

[11]   ASG in Szczecin, Akta DWOP, ref. no. 1839, t. 2, Tasks of the Border..., op. cit., p. 3.

of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Defence. The tasks of this protection were carried out directly on the border by WOP. Until the dissolution of this formation (in 1991), its structure included WOP Command (DWOP) in Warsaw and tactical units on the border in the form of WOP Brigades (BWOP) and WOP Divisions (OWOP). Also, the organisation of WOP units in particular years was different due to the intensity and character of border crime, the distinctiveness of particular border sections and the principles of economy of forces.[12] For example, in mid-1962 WOP protected the state border of the People's Republic of Poland of a total length of 3,481 km (100%) including:

– 1,310 km (38%) with the CSRS;
– 1,250 km (36%) with the USSR;
– 461 km (13%) maritime border;
– 460 km (13%) with the GDR.[13]

At that time, the personnel of the entire WOP formation numbered 25,019 (100%) soldiers, including:

– soldiers of basic military service (zsw)-20,253 (81%);
– officers-3,339 (13%);
– professional non-commissioned officers-1,427 (6%).[14]

In this formation, its personnel represented various services and subdivisions. The following numbers of WOP soldiers were on duty in the various cells and types of subdivisions:

– border subdivisions-10,629 (42%);
– school divisions-3,846 (15%);
– technical subdivisions-3,141 (13%);
– recoveries-2,189 (9%);
– command and staff-1,390 (6%);
– supply organs-1,223 (5%);
– service subdivisions-1,085 (4%);
– Maritime Service (excluding the Head of Maritime Service and the WOP School of Maritime Specialists)-1,240 (5%);[15]
– flight-276 (1%).

The distribution of the above-mentioned forces for the protection of individual

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[12] *Operation of WOP in the system of protecting the country's borders during peace and war*, "Biuletyn Informacyjny" of the Academy of General Staff, Warsaw 1971, no. 1 (101), p. 15; See: also *Scope of action of the Brygady Brygsk Ochrony Pogranicza command* (in the authors' collection), Warsaw–January 1985.

[13] ASG in Szczecin, DWOP files, ref. no. 1608, vol. 4, Staff note on issues proposed for inclusion in WOP commander's notebook no. 01528a of 18.08.1962 prepared by maj. Kocybała, p. 1.

[14] *Ibidem*, p. 2.

[15] Bieniecki, I., *School of Marine Specialists of the Border Protection Forces (1950–1967)*, "Historical Bulletin" of the Naval Museum in Gdynia, Gdynia 2001, no. 17, pp. 95–102.

sections of the state border of the People's Republic of Poland varied, but the largest percentage of the personnel of this formation was involved in the protection of the western border (with the GDR) and the southern border (with the CSRS):

- Western border-44% (4,083 soldiers);
- Southern border-40% (3,756);
- sea border-13% (1,217);
- Eastern border-3% (318).

WOP detachments were also engaged in border operations, with a total of 2,189 (100%) soldiers at the time. Again, the most numerous detachments operated on the western and southern borders:

- Western border-36% (791);
- Southern border-28% (617);
- Eastern border-23% (493);
- sea border-13% (288).[16]

In mid-1962, the intensity of border crime on individual sections of the PRL state border varied considerably, ranging from 68% on the southern border (with the CSRS) to 3% on the maritime border. On individual sections of the PRL border it amounted to:

- 68% of total border crime at the southern border;
- 22% on the western border (with East Germany);
- 7% on the eastern border (with the USSR);
- 3% on the maritime border.[17]

Therefore, two basic types of border subdivisions, guards and outposts, were used to protect the PRL border.

Watchtowers functioned within BWOP structures, while outposts functioned within OWOP structures.

The sections of service responsibility protected by BWOP had an average length of 240 km, and the sections of the border protected by WOP watchtowers varied and were:

- 17 km at the maritime border;
- 12 km at the southern border;
- 8 km on the western border.

The average length of the section protected by the watchtower depended on the level of border crime threat and was 5 km in the main threat direction and 7 km in other directions.

Each BWOP had an average of about 17 watchtowers, which fell into four basic categories (types) with varying staffing levels:

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16 ASG in Szczecin, DWOP files, ref. no. 1608, vol. 4, Staff note on issues..., op. cit., p. 2.
17 *Ibidem*, p. 3.

- Cat I guards-84 men (command, 2 infantry platoons and service team);
- cat II guardhouse -66 men (command, 2 infantry platoons and service team);
- Cat III guardhouse -47 men (command, 4 infantry teams and a service team);
- Cat IV guardhouse -26 men (command, 2 infantry teams and a service team).

On the other hand, OWOP protected a section of service responsibility with a length of 306 km, and the average length of a WOP outpost section was 45 km. Each division had an average of 7 outposts, whose staffing varied from 10 people on the southern border to 5–7 people on the eastern border.

At that time, various technical devices such as traffic lights, acoustic signalling, infrared signalling, radar surveillance (r./local)[18] and checking the border lane[19] were used to protect the border in the various sections.

A section of the eastern border was protected by the personnel of WOP outposts, based on reconnaissance and work with the civilian population of the border area.[20]

In the mid-1960s, the next, in the opinion of the authors of this article, most significant changes in the organisational structure of WOP were made, which affected their activity until the end of the formation's functioning. The former DWOP and its subordinate units were subordinated to the General Inspector of Territorial Defence (GIOT) of the Ministry of Defence, Lieutenant General Grzegorz Korczyński, by a decision of the Committee for National Defence (KOK) of 6 March 1965. From 1 July 1965, the formation was subordinated to the Ministry of Defence in terms of command. Together with WOP, the Internal Security Corps (KBW) was incorporated into the Ministry of the Interior. Border crossings were still left in the Ministry of the Interior.[21] A new system of command of WOP units was created, through the General Staff of the Polish Army, the Inspectorate of Territorial Defence (IOT) and the WOP Headquarters. At the same time, the entire supply of WOP units was taken over by Military Districts.[22] At that time (1965), the WOP force had a total of 24,695

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18   Bieniecki, I., *Obserwacja i radiolokacyjny dozór Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza na polskim wybrzeżu morskim w latach 1960–1991 (powstanie – rozwój – organizacja)*, cz. 1, „Biuletyn COS SG" 2011, no. 3 (58), pp. 73–90; Bieniecki, I., *Obserwacja i radiolokacyjny dozór Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza na polskim wybrzeżu morskim w latach 1960–1991 (powstanie – rozwój – organizacja)*, cz. 2, „Biuletyn COS SG" 2011, no. 4 (59), pp. 71–87; Bieniecki, I., *Obserwacja i radiolokacyjny dozór Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza na polskim wybrzeżu morskim w latach 1960–1991 (powstanie – rozwój – organizacja, cz. 3*, „Biuletyn COS SG" 2012, no. 1–2 (60–61), pp. 99–118.
19   ASG in Szczecin, DWOP files, ref. no. 1608, vol. 4, Staff note on issues..., op. cit., pp. 3–4.
20   *Ibidem*, p. 4.
21   A border crossing point in the PRL was defined as a place designated for crossing the state border. It could include a fixed section of road crossing the state border, the area of a border railway station, an airport or part thereof, a specific part of a sea or river port. The territorial scope of a border crossing in the PRL was determined by the Minister of Intenal Affairs. Border crossing points were distinguished: road, rail, air, sea and river. See entry "Border crossing", *Lexicon of military knowledge*, collective compilation dir. M. Laprus, op. cit., p. 340.
22   Dominiczak, H., *Establishment and organisational development of the Border Guard Troops in 1945–1983 (Studies in the history of the internal affairs department)*, z. 5, ASW Publishing House in Warsaw, Warsaw 1984, pp. 69–70.

professional and basic military service (zsw) soldiers. Pursuant to an order of the Ministry of Defence (No. 017/MON of 27 July 1965 on temporary terms of reference), the post of Chief Inspector of National Defence (GIOT) was created. It was directly subordinate to the Minister of National Defence and directed preparations for the land defence of the country's territory, the activities of the Internal Forces (WW) and Territorial Defence (OT) units, the preparation of field command posts of the chief state bodies, as well as coordinated undertakings in the field of general defence preparation of society. The WW comprised the Internal Defence Forces (WOWewn.) – subordinate to the GIOT directly or through the commanders of the OW and the WOP – subordinate directly to the GIOT.[23]

In view of the organisational integration of the WWE into the composition of the unified OTK system and in accordance with the orders and orders of the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of the Gen. Staff Nos. 054/Org. of 26 June, 057/Org. of 28 June, 053/Org., 052/Org. and 060/Org. of 14 July 1965:
  − On 26 June 1965, the post of GIOT was introduced and placed under the direct authority of the Ministry of Defence;
  − On 1 July 1965, the position of Head of IOT was introduced at the same time as the Deputy of GIOT, creating the OT Inspectorate;
  − as of 1 July 1965, the commanders of KBW and WOP were subordinated to MON by GIOT, maintaining the existing command system in WW until the competence of the OT Inspectorate was defined.
At the same time, a commission of the Polish Army General Staff under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for org./ mob. Maj. gen. A. Czaplewski had until 1 November 1965 to develop a project for the organisational structure of the WW units and their positioning in the composition of the unified OTK system, which was the core of the land forces of the system.
Archives of the Land Forces (hereafter AWL) in Toruń, DPOW Files, ref. no. 115/68, vol. 17, Order of the Chief of Staff of the POW No. 031/Org. of 21.07.1965, p. 1.

[23] ASG in Szczecin, Akta Szefostwa WOP, ref. no. 1841, vol. 3, Order of the Ministry of Defence no. 017/MON of 27.07.1965 on the temporary scope of competence of GIOT, p. 1.
    The OTK troops were mainly intended for combat tasks within the internal defence front and in particular for:
  – the country's air defence;
  – land defence and sea coast defence (especially to combat enemy air and sea landings, special and diversionary groups);
  – the protection of land and sea borders and the protection and defence of key facilities;
  – securing the needs of operational troops in terms of their regrouping, development and replenishment;
  – to participate in operations carried out mainly through the militarised and self-defence forces, aimed at preventing and removing the effects of enemy attacks on the country's territory.
The OTK troops included: the OPK troops, land troops, part of the air force and the MW. In the organisational system of the OTK ground troops, the following were distinguished: branches of the Internal Defence Forces, WOP, engineering-technical units (pontoon, bridge, railway, road-operational), OT units and others. OT units were intended to operate in the system of defence of provinces and districts, i.e. within the OT in conjunction with the general self-defence of society.
Archives of the Institutions of the Ministry of Defence (hereafter AIMON) in Modlin, GIOT Files, ref. no. 21/91, vol.147, Paper of the Deputy GIOT-Head of the Inspectorate of General

The next significant changes in the organisational structure of BWOP and forms of border protection took place after 1975, in connection with the reform of state administration and the new administrative division of the country. The directions for the improvement of border protection, adopted in 1975 by the management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the activities of WOP until 1980, envisaged adjustment of BWOP's service sections to the new administrative division of the country and a transition to a two-tier structure of command and management (WOP brigade – WOP watchtower, WOP brigade – WOP Border Control Post). At the same time, from 1 June 1976 the level of border battalions (bg) was eliminated and a new organisational structure of WOP was introduced, which was in force in the 1980s.[24]

Forces and means of WOP in the protection of the eastern border of the People's Republic of Poland until the mid-1980s

In 1983, the total length of the Polish borders protected by WOP was 3,397.758 km (100%). The longest was the border with: the CSRR-38.55% (1,309.900 km), the border with the USSR accounted for 36.17% (1,228.958 km), the border with the GDR-13.55% (400 km) and the maritime border-398.500 km (11.73%).[25]

At the time, the formation had 24,188 full-time personnel, including 23,147 military personnel (95.7%) and 1,041 (4.3%) full-time civilian employees.

The cadre group of 7,375 consisted of: 2,933 officers (39.8%, including 18 general posts), 1,876 ensigns (25.4%) and 2,566 NCOs (34.8%). In addition, there were 15,772 (68.1%) zsw soldiers. Within this group, privates 13,644 (86.5%) and zsw non-commissioned officers 2,128 (13.5%) accounted for the largest proportion.

In the WOP formation in 1983 the following units, centres and subdivisions were in operation, with soldiers and civilian employees on duty:
- 11th WOP Brigade (BWOP);
- 1. WOP Training Centre (CSWOP) in Kętrzyn;
- 73. land guards (developed);
- 72. land (staff) guards;
- 19. coastal watchtowers;
- 9. port watchtowers (Szczecin, Gdynia, Gdańsk);
- 57. Border Inspection Posts (BIPs);
- 2. border battalions (bg);
- 3. Port battalions (bport);
- 12. de-escalation battalions (bo);

Self-Defence by Brig. Gen. A. Cesarski on the subject "Development of the defence of the People's Republic of Poland with particular reference to the territorial defence of the country" of 19.11.1969, pp. 9–10.

[24] ASG in Szczecin, Akta DWOP, ref. no. 2519, vol. 82, Order concerning organisational and staff changes in BWOP until 1985 (draft) of 20.07.1983, p. 1.

[25] ASG in Szczecin, Akta DWOP, ref. no. 2519, vol. 82, List of WOP units and subdivisions from 1983, p. 5.

- 9. independent retreat companies (sko);
- 30th Operational Groups (GOs);
- 8. training centres.[26]

BWOPs at the time protected sections of the state border of varying lengths-from 5.2% (Baltic BWOP) to 13.0% (Nadbuzhanska BWOP) of the total length of the state border of the People's Republic of Poland. In individual BWOPs on the eastern border of the People's Republic of Poland, the following forces and resources were assigned for this purpose.

Podlasko-Mazurska BWOP-mp. Bialystok
This protected a section of the border of 421.700 km (12.4%). In its structure it had the following frontier and retreat subdivisions:
I)   10. land (staff) guards;
II)   4. GPK;
III) 1. sko;
IV) 1. GO.

Nadbużańska BWOP-mp. Chelm Lubelski
This protected a section of the border of 442.472 km (13.0%). In its structure it had the following border and retreat subdivisions:
- 8 land (staff) guards,
- 3. GPK.

Bieszczady BWOP-mp. Przemyśl
This protected a section of the border of 372.122 km (10.9%). In its structure it had the following frontier and retreat subdivisions:
- 13. land (staff) guards;
- 4. GPK;
- 1. sko;
- 1. GO.[27]

As mentioned above, the number of WOP forces and resources engaged to protect particular sections of the state border of the People's Republic of Poland depended, among other things, on the border crime occurring there.

Border division and crime on the communist-USSR border

According to the views held in the People's Republic of Poland, the protection of the state border did not just boil down to securing the border in a narrow sense.

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[26]   *Ibidem*, p. 5. See e.g.: Dominiczak, H., *Centrum Szkolenia Wojsk Ochrony Pograniczna w Kętrzynie 1946–1986*, DWOP Publishing House, Warsaw 1986, pp. 1–268.

[27]   ASG in Szczecin, DWOP, ref. no. 2519, vol. 82, List of WOP units..., op. cit., pp. 1–4.

It required the creation of a number of conditions and the carrying out of numerous organisational undertakings in the area adjacent to the border, known as the border-land.[28] The border area was divided into the following zones, starting from the state border and extending inwards into the country: the *border road strip, the border zone and the border strip.*

The border road strip was an area 15 m wide, starting from the state border line on land or from the water protection devices of the border waters (dykes, dams, sluices, etc.) and the seashore inland. This strip of land was used by WOP authorities to carry out activities related to the protection of the state border (a by-pass road) and |the construction of border facilities, and it was forbidden to enter this strip or carry out any activities on it without the permission of WOP authorities. In situations where the characteristics of the terrain or the course of the border line required it, the Presidium of the Voivodeship National Council (WRN) could, at the request of the WOP authorities, extend the border road strip to 100 m.[29]

The border zone comprised an area from 2 to 6 km wide, starting from the border line on land or from the shore of border waters or the seashore in-land. Its width (within these limits) was defined by the presidencies of the WRN in agreement with the WOP authorities. It could be narrowed to less than 2 km by the Council of Ministers or in special cases extended to 10 km by the Ministry of the Interior.[30] On land located in the border zone, activities related to the marking and protection of the border and the construction of border facilities could be carried out without the consent of the owners or users of the land. Residence in the border zone required a permit from the District National Council (PRN) or the Municipal National Council (MRN) with jurisdiction over the place of residence. Also, temporary residence in the zone required a permit from the Citizens' Militia Headquarters competent for the residence of the person who intended to go to the border zone. The Presidium of the PRN or the MRN could prohibit a person permanently residing there from continuing to live and stay in the zone if security reasons or the protection of state borders required it.[31] The border area also had specific and rigorous regulations for those residing there. Temporary residence in the border area required a permit from the authorities of the MO (police station, commissariat, post) having jurisdiction

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[28] A borderland is an area adjacent to a state border, which was subject to legal provisions introducing certain rigours and restrictions aimed at ensuring the security and inviolability of the state border. In the People's Republic of Poland the following parts of the borderland were distinguished, starting from the state border and extending inwards into the country: the border road strip, the border zone and the border strip. See the entry "Borderland", *Lexicon of military knowledge...*, op. cit., p. 315.

[29] *Border Service Regulations. Part 1 – General principles*, MON Publishing House, Warsaw 1968, pp. 6–7; and the entry "Belt of the border road", *Lexicon of military knowledge...*, op. cit., p. 296.

[30] ASG in Szczecin, Akta DWOP, sygn. no. 1841, vol. 8, Opracowanie pt. "Organisation of activities of WOP forces and means in the system of protecting the country's borders and cooperation in this field with other forces and means OTK of 15.10.1970, p. 3.

[31] *Border Service Regulations. Part 1...*, op. cit., pp. 8–9, and the entry "Border Zone", *Lexicon of military knowledge...*, op. cit., p. 418.

over the place of residence of the person who intended to go to the border area. A residence permit for the border zone entitled the person to stay in the locality that was listed on the permit. Permits were not required for juveniles under 14 years of age.[32] The need to hold a temporary residence permit in the border area was suspended only in the coastal provinces during the summer season (1 May to 30 September) each year. In addition, the possession of a temporary residence permit in the border area was not valid for certain groups of people. Any person staying in the border area individually or as part of an organised group was obliged, when requested by the WOP or MO authorities, to present a document confirming his/her right to stay in the border area, together with an identity card. People under the age of 18 were not required to have an identity card and could instead present a school ID card, a temporary identity certificate or another personal document. Such a document was not required as long as they were staying in the border area together with the people whose identity card they were registered with. People arriving in the border area were required to register at the office of the local territorial state administration of the basic level, within 24 hours of their arrival, regardless of the length of time they intended to stay in the border area. Those staying in the border area were obliged to comply with regulations issued by the local provincial offices. In particular, these regulations regulated the use of bathing and beach areas as well as tourist facilities and trails. These regulations were published in the form of notices. Managers of organised groups travelling on tourist routes in the border area were obliged to have a list of participants by name. In order to maintain the safety of the participants of these groups, it was recommended that their managers (organisers) should each time notify the local WOP guards of the date and route of the planned marches, rallies and hiking camps.[33]

The border strip included the area of the counties adjacent to the state border line and from the shore of the border waters and the seashore. Those towns and counties whose area lay wholly or partly within 30 km of the border were also included in the border strip. The Council of Ministers could, by means of a decree, extend the area of the border strip to all or certain districts or localities adjacent to the districts of the border strip, as well as extend all or certain provisions in force for the protection of borders in the border zone, to the area of the border strip or certain parts thereof.[34] The above-mentioned terms were linked to the concept of a border offence, which was a judicially prohibited act directed against the inviolability and security of state borders. This category of offences included, inter alia, crossing or attempting to cross the state border without permission, on the basis of forged documents or documents belonging to another person, providing assistance in the illegal crossing of the state border or violating border signs and equipment.[35] For example, in the period from 1 January 1965 to 30 September 1968, a total of 1,651

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[32] Regulations in force in the border area, "Granica" (WOP magazine), no. 7 of 1986, p. 3.
[33] *Ibidem*, p. 3.
[34] *Border Service Regulations. Part 1...*, op. cit., pp. 8–9; and the entry "Border Belt", *Lexicon of military knowledge...*, op. cit., p. 296.
[35] See the entry 'Borderline crime', *Lexicon of military knowledge...*, op. cit., p. 343.

people (100%) were detained at the PRL-Soviet border for border crossings or attempted and for committing other border crimes and offences, as shown in the table below.

Table 1. Persons apprehended at the border of the People's Republic of Poland and the USSR in the years 1965–1968

Nature of the act committed	Year				Total on the border of COMMUNIST PARTY–USSR
	1965	1966	1967	1 January – 30 September 1968	
Illegal border crossing or attempted illegal border crossing	224	309	357	310	1 200
Other offences	1	3	11	10	25
Border offences	52	91	148	135	426
Total	277	403	516	455	1 651
Percentage of total	16,8	24,4	31,3	27,5	100

Source: ASG in Szczecin, DWOP files, sygn. no. 1839, vol. 2, Information on the activities of the Border Protection Forces in the field of PRL border protection of December 1968, p. 25.

On the basis of the data presented above, an upward trend in each of the categories listed in the table (other offences, border offences) can be observed at this section of the state border during this period. Also, according to the assessment of the USSR side, the threat to this border increased in these years, with a particularly noticeable increase in incidents of attempted in the direction towards Poland. An assessment of the state of border crime on the eastern border was the subject of a meeting with the then head of the WOP. It was conducted on the initiative of the Russian side in January 1968. There was also a written submission on this issue from the USSR, delivered in February 1968, by the head of the KGB representation of the USSR to the Interior Ministry of the People's Republic of Poland. At the time, of particular interest and concern to the neighbour beyond the River Bug was the phenomenon of a marked increase in border crime on the USSR's western border, where around 50% of all border crime with the USSR was concentrated.[36] In their information, the Russians also signalled the phenomenon of an increase in the smuggling of hostile literature at border crossings. In 1967 alone, 27,000 copies of so-called hostile publications smuggled into the USSR from Poland were revealed. Due to the increase in crime and the increased penetration of the border areas by tourists from the Western countries at the time, the Russian side expressed concern that, under these conditions, there was the possibility of the smuggling into the USSR of agents of foreign intelligence *"and emissaries of bourgeois-nationalist*

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[36]   ASG in Szczecin, Akta DWOP, ref. no. 1839, vol. 2, *Informacja o działalności Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza w zakresie ochrony granic PRL of December 1968*, p. 25.

centres operating in the West."[37] Also, operational analyses carried out by the Polish side confirmed the facts of increased penetration of communication routes crossing the borders, bridges over the River Bug, military facilities, etc. by diplomats of Western countries accredited in Poland (in particular the USA, the UK and France). On the eastern border of the People's Republic of Poland, in the zone of operation of WOP subunits, the organs of Zwiadu[38] of this formation operationally controlled approximately 700 people who, in their opinion, posed a threat to the security and inviolability of the state border at that time. On this section of the state border, there were population centres of Ukrainian origin in the northern and southern parts of the border area. In these communities, a resurgence of nationalist sentiment was observed, fuelled by centres in what was then West Germany and Canada. The activation of contacts of local Ukrainian population groups with the mentioned centres was also noted. Cases were found where the eastern and southern borderlands were used as a meeting place for people of Ukrainian origin residing in the USSR to meet representatives of Ukrainian circles from West Germany, the USA and Canada. Such meetings were arranged in advance by correspondence. Similar trends also occurred in centres of Lithuanian origin in the districts of Sejny and Suwałki.[39] In 1966, an organised smuggling operation across the border into Poland was uncovered and dismantled in the town of Bereźniki in the Suwałki district, with the involvement of Soviet border residents of Lithuanian origin. In the above mentioned case 7 citizens of the People's Republic of Poland were detained. In addition, numerous violations of border order, most often by border residents, such as damage to USSR border signs, unconscious border violations and numerous incidents of cattle crossing over the border line, were found on the PRL-Soviet border at this time. The perpetration of these offences was greatly facilitated by the lack of a direct border (line) service. At the time, it was assessed that such incidents constituted

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[37]   *Ibidem*, p. 26.

[38]   Bieniecki, I., Szkurłat, I., *Zwiad Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza w zabezpieczeniu polskiej granicy morskiej w latach 1960–1991*, [in:] *W cieniu służb. Ze studiów nad bezpieczeństwem państwa*, P. Kołakowski, B. Sprengel, M. Stefański, J. Zawadzki (eds.), Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek w Toruniu, Toruń 2016, pp. 387–411; Bieniecki, I., Szkurłat, I., *Zwiad Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza w latach 1960–1991 (tasks, organisation, personnel and its activity in protecting the border of the People's Republic of Poland)*, [in:] *Służby wywiadowcze jako element polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa. History and contemporaneity*, M. Górka (ed.), Adam Marszałek Publishing House in Toruń, Toruń 2016, pp. 299–335; Bieniecki, I., *Operacyjno-rozpoznawcza działalność Zwiadu Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza na polskim wybrzeżu morskim w latach 1960–1991*, [in:] *Służby specjalne w systemie bezpieczeństwa państwa. Przeszłość–Teraźniejszość–Przyszłość*, „Materials and Studies", vol. 1, A. Krzak, D. Gibas-Krzak (eds.) (materials from the International Scientific Conference entitled Special Services in the State Security System. „Przeszłość–Teraźniejszość–Przyszłość" organised by the University of Szczecin on 24–25.04.2012 in Szczecin), Publishing House of the University of Szczecin and the Military Centre for Civic Education, Szczecin–Warsaw 2012, pp. 457–482; Bieniecki, I., *Zwiad Nadmorskich Brygad Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza w latach 1965–1991. Zadania – struktura – działalność*, [in:] *Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa. Special Services in the State Security System. Practical aspects of security*, vol. 1, M. Ilnicki, A. Piotrowski (eds.), (materials from a conference organised by WSB),WSB Publishing House in Poznań, Poznań 2012, pp. 147–178.

[39]   ASG in Szczecin, Akta DWOP, ref. no. 1839, vol. 2, Information..., op. cit., p. 26.

a significant nuisance in the process of border protection and were treated by the Russian side as a serious violation of order at the state border. In 1967 alone, a total of 232 such incidents were recorded and 242 people were detained for unknowingly crossing this border. On this border there was also a simplified border traffic,[40] which was used by citizens of the Polish People's Republic and the USSR permanently residing in border towns. All activities related to the simplified border traffic, including the issuing of passes and control of this traffic, were performed by the border protection authorities of both countries. The second part of the article will be published in the next issue of Security Studies.

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[40] Until 1991, border traffic was defined as the crossing of the state border by people and means of transport on the basis of proper documents at a border crossing point designated for this purpose. Depending on the place and method of border crossing, border traffic was distinguished between road, rail, air, sea and river. On the other hand, with regard to the purpose, conditions and basis for crossing the border, border traffic was classified as: passport traffic, transit traffic, minor traffic, tourist traffic, fishing traffic and sporting/boating traffic. See: the entry „Border traffic", *Lexicon of military knowledge...*, op. cit., p. 381.

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Summary

The eastern border protection subsystem of the People's Republic of Poland provided protection for one of the four sections of the state border in the years 1945–1991. The first part of the article (below) presents such issues as the tasks carried out by the Border Protection Forces (WOP), the organisation and changes in the border protection system of the People's Republic of Poland in the years 1945–1991, the forces and means of the WOP in protecting the border of the People's Republic of Poland until the mid-1980s, and the division of the borderland and crimes on the People's Republic of Poland-Soviet Union border.

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SMART SOCIETY, EDUCATION. NEW FORMS OF "INFORMATION SOCIETY" EDUCATION IN THE LIGHT OF POLISH AND EU LAW

INTELIGENTNE SPOŁECZEŃSTWO, EDUKACJA. NOWE FORMUŁY EDUKACJI „SPOŁECZEŃSTWA INFORMACYJ-NEGO" W ŚWIETLE PRAWA POLSKIEGO I UE

Abstract: This issue concerns the reality of new technologies and services of the information society, which provide society with many professional and social advantages, but which also bring with them a wave of various risks. Nevertheless, as an information society we are happy to use these solutions to an unimaginable extent. It is therefore necessary to ask whether, as a society aspiring to become a 5.0 society, we are sufficiently, or not at all, educated about these technologies, both in terms of their benefits and potential dangers, e.g. cyber threats or impacts on us and our environment? The article presents an analysis of the current forms of education in Poland in 2021 in primary and secondary schools and questions whether, with the development of a reality filled with new technologies and in an era of information overload, we are placing sufficient emphasis on education in the dimension indicated?

Zarys treści: Kwestia ta dotyczy rzeczywistości nowych technologii i usług społeczeństwa informacyjnego, które zapewniają społeczeństwu wiele korzyści zawodowych i społecznych, ale które niosą ze sobą również falę różnych zagrożeń. Mimo to, jako społeczeństwo informacyjne chętnie korzystamy z tych rozwiązań w niewyobrażalnym zakresie. Należy zatem zadać pytanie, czy jako społeczeństwo aspirujące do miana społeczeństwa 5.0 jesteśmy dostatecznie lub w ogóle wyedukowani w zakresie tych technologii, zarówno pod kątem płynących z nich korzyści, jak i potencjalnych niebezpieczeństw, np. cyberzagrożeń czy wpływu na nas i nasze otoczenie? Artykuł przedstawia analizę obecnych form edukacji w Polsce w 2021 r. w szkołach podstawowych i ponadpodstawowych i stawia pytanie, czy wraz z rozwojem rzeczywistości wypełnionej nowymi technologiami i w dobie przeładowania informacyjnego kładziemy wystarczający nacisk na edukację we wskazanym wymiarze?

Keywords: education, information society, new technologies, cyber threats, robotisation, computerisation, cyberspace, artificial intelligence

Słowa kluczowe: edukacja, społeczeństwo informacyjne, nowe technologie, cyberzagrożenia, robotyzacja, komputeryzacja, cyberprzestrzeń, sztuczna inteligencja

Introduction

In the middle of the 20th century, the Polish writer of the hard science fiction geno.e, philosopher and futurologist, and eminent figure, Stanisław Lem, in his publications conveyed messages concerning the digital reality that has already materialised today. The guru of fantasy, and visionary thinker, made bold and accurate assumptions about the development of society with the advent of information technology development. A no less visionary approach was put forward by Karel Capek in a 1920 publication titled "*Rossum's Universal Robots,*" in which he used and popularised the word ROBOT for the first time.

Both authors presented, at the time, seemingly fantastic and surreal visions about new technologies and their application. They wrote about automation, robotisation, computerisation, the internet, cyberspace and virtual reality, creating original ideas of fantasy literature. In doing so, they warned of phenomena that could be dangerous to humans and even to humanity as a whole.

The hypotheses set out in the literature of the last century are currently materialising in many aspects of life, to the extent that many of us would not be able to function if these tools were not present. While technologically literate societies are happy to enjoy the benefits of technology in everyday life, which provide many advantages on both professional and social grounds, their awareness, responsibility and education in terms of potential dangers seems to be insufficient, at least in terms of formal education.[1]

Outline of the problem of using ICT services – results of a statistical survey

Publicly available statistics from 2021 show the current scale of our dependence on the Internet, which is on an upward trend. The Digital 2021 report series,[2] published in collaboration between *We Are Social* and *Hootsuit,* shows that over the past year web-based services such as e-commerce and social media etc. have become an indispensable part of people's lives. Of a population of 7.83 billion people, 5.22 billion use a mobile phone today, representing 66.6 per cent of the world's total population. 4.66 billion people worldwide used the Internet in January 2021, 316 million more compared to the same period in the previous year. Social media currently has 4.20 billion users worldwide. This number has increased by 490 million in the last 12 months, showing year-on-year growth of more than 13 per cent.[3]

The same report shows that the average user now spends 2 hours and 25 minutes on social media each day. In total, social media users worldwide spent *3.7 trillion*

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[1]   *On the Integrated Qualification System* Act of 22 December 2015, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2020, item 226, as amended.
[2]   https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-global-overview-report, [accessed: 08.12.2021].
[3]   *Ibidem*.

hours on social media in 2021, which equates to more than 420 million years of connected human existence. These comparisons may evoke different emotions, although it is the statistical number of hours per day spent "online" by a user that is astonishing.

In total, the average internet user now spends almost seven hours a day using the internet across all devices, which equates to more than 48 hours a week online – that's a full two days out of the week. Assuming the average person sleeps between seven and eight hours a day, this means that we now spend around 42 per cent of our lives awake and spend almost as much time online as we do sleeping.

According to the Business Insider website, during an average eight-hour working day, an employee works productively for only three hours.[4] They vary the rest of their working time with pleasures such as mentally moving to the online world and browsing social networks etc.

One of the reasons why we use the internet so much is the widely available information society services,[5] which enable us to work remotely, to entertain ourselves, to carry out many activities and needs (which are e.g. shopping, obtaining information, communication, etc.). Services are also defined in Article 4(25) of RODO,[6] which refers us to Article 1(1)(b) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and means any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of the recipient of the service. In Poland, an information society service is defined as a service provided electronically.[7] In other words, it is a service provided without the simultaneous (physical) presence of the parties at the time the service is provided (service provided at a distance).

Provision of a service by electronic means means that the service is sent and received at its destination by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data and is entirely transmitted, routed and received by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means. An information society service must furthermore be provided at the individual request of the recipient of the service, e.g. use of a social networking site, sending of e-mails or video on demand.

An information society service should (but not necessarily) be provided for remuneration, but this is not just about situations where the service provider receives remuneration expressed in money, but remuneration understood as economic value. This is therefore of all kinds:

  – online newspapers;

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[4]   https://businessinsider.com.pl/twoje-pieniadze/praca/psychologia-pracy-efektywna-praca-jak-dlugo/xc545sz, [accessed 14.12.2021].

[5]   The concept of "information society" is formulated, [in:] Krzysztofek, K*., Understanding the development from traditional to information societies*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2005, p. 169; Goban-Klas, T., *Media and mass communication. Teoria i analizy prasy, radia, telewizji i Internetu*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa–Kraków 1999, p. 286.

[6]   Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016, on the protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data and on the free flow of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC.

[7]   *On provision of electronic services* Act of 18 July 2002, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2020, item 344, as amended.

- email;
- online TV;
- social networks;
- communicators, auction portals;
- dating apps;
- e-libraries;
- medical e-visits;
- restaurants providing a meal delivery service;
- car rental companies;
- hotel booking portals;
- banking;
- discussion portals;
- advertising portals
- online shops;
- e-training;
- e-advice and many others (omitted here).

It would seem that in Poland we use the Internet mostly for private purposes and less frequently for work. Nothing could be further from the truth. Due to technological possibilities and "public health" conditions in Poland, many employers have decided to enable remote working.[8] According to the Central Statistical Office, in 2020, 14.2% of all working people in Poland will work remotely, using the Internet, which is a considerable number of 2,317,700 people.

Taking the above data into account, it can be concluded that, apart from sleep and active web surfing, the real world is only a sideline for us, which we have to use for everyday hygiene, a meal, walking the dog or shopping. The amount of time we devote to surfing the web every day, both privately and professionally, means that we, as an information society, are confronted with considerable challenges and threats in various forms.

Each of us, because of the influence of the development of technology, the internet of things[9] and artificial intelligence, is becoming more and more dependent and less cautious in our daily activities, after all, it is "the good itself," and any risks concern other users, not us. Thus, we become completely defenceless in the face of the impact of the internet. We are affected, for example, by social media algorithms and automated scripts for commercial, social or political purposes and factors that shape our behaviour, perception and absorption of information, knowledge, intellectual development, and the online identity we create online, very often without realising how wrong we are about its anonymity.

In the digital world, we can never be fully anonymous or safe. Each of our online activities leaves a kind of digital footprint that we leave behind us by visiting

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8   *Labor Code* Act of 26 Juni 1974, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2020, item 1320, 2021, 1162, as amended, art. 67.

9   Ashton, K., *That "Internet of Things"*, 2009.

various websites, filling in forms, sending e-mails, adding various attachments, videos, photos, comments, etc., thus sharing our emotions, views, preferences, problems, location, finances, needs, family situation, health data, data about our address, marital status and information about our absence from home. It is clear that the information we leave about ourselves on the web can become subject to, for example, hacking attacks or targeted algorithms.

Current forms of training

It seems natural that as a society aspiring to become society 5.0[10] with the development of technology we should acquire knowledge, shape and develop our awareness, responsibility, skills, e.g. information and cognitive skills, which are the foundations for the functioning of the information society and the knowledge society.[11] There is a mutual correlation between these two types of societies, because having an amount of data implies the need to be able to manage it, transform it, build logical relationships from it, to have knowledge, understood as the totality of human skills or a given mind, but also a body of knowledge in a certain field and consisting of information systematised and placed in context, processed through the prism of our experience, i.e. it is an appropriate analysis and synthesis of information.

It should be noted that having information is not the same as having knowledge. Knowledge implies, among other things, that, with knowledge, we can judge which information is true or not. So, given the direction we are going in, and that information technology allows us to absorb information more efficiently, can we conclude that we are becoming better at using the information we have? Is it possible to uphold the assumption of social philosophers that free access to information on any subject is a sufficient condition for forming opinions and making judgements, and consequently for making informed decisions and being a responsible Internet user?

According to some researchers, the fact that information has such important functions in modern society also has negative consequences. No society has suffered from such an overabundance of information and T. H. Eriksen, for example, argues that the basic skill to be developed in today's world is to be on guard against 99.99% of the information reaching us and to focus on the reliable use of the remaining 0.01%.[12]

It is worth remembering that it is people who decide how to dispose of information and in this their role is irreplaceable. It is not in the use of technology that the main source of danger lies, the problem is that people may stop wanting to think, e.g. due to so-called "information overload."[13] The lack, or rather the low level of information culture and education, and the implementation of concepts of social development that are

[10]   Society 5.0 – a human-centred society in which economic progress containing solutions to social issues is balanced by a system offering high integration of digital and real space, https://sektor3-0.pl/blog/japonski-czlowiek-nowej-ery-czyli-spoleczenstwo-5-0/, [accessed: 03.01.2022].
[11]   Toffler, A., Toffler, H., *Budowa nowej cywilizacji*, Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 1996.
[12]   Eriksen, T.T., *Tyranny of the Moment*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 2003, p. 33.
[13]   Toffler, A., *Future shock*, Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 1998, p. 41 .

not always accurate, means that society in the age of the Internet, instead of becoming more and more reflective, is becoming more and more algorithmic, and therefore more and more "like" the computer to a degree beyond its real needs. The world moving towards total openness and the public's desire to consciously share personal information with the world is also a significant problem, and thus the value of privacy is being eroded. Sometimes we ourselves do not even realise that we are accepting widespread surveillance**.**

 We are surrounded by information, our everyday life is based on its production, dissemination and use. We want to be up to date, so we do it quite uno.eflectively. As defined by *Dr Hanna Batorowska, Professor at UP, "Information literacy is the responsibility of the information society."* These duties should not only concern the essence of information, but mainly the moral dilemmas related to its use, dissemination, sharing, selection, evaluation and management.

In view of the above, it must be recognised that the scale of the penetration of the Internet into our daily lives and the ocean of information available means that the elements that should keep up with it, or even surpass it, are the education of society, multi-level development, humanism and the interdisciplinarity of the fields of life. It is therefore important to pay attention to current forms of education and to create awareness in this area.

The declaration,[14] made on 12 October 2020 by the Association of Data Protection Officers within the framework of a commemorative letter in view of the 4th anniversary of the Association, that *Information + Knowledge + Wisdom* will balance the imbalance between privacy and today's high technology, is the essence expressing the needed educational trend.

It is not without significance that a new value for the respect of privacy is expressed in the activities of the SIODO, the "Data Protection Culture." Developed in a multi-level manner, it will arouse the need to respect one's own privacy, as well as allow for the skilful acquisition, evaluation and application of information, and thus contribute to raising awareness of the constitutional right to informational autonomy and the protection of one's personal rights.

How, then, is the aforementioned education implemented in Poland in 2021? Well, the basis for consideration is the Ordinance on the core curriculum of formal education in Poland[15] and the Ordinance of the Minister of National Education of 30 January 2018 on the core curriculum of general education for general secondary school, technical school and industry secondary school.

In terms of the analysis of the curriculum for grades I–VIII, at least the content related to the essence and understanding of privacy as a fundamental human right, its value and potential sources of its threat are overlooked.

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[14]   https://siodo.pl/2020/10/, [accessed: 28.12.2021].
[15]   Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 14 February 2017, on the basis of the program of preschool education and the program basis of general education for elementary school, including for students with intellectual disabilities of a moderate or severe, general education for secondary school, general education general education for a special school for special preparation for work and general education for a post-secondary school post-secondary school Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2017, item 356.

Also overlooked in the analysed core curriculum is content related to building information management skills, which, in an age of information overload, as Alvin Toffler wrote about in "Future Shock" as early as 1920, is fundamental to navigating through the thicket of information and assessing its value and sources.

The only subject that thematically comes close to the area in question is Safety Education. This subject has been taught since 1 September 2009 as one hour per week per school year in the then lower secondary school. Since 1 September 2012, it has been taught for the same amount of time in upper secondary (post-primary) schools. Safety education has completely replaced the previously known defence przysposo-bieczenie obronne. With the introduction of the new core curriculum from 1 September 2017, Safety education was introduced in primary schools. As of 2018, it is taught in class VIII as one lesson per week.

This subject focuses primarily on general aspects of state security and civil defence. In the form of truncated theory, it prepares students for emergency situations such as disasters, mass accidents or terrorism. It also develops first aid skills and attitudes that promote health in a broad sense.

Although Education for Safety does not teach about the problems indicated in the article, some educational materials at individual schools include lesson topics that address cyberbullying and the use of resources available on the Internet. These may amount to several lesson hours over the entire eight years of primary education, but their implementation depends on the teacher's initiative. This seems to be an insufficient amount of hours devoted to education when juxtaposed with the results of a consumer survey of children and parents carried out by the Office of Electronic Communications,[16] which shows that in 2020 97% of school-age children were using the Internet.

It cannot reasonably be considered that the fault lies with the school principals, as the lack of introduction of content into the programmes and adequate preparation of the teaching staff will not happen "overnight." It is an action that should be planned and systematically implemented over years with the addition of content.

According to the above-mentioned report, almost 60% of the teachers participating in the survey consider that there is too much inappropriate content on the Internet, including manipulation, violence, swearing, pornography and material that may have an impact on the demoralisation of the youngest generation, who, in retrospect, will be responsible for the further education of younger generations. So why is there so little focus on education about perceived problems?

Attention to the aspects in question is given in the Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 30 January 2018 on the core curriculum of general education for general secondary, technical and upper secondary schools.

The above programme indicates that one of the most important skills acquired by a student in the course of general education at upper secondary and technical schools is the ability to efficiently use modern information and communication technologies, including respect for copyright and safe navigation in cyberspace. Well, a specific skill is acquired by a student in 3 subjects.

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[16]   https://www.uke.gov.pl/akt/badanie-konsumenckie-dzieci-i-rodzicow-oraz-nauczycieli-2020,372.html, [accessed: 05.01.2022].

One of these is Education for Safety, already discussed, which in its subject area includes, among other things, the task for the instructor to explain the meaning of cyberbullying and knows the procedures to follow in the event of its occurrence, and identifies inappropriate behaviour regarding cyberbullying and knows what the appropriate response to it should be.

Another subject, which thematically touches upon the problems indicated in the article, is Ethics, which deals with the identification and analysis of selected moral problems associated with scientific and technological progress (e.g. the problem of privacy protection, copyright protection, cyberbullying, the development of artificial intelligence, transhumanism).

The third element of the curriculum in question is also Information Technology, which covers with its thematic scope a truly important issue, i.e. "*respecting the law and security rules. Respecting information privacy and data protection, intellectual property rights, etiquette in communication and norms of social coexistence, assessing the risks associated with technology and taking them into account for the safety of oneself and others*." It is puzzling, however, that the legal aspect is taught as part of a subject whose most important aim is to develop computational thinking skills, focused on creative problem solving in various fields with the conscious and safe use of methods and tools derived from computer science. In its basic and extended scope, the subject focuses, among other things, on technical and IT aspects of information security, and this is not conducive to bringing users closer to information awareness and developing the necessary skills.

Another interesting element of reference is the framework curriculum[17] for a four-year general secondary school and the minimum number of hours of compulsory education classes and tutor classes indicated therein, which for the subjects indicated above is respectively:

1) Safety Education – 1 hour per week, implemented only during the education period of Class I
2) Ethics – at least 1 hour per week – although the final decision on the number of hours of ethics is taken by the principal
3) Computer science – 1 hour per week implemented during the education period of grades I–III

I agree with the assumption included in the core curriculum,[18] i.e. "*An important task of school is to prepare students for life in an information society. Teachers of all subjects should create conditions for students to acquire the skills of searching, organising and using information from various sources and documenting their work, taking into account the correct composition of the text and the principles of its organisation, with the use of information and communication technologies*." However, the success of this task is in doubt:

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[17]   Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 3 April 2019, on framework educational plans for public schools, Dz. U. (Journal of Laws) 2019, item 639.
[18]   Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 14 February 2017, op. cit.

a) Minimalist approach to issues in the core curriculum;
b) too few hours dedicated to their implementation;
c) lack of system orientation.

Within the framework of the subject matter under discussion, the shortcomings of the systems approach are discernible in both core curricula presented above. By this I mean a curriculum based on a structured and logically structured range of topics, forming a whole. Such an approach, together with continuing education, would influence the interdisciplinary development of the pupil, providing him or her with the necessary knowledge appropriate to the stage of life in question. This would allow for a balanced flowering of wisdom in the broadest sense. The systematic acquisition of knowledge, the development of awareness, intelligence, maturity and the gaining of experience at further stages of education, combined with commercial education would allow for a number of individual benefits.

It would also provide an opportunity in building specialist human resources, future managers or managers of organisational security and state security in this area. Commercial education could play a significant role here, contributing to the specialisation of these individuals. However, there are few such pro-social activities, to say the least, that I see in the field of continuing education. With certain "periodic booms", such as the entry into force of the General Data Protection Regulation,[19] commercial education offers appear to be aimed at the most profitable customer segment, which in this case can "create" an expert in information security management in a few days.

The dilemma, however, is that they lack in-depth knowledge of, for example, information security systems, the methodology used in audit activities, or even the subject of information society threats in the security system of organisational units. Instead, content concerning the creation of registers, records, the so-called information clauses (which, in fact, should not be called that), the "implementation of RODO" in the organisation, with the help of sample documents, prevails.

Admittedly, some are saturated with knowledge that is highly cumulative, both practical and theoretical, but which cannot be taught effectively in a day or two, or often even a year, of postgraduate study. However, it would not be an exaggeration to say that no one would risk hiring a head of human resources or a chief accountant after this level of training, even if he or she had regulations and model letters at their disposal; what is needed here is well-established knowledge and skills.

The remodelling of current and the creation of new forms of education requires, above all, qualitative changes in the interpretation and conceptualisation of specialised knowledge in confrontation with increasing technological development and the scale of its penetration into everyday life and the resulting new challenges for society. Curricula and all forms of education should be built on a systems approach, which will force issues to be treated as open systems, interlinked to form a coherent whole.

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[19]   Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016, op. cit.

Risks

It should realised that it is not the information itself that is at risk, but rather its unskilful and irresponsible use. There are many dangers, for example, psychological dangers (inner compulsion to be online, escape from the real world into an artificial virtual world, access to pathological cultural groups, alienation), technical dangers (loss of confidentiality and integrity of data), medical dangers (dangers to human health caused, for example, by work at a computer or the harmfulness of radiation from a computer monitor) and legal dangers (dangers to human health caused, for example, by work at a computer or the harmfulness of radiation from a computer monitor). The risks are also linked to the development of modernity (excessive information, disparity of information, problematic value of information, information noise, information stress and ethical dilemmas).

The scarcity or non-existence of the indicated educational elements in educational programmes and the lack of a systemic approach to teaching makes an unaware society fall prey to the threats indicated above and contributes to the vulnerability of the individual. Recognising the scale of the potential challenges that lie ahead, and given the range of forms of education discussed above, it is also worth drawing attention to cyber threats such as:

– Cyberbullying – bullying by sending and posting harmful content or images via online communication tools. Cyberbullying occurs when a child or adolescent is bullied, intimidated, harassed, humiliated, shamed or otherwise harmed by another child or adolescent using the internet, interactive or digital technologies, or mobile phones.

– Deepfake – image editing, which involves combining images of the human face via artificial intelligence. The resulting images offer the possibility of manipulating, blackmailing or compromising the person whose image has been used.

– Fake news – the large-scale dissemination of false information.

– Flaming – the so-called "insult war", which involves sending hostile and vulgar messages to one or more members of a community.

– FOMO – an acronym for fear of missing out, meaning a paranoid fear of what is passing us by while we are offline. It involves constantly keeping track of what is happening online.

– Child Grooming – actions taken to befriend and emotionally bond with a child in order to reduce the child's resistance to later sexual abuse.

– Heyt – involving destructive criticism using online posts in a public forum.

– Patostream – consisting of "online" webcasts during which behaviour widely regarded as social deviance is presented, for which viewers pay so-called donations.

– Pharming – a more dangerous form of phishing for the user and more difficult to detect. Characteristic of pharming is that even after entering a valid website address, the victim will be redirected to a fake (although it may look the same)

website. The aim is to intercept passwords, credit card numbers and other sensitive data entered by the user on trusted sites.

- Phishing – a method of deceptively obtaining passwords to a user's online bank accounts via e.g. emails, including phishing for sensitive personal information (e.g. passwords or bank account details) by impersonating a trustworthy person or institution.
- Ramsonware – malware that causes data on devices to be encrypted until a ransom is paid by the victim. Infection most commonly occurs via emails, pop-ups and social media.
- Scam – a scam to induce trust in someone and then use that trust to defraud them of money or other assets, popular on dating sites, charity ads, advertisements for a win, super offer or quick way to make money, etc.
- Sexting – sending photos, videos or messages of a sexual nature via mobile phones.
- Skimming – the illegal copying of the contents of a bank card's magnetic strip without the cardholder's knowledge in order to perform unauthorised transactions.
- Stalking – persistent and repeated harassment, solicitation of a person using new technologies.
- Trolling – unfriendly behaviour towards other internet users that is intended to disrupt an ongoing discussion.
- Vishing – a method of fraud, with its basis in phishing and social engineering methods, whereby fraudsters use internet telephony to impersonate financial institutions.

The above dangers are just a few examples. Every victim of these dangers will find himself or herself in an extremely difficult situation. Will he or she be able to cope? Will a teenager who wants to conceal a situation (e.g. embarrassing photos) from his or her parents find help from those close to him or her, when his or her parents are not even aware of it? Ridiculous content shared within a community (e.g. a class or school) can lead to anger, sadness, fear, lowered self-esteem or even a suicide attempt within seconds. Every day 160,000 children in the United States of America do not go to school because of cyberbullying (online bullying). Unfortunately, we are also dealing with this phenomenon more and more often in Poland.[20]

When we reply to an e-mail in a hurry, will we each time spot a form of phishing and recognise an attempt to defraud us by impersonating an institution in order to obtain personal data or other information from us?

Will we uno.effectively dispose of our data for the range of proof of identity requirements placed on us?

Without reflection, do we share our material possessions on social media, e.g. a beautiful house, also sharing information about a holiday stay?

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[20] https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/1097364,michal-wroczynski-w-rozmowie-z-magdalena-rigamonti-dzis-sztuczna-inteligencja-nie-wie-nawet-ze-w-grze-pokonala-czlowieka.html, [accessed: 06.01.2022].

Will we securely dispose of company information as part of our professional activities?

In view of the above, insufficiently or inadequately developed ethical values and information competences of Internet users will lead, among other things, to addictions, a range of psychological and social effects, cyber-bullying, to a loss or withdrawal of one's own privacy and even to a decrease in respect for one's own privacy in relation to others, and, when faced with too much information, may lead to information overload, which will distort the information evaluation system.[21]

It is impossible not to draw attention to threats involving information security of private and state organisations and state security. The available forms of education and the applicable legal regulations treat very openly, for example, the obligations of[22] Administrators to appoint functional people responsible for supervising, monitoring and advising on the management of the information security system, i.e. Data Protection Officers.

They are appointed pursuant to Article 37 of the RODO, on the basis of their professional qualifications and, in particular, their expertise in data protection law and practice and their ability to fulfil the tasks incumbent upon them.[23]

This seems to be an insufficient regulation, which is devoid of standards supporting the decision to appoint a Data Protection Officer after prior verification and confirmation of relevant qualifications (e.g. obtained through formal education[24]) and experience within the defined specificity of the organisation. The lack of such regulation in practice translates into the appointment of people to the position of Data Protection Officer who often have completed short preparatory courses lasting a few hours in preparation for this function. In most cases, the only criterion that influences the selection of a candidate, especially in the public sector, is the lowest price, which obviously translates into the quality of the service provided. Thus, finances are prio ritised over real benefits and acting in accordance with the law, or simply over the responsible disposal of other people's personal data.

This aspect requires, above all, an understanding of the correlation between financial issues and the losses caused by negligence in this area. It is also important to change the attitude of entity managers and company boards to the issue of information protection and the application of legislation. Their lack of awareness in this regard very often results in them equating and making the Data Protection Officer responsible for fully relieving the management of their tasks and dealing with the unprepared area comprehensively, preferably without interfering in the day-to-day operation of the entity.

Ultimately, the road we are heading down, which is devoid of elementary assumptions for education and the formation of an information culture, instead of creating attitudes of an informed consumer of information, active, selective, critical and ready

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21   Babik, W., *W natłoku informacji i związanym z tym przeciążeniu informacyjnym*, Kraków 2010.
22   Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016, op. cit., art. 4 (7).
23   *Ibidem*, art. 37.
24   *On the Integrated Qualification System* Act of 22 December 2015, op. cit.

for the daily technological development of the surrounding world, will lead to information illiteracy and the "dumbing down" of society.

Videos and pictures, memes and emoticons are ubiquitous. The image has become a source of information and a vehicle for emotions, a medium that shapes our perception of the world. We read less and less, and if we do, we prefer to listen to an audiobook instead of a traditional book. In addition, however, we prefer to relax with a phone in our hand, scrolling for hours on a smartphone or tablet screen. A society that does not see the real world, only the digital.

Any form of public transport is a case in point; on buses most passengers use their smartphones or tablets. The same happens among pedestrians and, horror of horrors, among car drivers in traffic jams. They derive satisfaction and fulfilment from winning the games offered by the online world, to which young people devote a significant proportion of their time.

Conclusions

Noticing the deepening knowledge deficit in relation to the increasing scale of the use of new technologies, social deviations and relativism in the field of information security management, I believe that the current "trends" and attitudes to the essence of the discussed area, if deprived of some kind of sobriety, in the long run will lead to many pathologies, psychological problems and destruction of social relations. It will also lead to a lot of negligence, backlogs and absurd solutions in the field of information security management and problems in the application of legal regulations in organisations obliged to do so.

How can this be prevented? We absolutely need an appropriate supplement to the core curriculum and a thorough remodelling of the educational assumptions. These should include an outline of the protection of society's privacy and its potential dangers, criminal liability for the use of high-tech devices, anonymity on the web, the impact of social media on disruptions in social interaction (electronic aggression, pathostreaming, manipulation, hejt, etc.) and many others.

The education of society in this regard should be based on lifelong learning. According to this concept, the initial years of primary education should be regarded as one of the first links in a demanding educational process that will prepare the individual for further educational activity.

A systems approach could dramatically change this state of affairs and could be implemented on the basis of the following exemplary pillars, which represent the direction of the core issues:

Pillar I – Right to privacy
Pillar II – Right to the protection of personal data
Pillar III – Cyber security
Pillar IV – Public information
To do this you need staff with both knowledge and experience. Admittedly,

this knowledge can be gained in-house, based on private experience and indeed this is the case, but it is not sufficient. However, our goal, as an information-conscious society striving for constant evolution, should be to further educate the current workforce and to build the future workforce on the basis of an educational programme developed through a public discussion in which the relevant scientific communities and state organisations would be involved and, by extension, the creation of new institutionalised forms of education for children, young people and adults.

We are talking here about starting work on integrating the subject into formal education because it is not being addressed to a sufficient extent. This reveals a number of neglected issues, if only due to the fact that the information civilisation is a civilisation of rapid changes, and this implies the necessity to react efficiently to new conditions, for example work focusing on legal standards covering artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things and virtual reality. In a perspective of years, this would allow building an information society aware of both opportunities and threats and deliberately aspiring to be the 5.0 society.

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